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Abstract
Drawing upon the Foucauldian approach of governmentality, this article argues that the democratic deficit of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the outcome of how governmental power flows in CSDP governance and more precisely within the governance practices of the policy. To support this argument, the narrative explores the secrecy/confidentiality, informality and normalisation of the exercise of governmental power in a concrete example of CSDP governance, the recent pooling and sharing initiative. The example shows that the official makers of CSDP pursue efficiency of governance to the detriment of the democratic quality of the policy, and this is related with the productive and expansive rationality of governmental power flowing in and between the EU institutions. Despite the fact that governmentality usually links to structural explanations, allowing limited space for the role of agency in politics, the article concludes with reflections on how the political agency of the governing EU political subjects contributes to the social construction of the democratic deficit of CSDP.
Notes on contributor
Evangelos Fanoulis is Graduate Instructor of European Integration and European Politics at the University of Essex, Department of Government, where he has recently submitted his PhD thesis. Having previously received training at the EU Commission and the EEAS, he has been Research Officer for the European Commission FP7 (Seventh Framework Programme) ANVIL (Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe) project. His main research interests lie within EU democracy, CFSP, CSDP and civil security.
Notes
1. Referring to Foucault's genealogical method and how the latter unravels power relations in systems of knowledge, Howarth mentions about Foucault ‘His genealogical investigations display the contingent and ignoble origins of such systems, whilst stressing the role of power and conflict in forging identities, rules, and social forms’ (Howarth Citation2009, p. 315).
2. A more narrow perception of defence as a concept is adopted by authors focusing on the strategic perspective of CSDP such as Howorth (Citation2007), Hyde-Price (Citation2007) and Biscop and Coelmont (Citation2012).
3. Such a broad understanding of defence complies with the broad perception of security by European security governance experts. See, for example, Kirchner and Sperling (Citation2007).
4. Generally speaking, whenever I use the term ‘population’, it is always in its Foucauldian, biopolitical meaning.
5. Bigo (Citation2008, p. 96) generally prefers the untranslatable collocation ‘security dispositif’.
6. Foucault has never been very explicit about the circumstances under which biopower turns into governmental power. In Society Must Be Defended and Security, Territory, Population, he prefers the term biopower whereas from the Birth of Biopolitics onwards he tends to use the term governmental power.
7. Citing Foucault (Citation2007, p. 94), ‘whoever wants to be able to govern the state must first know how to govern himself’. If the juridical system is sovereignty's basic field of action contra governmentality that operates upon the historical contingency of power relations, Valverde (Citation2008, p. 149) correctly underlines that such a juxtaposition does not necessarily render the two conceptions ‘mutually exclusive alternatives’.
8. I am not going to analyse here the context and content details of St. Malo Agreements. For those interested in more information about the diplomatic backstage of St. Malo meeting, see Howorth and Keeler (Citation2003, pp. 10–12). Also, Hill and Smith (Citation2000, pp. 450–456) provide the full text of conclusions from the Helsinki European Council.
9. For the different security perceptions of the EU MS, see Kirchner (Citation2007, pp. 129–131).
10. For a brief explanation of the Foucauldian term ‘subject position’, see Howarth (Citation2000, p. 53).
11. A qualified majority voting ‘shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications’. Paragraph 4, Article 31, Section 1, Chapter 3, Title V of the Treaty on European Union.
12. In accordance with Dean (Citation2010, p. 125).
13. Paragraph 1, Article 31, Section 1, Chapter 3, Title V of the Treaty on European Union. In the post-Lisbon era, the same productive logic applies for the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), according to which a group of MS can intensify their cooperation under CSDP. Decisions for initiating a PESCO are to be taken by the participant countries with Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and not with unanimity, pointing again towards a governmental urge for policy outcomes.
14. See Foucault (Citation2007, p. 108).