Public attitudes toward external democracy promotion in Africa

Figures & data

Figure 1. Percentage approval of external democracy promotion.

Table 1. Public approval of external democracy promotion in Africa.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Individual-level
Election history	0.188*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.191*** (0.07)
Democrat	0.085** (0.04)	0.086** (0.041)	0.086** (0.041)	0.085** (0.041)	0.085** (0.041)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.002 (0.024)	−0.001 (0.024)	−0.001 (0.024)	−0.001 (0.024)	−0.001 (0.024)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Female = 1	−0.045*** (0.017)	−0.045*** (0.017)	−0.045*** (0.017)	−0.045*** (0.017)	−0.045*** (0.017)
Higher education	−0.011 (0.042)	−0.01 (0.042)	−0.01 (0.042)	−0.009 (0.042)	−0.009 (0.042)
Country-level
Attempted coups		0.049** (0.024)
Successful coups			0.11*** (0.039)
Neighbours’ attempted coups				0.017** (0.007)
Neighbours’ successful coups					0.027** (0.011)
Democracy		0.262* (0.138)	0.259** (0.117)	0.373*** (0.101)	0.343*** (0.107)
Democratic neighbours		0.731*** (0.222)	0.687*** (0.21)	0.796*** (0.208)	0.769*** (0.203)
Regime corruption		0.082 (0.418)	0.097 (0.326)	0.36 (0.3)	0.364 (0.298)
Intercept	−0.540*** (0.0932)	−1.135*** (0.257)	−1.155*** (0.221)	−1.443*** (0.177)	−1.375*** (0.189)
Variance (Country)	0.201*** (0.0538)	0.128*** (0.043)	0.101*** (0.025)	0.113*** (0.034)	0.114*** (0.037)

Notes. N: 43,286 respondents (36 countries) for all models. Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Figure 2. Election history and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals. The figure is based on estimates from Model 1 of Table 1.

Figure 3. Coups and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4. Neighbourhood coups and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5. Election history and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion for ruling party trusters and nontrusters. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6. Election assessment and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 7. Election history components and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 8. Recent coup activity and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 9. Military rule and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 10. Military rule in neighbourhood and predicted probabilities of public approval of external democracy promotion. Notes. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.

Table

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democracy promotion	0.377	0.485	0	1
Election history	−0.092	0.736	−2.092	2.799
Unfair tallying	1.232	1.092	0	3
Barred opposition	0.797	0.949	0	3
Unfair media	1.394	1.038	0	3
Voter bribing	1.469	1.087	0	3
Fake choice	1.037	1.04	0	3
Election violence	0.829	0.98	0	3
Election assessment	1.971	1.059	1	4
Ruling party trust	0.251	0.433	0	1
Democrat	0.742	0.438	0	1
Democracy satisfaction	2.39	1.033	0	4
Age	37.265	14.539	18	105
Female = 1	0.503	0.5	0	1
Higher education	0.158	0.365	0	1
Attempted coups	3.535	3.631	0	14
Successful coups	1.823	2.184	0	7
Neighbours’ attempted coups	14.841	11.6	0	42
Neighbours’ successful coups	7.443	7.028	0	26
Attempted coups (since 2003)	2.645	2.669	0	11
Successful coups (since 2003)	1.312	1.645	0	6
Military period	1.468	1.821	0	6
Past military rule neighbours	0.438	0.369	0	1
Democracy	0.444	0.497	0	1
Democratic neighbours	0.355	0.289	0	1
Regime corruption	0.588	0.233	0.145	0.932

Table A1. The conditional effect of election history on approval of external democracy promotion.

	(1)
Election history	0.240***
	(0.0783)
Ruling party trust =1	0.0903
	(0.0568)
Election history# Ruling party trust	−0.115**
	(0.0534)
Democrat	0.0799*
	(0.0413)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.0107
	(0.0252)
Age	−0.00116
	(0.00121)
Female = 1	−0.0403**
	(0.0190)
Higher education	0.0117
	(0.0428)
Constant	−0.595***
	(0.0940)
Variance (Country)	0.161***
	(0.0351)
Observations	39,707
Countries	33

Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Table A2. Assessment of recent elections and approval of external democracy promotion.

	(1)
Election assessment	0.0806***
	(0.0267)
Democrat	0.0787*
	(0.0425)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.0176
	(0.0272)
Age	−0.00125
	(0.00119)
Female = 1	−0.0447**
	(0.0197)
Higher education	−0.00323
	(0.0435)
Constant	−0.675***
	(0.108)
Variance (Country)	0.187***
	(0.0511)
Observations	40,142
Countries	36

Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Table A3. The effect of Election History components on approval of external democracy promotion.

	Unfair tallying	Barred opposition	Unfair media	Voter bribing	Fake choice	Election violence
Election history component	0.0734**	0.0819***	0.0202	0.0170	0.0575**	0.0780***
	(0.0297)	(0.0292)	(0.0279)	(0.0231)	(0.0267)	(0.0273)
Democrat	0.0780*	0.0761*	0.0851*	0.0719*	0.0872**	0.0920**
	(0.0410)	(0.0431)	(0.0439)	(0.0426)	(0.0418)	(0.0427)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.0173	−0.0292	−0.0363	−0.0374	−0.0321	−0.0342
	(0.0274)	(0.0294)	(0.0298)	(0.0289)	(0.0305)	(0.0297)
Age	−0.00145	−0.00126	−0.00157	−0.00147	−0.00151	−0.00119
	(0.00120)	(0.00125)	(0.00120)	(0.00114)	(0.00119)	(0.00121)
Female = 1	−0.048***	−0.052***	−0.051***	−0.052***	−0.05***	−0.05***
	(0.0182)	(0.0187)	(0.0186)	(0.0192)	(0.0182)	(0.0183)
Higher education	0.00674	−0.00832	−0.00351	−0.0123	−0.00472	0.00747
	(0.0466)	(0.0479)	(0.0444)	(0.0431)	(0.0435)	(0.0437)
Variance (Country)	0.180***	0.187***	0.188***	0.188***	0.188***	0.186***
	(0.0505)	(0.0538)	(0.0517)	(0.0524)	(0.0527)	(0.0534)
Constant	−0.602***	−0.541***	−0.483***	−0.477***	−0.533***	−0.546***
	(0.0968)	(0.0925)	(0.102)	(0.0915)	(0.0956)	(0.0982)
Observations	40,964	40,260	40,394	40,541	41,631	41,111
Countries	36	36	36	36	36	36

Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Table A4. Recent cumulative coups and public approval of external democracy promotion.

	(1)	(2)
Election history	0.191***	0.191***
	(0.0698)	(0.0698)
Democrat	0.0853**	0.0855**
	(0.0405)	(0.0405)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.000956	−0.000841
	(0.0236)	(0.0237)
Age	−0.00105	−0.00105
	(0.00113)	(0.00113)
Female = 1	−0.0447***	−0.0448***
	(0.0170)	(0.0170)
Higher education	−0.00934	−0.00958
	(0.0422)	(0.0422)
Coups since 2003
- Attempts	0.0518**
	(0.0202)
- Successes		0.0816**
		(0.0366)
Democracy	0.316***	0.329***
	(0.118)	(0.116)
Democratic neighbours	0.727***	0.739***
	(0.205)	(0.215)
Regime corruption	0.452	0.467
	(0.303)	(0.303)
Variance (Country)	0.130**	0.132***
	(0.0506)	(0.0491)
Constant	−1.340***	−1.331***
	(0.221)	(0.215)

Notes. N = 43,286 respondents (36 countries) for all models. Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Table A5. Military rule and public approval of external democracy promotion.

	(1)	(2)
Election history	0.191***	0.189***
	(0.0697)	(0.0699)
Democrat	0.0868**	0.0856**
	(0.0407)	(0.0406)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.00106	−0.00107
	(0.0236)	(0.0237)
Age	−0.00105	−0.00104
	(0.00113)	(0.00113)
Female = 1	−0.0447***	−0.0446***
	(0.0170)	(0.0170)
Higher education	−0.0104	−0.00945
	(0.0424)	(0.0422)
Military rule years	0.141***
	(0.0470)
Past military rule neighbours		0.530**
		(0.261)
Democracy	0.389***	0.443***
	(0.104)	(0.128)
Democratic neighbours	0.847***	1.067***
	(0.220)	(0.298)
Regime corruption	0.0296	0.442
	(0.333)	(0.304)
Variance (Country)	0.0996***	0.129***
	(0.0270)	(0.0460)
Constant	−1.239***	−1.599***
	(0.193)	(0.284)

Notes: N = 43,286 respondents (36 countries) for all models. Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Table A6. Public approval of external democracy promotion in Africa with regional fixed effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election history	0.190***	0.191***	0.191***	0.191***	0.191***
	(0.0700)	(0.0698)	(0.0697)	(0.0697)	(0.0698)
Democrat	0.0833**	0.0843**	0.0847**	0.0845**	0.0846**
	(0.0403)	(0.0405)	(0.0405)	(0.0405)	(0.0406)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.00203	−0.00143	−0.00134	−0.00168	-0.00153
	(0.0237)	(0.0236)	(0.0236)	(0.0236)	(0.0236)
Age	−0.00105	−0.00105	−0.00105	−0.00106	-0.00105
	(0.00113)	(0.00113)	(0.00113)	(0.00113)	(0.00113)
Female = 1	−0.045***	−0.045***	−0.045***	−0.045***	−0.045***
	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)
Higher education	−0.00853	−0.00846	−0.00794	−0.00849	−0.00824
	(0.0423)	(0.0423)	(0.0424)	(0.0422)	(0.0422)
Attempted coups		0.0380*
		(0.0230)
Successful coups			0.107***
			(0.0398)
Neighbours’ attempted coups				0.0191***
				(0.00706)
Neighbours’ successful coups					0.0282***
					(0.0100)
Democracy		0.0941	0.0790	0.285**	0.246*
		(0.182)	(0.149)	(0.130)	(0.138)
Democratic neighbours		0.385**	0.286	0.524**	0.498**
		(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.215)	(0.198)
Regime corruption		0.0399	0.0232	0.352	0.351
		(0.453)	(0.344)	(0.299)	(0.310)
Eastern Africa	−0.0848	0.0386	0.0969	0.236	0.201
	(0.165)	(0.110)	(0.0992)	(0.195)	(0.160)
Southern Africa	−0.178	−0.0916	0.0616	0.177	0.138
	(0.166)	(0.170)	(0.154)	(0.141)	(0.151)
Northern Africa	−0.688***	−0.482**	−0.435**	−0.118	−0.144
	(0.189)	(0.239)	(0.190)	(0.181)	(0.184)
Central Africa	−0.793***	−0.502***	−0.381*	−0.368**	−0.365**
	(0.164)	(0.191)	(0.211)	(0.154)	(0.144)
Intercept	−0.314**	−0.745**	−0.827***	−1.378***	−1.258***
	(0.132)	(0.346)	(0.277)	(0.245)	(0.271)
Variance (Country)	0.124***	0.105***	0.0832***	0.0952***	0.0983***
	(0.0380)	(0.0371)	(0.0237)	(0.0337)	(0.0370)

Notes: N = 43,286 respondents (36 countries) for all models. Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

Table A7. Models excluding Burkina Faso.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election history	0.192***	0.194***	0.194***	0.194***	0.194***
	(0.0707)	(0.0703)	(0.0703)	(0.0702)	(0.0703)
Democrat	0.0856**	0.0860**	0.0862**	0.0854**	0.0855**
	(0.0410)	(0.0411)	(0.0412)	(0.0411)	(0.0412)
Democracy satisfaction	−0.00285	−0.00136	−0.00132	−0.00133	−0.00124
	(0.0243)	(0.0242)	(0.0242)	(0.0242)	(0.0242)
Age	−0.00132	−0.00132	−0.00132	−0.00132	−0.00132
	(0.00113)	(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00114)
Female = 1	−0.0403**	−0.0403**	−0.0403**	−0.0403**	−0.0403**
	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)
Higher education	−0.0106	−0.00937	−0.00922	−0.00866	−0.00842
	(0.0428)	(0.0425)	(0.0426)	(0.0424)	(0.0424)
Attempted coups		0.0234**
		(0.00988)
Successful coups			0.0599***
			(0.0217)
Neighbours’ attempted coups				0.00952*
				(0.00505)
Neighbours’ successful coups					0.0159**
					(0.00745)
Democracy		0.374***	0.354***	0.427***	0.412***
		(0.0937)	(0.0897)	(0.0892)	(0.0869)
Democratic neighbours		0.627***	0.618***	0.678***	0.666***
		(0.192)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.187)
Regime corruption		0.500**	0.444*	0.607**	0.609***
		(0.240)	(0.254)	(0.236)	(0.229)
Constant	−0.566***	−1.324***	−1.299***	−1.484***	−1.453***
	(0.0917)	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.176)	(0.178)
Variance (country)	0.159***	0.0850***	0.0791***	0.0791***	0.0781***
	(0.0341)	(0.0272)	(0.0242)	(0.0231)	(0.0239)

Notes: N = 42,218 respondents (35 countries) for all models. Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.