The Common Security and Defence Policy as an act of American hegemony

Abstract

This article argues that rather than being an emancipatory step for the EU, the Common Security and Defence Policy in its current format represents a continuation of US strategic hegemony. Using a neo-Gramscian model of hegemony, by considering both civilian and military aspects of CSDP, the article shows how US ability to export its strategic doctrine to EU member states is undiminished. It argues that respect for US military achievements is a key reason for this, but that this may lead EU states to make poor strategic decisions, which moreover may lack political and public legitimacy.

Keywords:

• CSDP
• EU-US relations
• hegemony
• strategy
• legitimacy

Notes

1. For reasons of space, the differences between the three generations are not discussed in detail but used to put our argument on hegemony into a strategic culture setting – for more in-depth discussions of the differences, see Johnston (1995b), Lock (2010) and Neumann (2005).

2. Neo-Gramscian understandings of hegemony are not synonymous with those of Gramsci himself or of classical Marxism. Gramsci combined a commitment to historical materialism with a historicist methodology, which some viewed as a rejection of classical Marxism. Neo-Gramscian scholars have applied Gramsci's thought (which dealt with the challenges of statism) to international relations, and have been criticised for doing so. Nevertheless, their understanding of hegemony is helpful to unpack the USA–EU relationship on security and defence. See Germain and Kenny (1998) for an extensive discussion of these issues.

3. It is interesting that despite clear European unhappiness on the part of both states and people about some aspects of US military policy (notably the invasion of Iraq in 2003), opposition to NATO membership remains marginalised in its member states.

4. See inter alia Gheciu (2005) and Flockhart (2004).

5. For an example of this lobbying in practice, see European Commission (2004).