ABSTRACT
This article argues that the European Union’s capacity to use an operational instrument for the purpose of an articulated objective constitutes an important, but conceptually neglected and empirically underexplored, element of its actorness. In order to fill this gap, the article introduces the concept of strategic capacity and develops an analytical framework for systematic empirical assessments thereof. Drawing on 22 qualitative expert interviews, the framework is applied to the EU’s maritime operation against human smugglers in the Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia). The article finds that the EU so far has displayed a fairly low degree of strategic capacity in its fight against human smugglers. The article argues that this fairly low degree of strategic capacity is not to be ascribed to an institutional apparatus that is unfit for strategic action, but a decision on the part of political decision-makers to give weight to symbolic, as opposed to strategic, action. As a result, the operation has contributed little to the formal objective of disrupting and dismantling human smuggling networks in the Central Mediterranean. In some areas, it has even had an adverse effect on this objective.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Anne Ingemann Johansen is a Ph.D. Fellow at Roskilde University’s Institute for Society and Business. She holds a Bachelor’s and a Master’s in Political Science from the University of Southern Denmark. During her Ph.D. studies, she has been a visiting scholar at the Institute for European Studies at Vrije University in Brussels. Before joining Roskilde University, she worked as a research assistant at the Centre for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark focusing on the EU as a military actor. Her Ph.D. research is situated in the fields of strategic studies, maritime security and EU studies. It focuses on how the division of authority and autonomy between the EU and the Member States in the areas of Police Cooperation, External Border Control and Security and Defence is affecting the Union’s strategic capacity in fighting human smuggling in the Central Mediterranean. The research performs a comparative case study of three operational instruments (Europol’s Jot Mare, Frontex’s Operation Triton and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia). The purpose of the research is to contribute to our understanding the impact of institutional frameworks on the EU’s strategic capacity.
Notes
1 There is a list of the interviews at the end of this contribution.
2 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016; interview (12) with EUMC representative, February 2016; interview (13) with official from the Cabinet of the High Representative, April 2016; interview (9) with PSC official, April 2016; interview (11) with Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 2017.
3 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016; interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016; interview (12) with EUMC representative, February 2016; interview (8) with PMG member, May 2016.
4 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016.
5 EEAS (2015) 696 REV 2; interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016; Interview (12) with EUMC representative, February 2016.
6 Interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016.
7 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016.
8 Interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016.
9 Interview (8) with PMG official, May 2016.
10 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016.
11 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016.
12 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016; interview (8) with PMG member, May 2016, interview (14) with official from OHQ, August 2016; interview (15) with official from OHQ, August 2016.
13 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016; interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016; interview (14) with official from OHQ, August 2016.
14 Interview (8) with PMG official, May 2016.
15 The Military Strategic Option (MSO) details the military-strategic objectives related to the end-state of the military operation and specifies the military course of action as well as the resources and assets that are necessary in order to achieve the desired end. It also includes an assessment of feasibility and risk and an outline for a possible Command and Control structure (Mattelaer Citation2010).
16 Interview (13) with official from the cabinet of the HR, April 2016; interview with EEAS official, May 2016.
17 Interview (3) with EEAS official, March 2017.
18 Interview (11) with a European Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 2017.
19 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016; interview (10) with PSC representative, April 2016.
20 Interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016; interview (10) with PSC representative, April 2016.
21 In the initial phase of force sensing, EUMS issues calls for contributions from Member States in order to acquire sufficient assets and resources to carry out the operation.
22 Interview (7) with EEAS official, May 2016.
23 The principal difference between the two activities is that smuggled people have a consensual relationship with their smugglers and are not exploited after they reach their end destination, whereas this is not the case for trafficked persons. Human smuggling is furthermore always a transnational activity, whereas this does not have to be the case with trafficking.
24 Interview (8) with PMG official, May 2016.
25 Interview (11) with Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 2017.
26 Interview with (9) PMG official, May 2016.
27 Interview (1) with EEAS official, March 2016.
28 Interview (15) with official from the OHQ, August 2016.
29 Interview (2) with EEAS official June 2016, interview (9) with PMG official, May 2016.
30 Interview (22) with Italian prosecutor, February 2017.
31 Interview (22) with Italian prosecutor, February 2017.
32 Interview (22) with Italian prosecutor, February 2017.