Notes
1 In fact, even regardless the level of trust, the dichotomy between “constructive” and “destructive” emotions is not as clear-cut as the proposed framework implies. For example, anger may increase group members’ engagement in collective action to reduce group inequality (Iyer & Leach, Citation2009; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, Citation2008). As such, it may be highly constructive (rather than destructive) for promotion of positive peace, namely, the promotion of social arrangements that eliminate group-based inequalities (Christie et al., Citation2008). At the opposite end, feelings of responsibility for the Nazis’ wrongdoings might lead to the experience of “Holocaust fatigue” and even secondary anti-Semitism among Germans (see Imhoff & Banse, Citation2009). Thus, at a certain point, the experience of collective guilt might become deconstructive for reconciliation.
2 Admittedly, Čehajić-Clancy et al. initially state that their framework refers only to the postviolent phase of intergroup conflicts, which “takes place mostly after the formal disagreements have already been addressed (during the conflict resolution phase)” (p. 3; see Christie et al., Citation2008; Kelman, Citation2008; and Lederach, 1995, for the distinction between different phases of intergroup conflicts). However, much of the reviewed research refers to conflicts in their violent phase, and the terminology is switched to discuss “(post)conflict contexts” (e.g., p. 74 in the target article).
3 In fact, on p. 84 of the target article, Čehajić-Clancy et al. state that they “do not wish to argue that specific interventions are only exclusively aimed at regulating one specific emotion”—but in this case, the effects of emotion regulation strategies should be discussed, as we argue, in terms of general changes in emotional orientation rather than in terms of changes to specific/discrete emotions.