ABSTRACT
Studies of environmental enforcement in the United States focus on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) civil enforcement actions. We develop a fuller understanding of why the agency enforces through analysis of how and why they use criminal enforcement. We build a comprehensive dataset on the history of the EPA’s criminal enforcement investigations and related prosecutions, 1983–2019. Through content analysis of the agency’s case summaries, we analyze 2,588 cases to explain criminal prosecution outcomes, contrasting organizational culture, transaction costs, and principal-agent explanations for agency behavior. We find that an agency culture focusing on deterrence and punishment of more serious crimes drives outcomes more than costs or pressure. Our findings inform the ongoing debate concerning why the EPA enforces the law and how its organizational prerogatives persist in complex political environments.
Disclosure statement
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose and received no financial support from any funding agency.