Russia and the role of the OSCE in European security: a ‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interests?

Abstract

This essay explores Russia's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) policy, by focusing on two questions. First of all, analysts have noted Russia's disinterest and obstructive policies towards the Organization. Thus, the question is what – if anything – does the Russian Federation still want from the OSCE? Secondly, does the OSCE still serve as a forum for dialog? These two issues are studied on the basis of rational institutionalism and realism. The essay demonstrates that Russia is still interested in the OSCE, but its policy has become more pragmatic, selective and instrumentalist. It includes obstructive and constructive strategies. At the same time, today the Russian Federation ascribes less significance to the Organization in European security. This is predetermined not only by its inability to push its interests through the OSCE, but also by the declining interest of other participating States in the Organization. The differences between OSCE participants have turned it into a battlefield of interests in many areas.

Keywords:

• Russian foreign policy
• Russian–Western relations
• OSCE

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Wolfgang Zellner for his helpful comments on the earlier versions of this article as well as to Frank Evers, Ursel Schlichting and Manuela Pollack for their support during the research. Furthermore, I very much appreciate the valuable comments, which I received from David J. Galbreath and two anonymous reviewers. My special thanks go also to Elizabeth Hormann, who made my English more eloquent. The first version of this article was presented at the BISA Working Group on Russian and Eurasian security workshop in June 2011.

Notes

1. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was institutionalized into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) by a decision of the Budapest Summit in December 1994. For convenience, I will use the term ‘OSCE’ in general.

2. Translations from Russian throughout the text have been made by the author.

3. For more details on rational institutionalism as well as on other ways to study IGOs as autonomous collective actors and as regimes or ‘socializing’ institutions see: Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Linden (2002), Simmons and Martin (2002) and Tavares (2010).

4. For more information see: http://www.osce.org/press/66529.

5. Such as, for instance, in the case of Russian Istanbul commitments. For more detailed analysis of evolution, strengths and weaknesses of the OSCE see, for instance: Galbreath (2007), Hopmann (2009)), Lynch (2009) and Zellner et al. (2007).

6. See also: The Foreign Policy Concept of the RF (2008). Available from: http://www.mid.ru. [Accessed 15 July 2011].

7. Multilateralism can mean a ‘cooperative activity among many countries’ (Caporaso 1992, p. 603) or a morale-political category/principle or a rational strategy: Bourantonis et al. (2008), Doran (2010) and Milner and Ruggie (1993).

8. On the evolution of Russian foreign policy see, for instance: Legvold (2007), Mankoff (2009), Trenin (2010), Thorun (2009) and Tsygankov (2010).

9. See: Bogaturov (2010), Dugin (2009), Shakleina (2003).

10. See: Lavrov urges OSCE to ‘return to its roots, 15 February 2007, available from http://www.interfax.com/3/242030/news.aspx [Accessed 15 May 2011].

11. See the report by Panel of Eminent Persons: ‘Common Purpose. Towards a More Effective OSCE’. 2005. Available from http://www.osce.org/cio/15805. [Accessed 15 July 2011].

12. For more information on Russia's CSCE policy see: Hurlburt (1995) and Zagorski (1997).

13. OSCE. Istanbul Document. Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1999, pp. 119–235, Annex 14 of the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on CFE, CFE.DOC/2/99.

14. CSCE. Concluding document, the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the CSCE, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the conference, here p. 13.

15. Istanbul Document. Agreement on Adaptation.

16. Konstantin Kosachev, head of Duma's Committee for International Affairs, cited in Permyakov (2007).

17. More details on events after 2007 in: Lachowski (2009), Schmidt and Zellner (2009).

18. Author's interviews in the OSCE in May 2011.

19. Cf. the draft of the EST, 29 November 2009, http://www.kremlin.ru. See also: Dunay and Herd (2010), East-West Institute (2009), Karaganov and Bordachev (2009), Lukyanov (2009) and Monaghan (2010). More on Corfu Process in: Lynch (2010).

20. See: Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1993, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, January, 1993, 3–23.

21. The Foreign Policy Concept of the RF 2008.

22. OSCE, Summit Meeting, Astana 2010, “Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community”, SUM.DOC/1/10, 3 December 2010, at: http://www.osce.org/mc.73962.

23. Alexey Venediktov, in Radio Program ‘Perehvat’, Echo Moskvy, 4 December 2010, http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/interception/731268-echo/ [Accessed 15 July 2011].

24. See: Medvedev: Posledniy sammit pokazal ‘opredelennuyu bespomoshnost’’ OBSE, Korrespondent.net, 7 December 2010, http://korrespondent.net/world/1146623-medvedev-poslednij-sammit-pokazal-opredelennuyu-bespomoshchnost-obse.

25. Interview with Dmitri Danilov, Head of the Department of European Security, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, 2008.

26. For more details on the issue see: Galbreath (2006); Dorodnova (2003).

27. See: OSCE Magazine (2008), 3, pp. 8–13; ICG (2008a); ICG (2008b).

28. Interview with Mark Entin, Director of the Institute of European Law, MGIMO, 25 August 2009, Moscow.

29. NATO does not have a unified consolidated position within the OSCE.

30. For example, see: Statement by CIS Member Countries on the State of Affairs in the OSCE, Moscow, 3 July 2004; Appeal of the CIS Member States to the OSCE Partners, Astana, 15 September 2004. Available at: http://www.osce.org.

31. See, for example: Statement by Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the CSTO, at the Second OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, 23/24 June 2004. Available from: http://www.osce.org/cpc/34399. [Accessed 15 July 2011].

32. See: ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [Accessed 15 July 2011]. See also: Jorgensen (2009), Kissack (2010).

33. Interviews in Vienna in May 2011.

34. Interviews in Vienna in May 2011.

35. For more information on the ‘positive overlap and cooperation’ and ‘negative overlap and conflict’ in the OSCE's relations with the EU (as well as some other IGOs) see: Galbreath and Gebhard (2010), Galbreath (2007), pp. 15–23); Peters (2004).