The political economy of industrial pollution control: environmental regulation in Swedish industry for five decades

Figures & data

Figure 1. Marginal Abatement Costs Associated with a Transition toward Deep Emission Reductions.

Table 1. Licensing processes for mining and metals projects during two regulatory systems.

	Time period	Description
Early System (1969–1998)
Boliden-Rönnskär	1974–1986	Production increase at the company’s metal smelter plant Rönnskär. This included the regulation of several pollutants, such as arsenic, cadmium, sulfur dioxide, and mercury.
Boliden-Laisvall	1974–1986	Production increase in the Laisvall mine (lead, zinc and silver) and in the nearby concentrating plant. The regulations concerned the discharges of mine water into one lake and of enrichment water into another lake.
LKAB-Kiruna	1975–1979	Production increase in the ore processing (pelletizing) plant in Kiruna. The emissions regulated include airborne dust, sulfur and fluorine.
Current System (1999–)
Boliden-Hötjärn	2004–2011	New tailings pond at Hötjärn supporting several mine operations by the company. Concerns emissions of metals into water, as well as acidifying and nitrogenous substances.
LKAB-Gruvberget	2008–2013	The opening of a new iron mine (Gruvberget), and where the licensing process came to focus on the appropriate scope of the environmental assessment.
Boliden-Rönnskär	2009–2014	Production increase at the company’s metal smelter plant Rönnskär. This included the regulation of several pollutants, not least sulfur dioxide.

Table 2. Questions guiding the screening of the empirical material.

Analytical concepts	Questions asked to the empirical material for each mining licensing process
Flexibility
What-flexibility (compliance strategies)	How have the licensing conditions been designed, e.g., the use of performance versus technology standards, including any provisional (temporary) standards? How were the decisions on the design of the licensing conditions motivated by the licensing authorities? How did the chosen standards affect the companies’ search for – and choice of – pollution abatement solutions?
When-flexibility (compliance and probation periods)	To what extent have compliance and probation periods been employed in the licensing conditions, including any extensions? How were the decisions to grant probation periods motivated by the licensing authorities, as well as influenced by the negotiations with the companies? How did the probation periods affect the companies’ search for – and choice of – pollution abatement solutions, including efforts to pursue technological innovation?
Predictability
Timeliness (licensing delays, e.g. due to appeals)	To what extent have the licensing processes been characterized by delays, and what has been the major cause of these delays? How have these delays affected the involved companies, and what measures (if any) have been undertaken to address the delays and their consequences?
Transparency (clarity regarding how the legal rules are interpreted)	To what extent have the licensing processes involved uncertainty and differences in opinion on how the legal rules should be interpreted and applied in each case? How have such unclarity affected the involved companies, and what measures have been undertaken to deal with uncertain interpretations of the legislation?
Know-how
Consensual negotiations (regulatory competence and negotiations on equal terms)	To what extent have the licensing processes involved continuous joint consultations between the regulatory authorities and the company? What has characterized these consultations and knowledge-sharing activities, not least in the presence of shared uncertainty about potential abatement technologies? How have the negotiations dealt with the task of balancing environmental versus economic outcomes, not least in the presence of uncertainty (e.g., about the legal interpretations)?

Table 3. Metal output and environmental emissions at the Rönnskär Smelter during 50 years.

		Emissions into air and water
	Metal production (kton per year)	Sulfur dioxide (S02) (kton per year)	Arsenic (As) (ton per year)	Copper (Cu) (ton per year)	Lead (Pb) (ton per year)	Mercury (Hg) (ton per year)
1967	119	36	2232	355	898	8.7
1972	136	46	1814	267	692	3.1
1977	136	28	815	236	251	1.5
1982	170	14	88	85	203	1.1
1987	192	11	20	53	75	0.4
1992	188	4.9	5.2	26	33	0.2
1997	213	3.3	1.1	7.0	7.8	0.15
2002	277	4.2	1.3	1.8	3.6	0.16
2007	277	4.2	1.2	1.7	2.8	0.10
2012	269	3.8	0.8	1.3	2.4	0.04
2018	285	3.5	0.3	1.5	2.5	0.02

Sources: Bergquist (2007), Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2019) and Boliden annual reports.

Table 4. Environmental regulation of swedish industry during two regulatory systems.

	Previous system (1969-1998)	Current system (1999 and onwards)
Key industrial pollution control legislation	Environmental Protection Act	Environmental Code
Regulatory arena	The Licensing Board for Environmental Protection (LBEP)	The Land and Environmental Courts (five courts distributed across the country)
Flexibility granted firms in identifying the measures to comply with regulations, and the time allowed for adjusting to new conditions.	Consistent use of performance standards allowed by existing BAT rather than technology standards. Frequent use of extended probation periods (2-5 years), as well as adaptation to existing market conditions.	Frequent use of performance standards (based on BAT) rather than technology standards. The legal rules permit extended probation periods, but these are generally shorter and used less frequently (compared to earlier).
Predictability with respect to the timeliness of the regulatory process, and the transparency regarding how the rules will be interpreted.	Licensing – and production – delays are generally not considered a key problem. Public participation relatively restricted. Expert-based and consensus-seeking dialogues implied less uncertainty about the final licensing conditions.	Frequent concerns over delays in licensing process, in part due to late appeals. Public participation important part of EIA. Concerns about unpredictable licensing conditions, including vague guidelines on how to interpret specific legal rules.
Know-how on the part of the regulatory authority about pollution abatement technologies and their costs.	Substantial regulatory knowledge about abatement opportunities, and an intense exchange of information among actors. Iterated and trust-based bargaining game involving repeated interactions between the key actors.	Concerns over lack of regulators’ technical competence and calls for expert-based and consensus-seeking regulatory approach. Regulatory approach more of a one-shot game, involving appeals, and limited joint investigations and knowledge transfer.

Figure 2. Designing and Implementing Efficient Environmental Licensing Processes: A Framework.

Bergquist, A. K. 2007. Guld och gröna skogar? Miljöanpassningen av Rönnskärsverken, 1960-2000. Umeå Studies in Economic History No. 36. Umeå, Sweden: Umeå University.

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Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. 2019. The Boliden Rönnskär smelter: Emissions. Accessed 12 August, 2019. http://utslappisiffror.naturvardsverket.se/Sok/Anlaggningssida/?pid=4505.

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