ABSTRACT
Is the contemporary global order under threat? This contribution weighs the case for and against the notion that we are witnessing an existential challenge to the contemporary global order. We show that there are grounds for optimism with respect to the endurance of the first two ordering principles of the contemporary global order: a state-led global order and economic liberalism, because states remain key actors in the current world order and because overall support for economic liberalism remains strong. However, we see greater challenges to the procedural principle of inclusive, rule-based multilateralism, such as unilateral disintegration challenges and rising popular scepticism about international institutions that provide considerable reasons to worry about the future of the global order. Yet, given that the global order has proven robust time and again in the past, we see some reasons for cautious optimism overall, despite considerable risks.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 (a) illustrates the stock of outstanding claims and liabilities of internationally active banks against counterparties in more than 200 countries, a good proxy for overall levels of cross-border activity in the global financial system. See: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1509e.htm.
3 It also clearly undermines the principle of political liberalism, which some scholars also see as a core principle of the ‘liberal international order.’
4 Switzerland will hold a referendum in 2020 whose approval would force the Swiss government to renegotiate or terminate the Swiss-EU bilateral treaty on free movement of people, which risks putting the entire institutional framework of Swiss-EU bilateral relations into question.
5 Although not always successfully, as the recent decision by the Austrian government not to ratify the EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement shows.
6 A notable exception is WTO, which has however faced accumulating problems have been accumulating over the past fifteen years.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Mark Copelovitch
Mark Copelovitch is Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin – Madison.
Sara B. Hobolt
Sara B. Hobolt is professor and the Sutherland Chair in European Institutions at the Department of Government at the London School of Economics
Stefanie Walter
Stefanie Walter is professor for international relations and political economy at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich.