Intra-allied competition and alliance durability: the case for promoting a division of labour among NATO allies

Abstract

This article suggests that the asymmetry of capabilities underlying the transatlantic partnership is NATO's main source of stability. Drawing on insights from mainstream political Realism, we stress the virtues of asymmetry (i.e. providing the allies with a wide bargaining space, increasing the cost of defiance and reducing intra-allied competition). The presence of these characteristics gives member states the incentive to prolong the convergence of their otherwise different political interests. In light of this theoretical model, we formulate some policy prescriptions. In particular, we argue that the USA and European countries should continue developing their own particular areas of expertise – i.e. implementing a functional division of labour. Therefore, contrary to widespread opinion, we conclude that the transatlantic military gap shall not be conceived as a burden, but rather as a key asset for the preservation of NATO's effectiveness.

Keywords:

• NATO
• alliance theory
• US defence policy

Acknowledgements

The first author wrote sections 2 and 3. The second author wrote section 1. The introduction and conclusion were written by both authors. An earlier version of this paper was presented at The 2009 Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference, Canterbury, UK, 13–16 July 2009. The authors wish to thank all the participants for their comments and suggestions. Particular thanks are also due to Andrea Carati and the two anonymous reviewers of European Security for their thorough remarks to a previous version of the article. Final thanks to Melissa Morgante, for her assistance in the making of the article.

Notes

1. As we do not want to participate in the long and unproductive debate over the structure of the post-bipolar international system, we opt for Huntington's famous phrase, namely a ‘system with one superpower and several major powers’ (see Huntington 1999, p. 36, along this line, see also Buzan 2004).

2. Though our theoretical framework is based on ‘hard’ realist assumptions, we are aware that other non-material variables (i.e. norms, values and identities) are of a great importance in explaining the persistence and the rationale of today's NATO (in particular, see Moore 2002).

3. In his attempt to explain the European foreign policy integration process from a realist perspective, Posen (2006) finds as a driving force the European attempt to become autonomous from the USA.

4. It should also be recalled that the Europeans are split over Russia's great power status. As a result, differently from the USA, the UK or Poland, states like Germany and Italy appear to inform their relationship with Moscow with a higher degree of diplomatic prudence. However, it is beyond our purposes to discuss whether this line of action is driven by perceived weakness or political wisdom.

5. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is in many ways confusing. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was originally deployed as a defensive peace-keeping mission, but soon developed as a counter-insurgency operation. Also, contrary to previous operations, it experienced both quantitative and territorial expansion. This makes it hard to classify the mission as low or high intensity. And yet, regardless of the disputes on burden sharing, unity and cooperation among allies still remain high (for a discussion of these problems, see Carati 2009, pp. 30–33).

6. The Iraqi crisis is admittedly just the tip of the iceberg. The USA and Europe (and even states across Europe) display different approaches on a variety of issues, like the Arab–Israel conflict, Russia and NATO enlargement, just to name a few.