Memory systems and the control of skilled action

ABSTRACT

In keeping with the dominant view that skills are largely automatic, the standard view of memory systems distinguishes between a representational declarative system associated with cognitive processes and a performance-based procedural system. The procedural system is thought to be largely responsible for the performance of well-learned skilled actions. Here we argue that most skills do not fully automate, which entails that the declarative system should make a substantial contribution to skilled performance. To support this view, we review evidence showing that the declarative system does indeed play a number of roles in skilled action.

KEYWORDS:

• Skill
• memory systems
• declarative
• procedural
• cognitive control
• motor control

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. At least in its most common form. Hybrid positions that combine representationalism and connectionism have been developed, and, indeed, Sutton (2015) adopted this kind of view.

2. For an extended case study from mountain biking which examined such scenarios in relation to affordance selection and anticipatory control, see Christensen and Bicknell (2018).

3. This follows Pacherie (2008) and Christensen et al. (2016).

4. We are not concerned here with capturing the specific details of Butterfill and Sinigaglia’s position, which focuses on the difficulty of understanding the interface between the two formats.

5. It is also worth noting that, over longer timescales, motor processes that are strongly automated can be brought under cognitive control with training. Both movement practitioners and rehabilitation specialists such as physiotherapists work with patients to intervene in and re-pattern both signature patterns of bodily tension and deeply automated motor processes, such as those involved in twisting the torso or swinging at the hip (Behnke, 1997; McIlwain & Sutton, 2014).

6. Keele and colleagues named these ‘unidimensional’ and ‘multidimensional’ systems, but we use the labels ‘modular’ and ‘nonmodular’ because modularity may be the more widely understood concept.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Wayne Christensen

Wayne Christensenis a Research Fellow at the University of Warwick.

John Sutton

John Sutton is Professor at Cognitive Science, Macquarie University.

Kath Bicknell

Kath Bicknell is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Cognitive Science, Macquarie University.