Unwanted participation? Defector public diplomacy in South Korea

ABSTRACT

The controversy surrounding defector balloon launches into North Korea is often viewed as a bizarre example of Cold War legacies on the Korean peninsula. However, it is also a unique case study of non-state public diplomacy because these groups are attempting to engage in cross-border communication against the wishes of their host government. This article argues that South Korea’s unique interpretation of public diplomacy as a participatory activity has proven vulnerable to non-state organisations with divergent views of the national interest, which has resulted in two different types of public diplomacy being directed at North Korea. Subsequent attempts by the South Korean government to control the dissonant public diplomacy of non-state groups resulted in reputational costs for both sides and ultimately failed to prevent defectors from advancing their claim to a human right to communicate across national borders. Even though this case study broadly supports a polylateral interpretation of public diplomacy, it cautions that human rights discourses may obscure the fact that the traditional diplomatic system was designed to mitigate many of the risks associated with non-state diplomatic actors. Therefore, this paper suggests the need for more discussion about the consequences of a right to communicate across national borders.

KEYWORDS:

• Public diplomacy
• defectors
• North Korea
• participatory diplomacy
• propaganda

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Indeed, Schwak observes that this embrace of nation branding in South Korea was driven by a powerful ‘competitive imaginary’ among Korean policymaking and economic elites. This strong focus on competition, it should be noted, is more likely to lead to power-centric approaches to public diplomacy rather than transformative ones.

2 For example, the US State Department combines foreign and domestic responsibilities in the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

3 To give some idea of this diversity, the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCK) is an umbrella organisation representing fifty-five humanitarian NGOs and has enjoyed a close working relationship with the progressive administration of Moon Jae-in. Balloon launching groups, on the other hand, are not members of the KNCCK but participate in the more conservative North Korean Freedom Coalition, a human rights advocacy network.

4 This move was justified under Article 38 of the Civil Act (2013), which stipulates that if any non-profit operates ‘outside the scope of its purpose … or engages in acts harming public interests, the competent authorities may cancel the permission.’

5 Article 5(f) of the Act on Collection and Use of Donations (2017) permits groups or individuals to receive donations to facilitate peace-building or unification between South and North Korea, but Article 9 stipulates that recipients’ financial records and registration documents are subject to government inspections.

6 The South Korean government also engaged in public diplomacy to protect its reputation. For example, on December 17, shortly after the passage of the law, South Korea’s foreign minister Kang Kyung-wha went on CNN and defended the ban on balloon launches as a justified restriction on the freedom of expression in the interests of public safety (Korea Public Diplomacy 2020).

7 According to Abduazimov (2017) this acceptance of polycentrism by the Korean government started in the early 2000s.

8 Speaking in the case of Indonesia, Huijgh (2016, 28) has noted that ‘including a domestic dimension in public diplomacy is a labyrinthine exercise, as dealing with identity pluralism and diversity governance lies at the core of this ambition.’

9 For a more on accountability challenges of non-state diplomatic actors see Ayhan (2018b).

10 An illustrative example of this harmful quasi-diplomacy by non-state actors is Mark Davis' (2019, 135) research on the emergence of a transnational anti-public sphere consisting of Australian, US, and European far-right groups who collaborate to ‘marshal public opinion and build their communities of identification on a global stage beyond any single sovereign authority and to some extent out of reach of lawmakers and police.’

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Daniel Connolly

Daniel Connolly is Assistant Professor at the Division of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. His research and teaching interests are broadly focused on the history of international relations, human rights activism, and the security and political implications of new technologies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. His recent publications have appeared in Asian Survey, New Political Economy, and Asian Perspective.