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ABSTRACT
Although the Copenhagen school’s securitisation theory and their sectoral analysis are integral parts of European security studies, the school’s economic sector of security has almost been completely ignored. In this article I examine why this is, and whether it makes sense to retain this sector. In the process I flesh out the logic of securitisation in the economic sector. I suggest that one reason why the economic sector of security has been neglected is that real life examples fitting the Copenhagen school’s logic of security as the exception have – in this sector – remained outstanding. Research in other sectors of security has shown however that securitisation does not need to include extraordinary countermeasures; instead it can play out below the level of the exception. Using alternative formulations developed in securitisation studies that relax the threshold for the success of securitisation, I attempt to locate evidence of economic securitisation by looking at two empirical cases. 1) Russia’s economic blackmail of Ukraine at the start of that country’s ongoing crisis. 2) The EU’s conditional bailout of Cyprus during the Eurozone crisis which necessitated capital controls. On the basis of the empirical evidence gathered I conclude by arguing the case for the economic sector of security.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Mark Webber for extensive comments on an earlier version of this paper and Jonathan Floyd for many helpful discussions about this paper. My thanks also to Christian Kaunert for his encouragement for persevering with this article, and to Philippe Bourbeau Thierry Balzacq and Ian Paterson for some much appreciated last minute help.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Dr Rita Floyd is a Lecturer in Conflict and Security at the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham (UK). Her work on securitisation theory, environmental security and IR theory has appeared in a number of peer-reviewed journals including most recently in the Review of International Studies. Her monograph The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitisation is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press in 2019.
Notes
1. Securitisation theory holds that security threats do not simply exist “out there”, but rather security is a highly political process with issues turned into security threats through a sequence of events usually involving a securitising actor, a securitising speech act/securitising move (whereby a securitising actor declares a particular referent object threatened in its existence unless urgent action is taken right away), the audience (which has to “accept” the threat narrative contained in the securitising move), and extraordinary measures (the breaking of established rules) in order to deal with a (perceived) threat.
2. A recent review article on securitisation theory highlights this well considering that its comprehensive examination of empirical applications of the theory does not mention the economic sector of security (Balzacq et al. Citation2016).
3. This question is particularly pertinent given that other sectors of security are vying for prominence (see below), while securitisation scholars, who generally are sceptical of the proliferation of securitisation, are interested in retraining the number of sectors of security (e.g. Albert and Buzan Citation2011).
4. By the EU I mean specifically: The European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup
5. The IMF paid just 10% of the overall sum, which is why in the remainder of the article I short-hand to EU bailout
6. Albeit not necessarily existential fear, but – as in the Russian case – fear that expansionist ambitions are scuppered.
7. The CS argues:
Securitisation is not fulfilled only by the breaking of rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules. Still, we have a problem of size and significance. Many actions can take this form on a small scale [… a] successful securitisation thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules. (Buzan et al. Citation1998, pp. 25–26, emphases added, see also p. 101)
8. I do not wish to suggest that the CS is categorically wrong, there surely are cases of securitisation that obey the logic of exception close to, or even in line with, the CS; my claim is rather that ignoring the logic of routine is inaccurate.
9. To be clear, this table does not summarise instances of securitisation, but only the kind of threats, referent objects etc. mentioned by the CS in their chapter on this sector.
10. The same is true if one understands the securitising move as an illocutionary speech act that does not depend on audience acceptance.
11. Each chapter on sectors specifies subheadings pertaining to Security Actors and Referent Objects and The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities, while countermeasures do not feature.
12. Criteria for the “mere” existence of securitisation remain with audience acceptance largely the same.
13. This has been a challenge for those approaches to securitisation that focus on “little security nothings” that when taken together add up to securitisation. Indeed Huysmans as a key proponent has found it necessary to re-introduce the notion of acts (as acts of rupture), as otherwise the onset of securitisation is impossible to locate (Huysmans Citation2011, pp. 378–380).
14. For example, when a democratically elected government has made a security-based promise to the electorate it wishes to observe.
15. Up 12.6 percentage points compared with first quarter 2012, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5160926/2-22072013-AP-EN.PDF/6c3a56f5-a425-473a-bd03-b837c371fa98.
16. In July 2013 this levy was set at 47.5%.
17. The CS consider securitisation of non-existential threats legitimate, provided non-securitisation would trigger chain reactions that are existentially threatening to the entire system (cf. Buzan et al. Citation1998, pp. 107–108).
18. Notably on the 17th of March 2013, in a televised address to the nation Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades said he “had no choice” but to accept the deal, the alternative being bankruptcy see here https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/cypriot-president-says-he-was-forced-to-accept-eu-bailout/.
19. Both of these authors set thresholds for when securitisation succeeds. While securitisation will sometimes involve the granting of new executive powers stressed by Salter, as a general proposition such a requirement seems too demanding and static. Léonard’s threshold is more promising, however, we can see that there is a problem with analysts setting thresholds when we consider that her theory would not be able to account for a further incidence of capital controls in the Eurozone. Indeed, Léonard’s requirement of “newness” was the reason why her theory failed to detect securitisation in the Russian case. Overall, “out of the ordinary” is perhaps better conceived as “rarely done” or “not normally done”. And indeed, at one point Léonard herself suddenly defines “out of the ordinary” as “never or rarely applied previously” (Citation2010, p. 238). Unless this is a slip in precision, this change is very likely necessitated because the earlier definition is too demanding to reliably pinpoint the securitisation of migration and asylum in the EU (i.e. Léonard’s focus in the relevant article).