https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4177-7356
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ABSTRACT
The notion of legitimacy is essential to motivate soldiers to fight in wars. However, the value of this factor to motivate in operations that do not involve the state’s vital interests – such as peacekeeping – is little explored. Drawing upon theories of the legitimate use of force and combat motivation, I argue that the UN legitimacy of using force to advance peacekeeping mandates is fundamental for the motivation of the blue helmets to carry out risky tasks and fight, as necessary, in robust PKOs. The article begins by proposing an operational definition of legitimacy to use force to advance peacekeeping mandates, a necessary step for effective communication with interviewees in subsequent empirical investigations. Then, it explores the connection between legitimacy and soldiers’ motivation to fight. Lastly, a case study based on interviews with dozens of blue helmets investigates perceptions of the legitimacy to use force and its motivational role in robust PKOs. The results reveal that positive perceptions of the mission legitimacy to use force increase the blue helmets’ motivation to accomplish risky tasks. Consequently, the article points to increasing awareness about the conditions that render the use of force legitimate as a way to improve military performances in robust PKOs.
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for facilitating my research by funding a twelve-month doctoral stay at Helmut Schmidt University (University of the German Federal Armed Forces) in Hamburg.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Kellet, Combat Motivation; Oetting, Motivation und Gefechtswert; Wyatt and Gal (ed.), Legitimacy and Commitment in the Military; Goulart, Ação sob Fogo!
2 Regarding the UN Secretariat’s efforts to clarify and guide the use of force, see the guidelines on the use of force in PKOs (United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Use of Force by Military Components”).
3 The UN defines the use of force in PKOs as the use, or threat of use, of physical means in self-defence and to execute mandated tasks in appropriate situations (United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Use of Force by Military Components”).
4 Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy,” 573.
5 The UN defines ‘robust peacekeeping’ as the use of force by a peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the UNSC to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 98). Moreover, the present article defines ‘risky tasks’ as tasks that subject or are likely to subject the blue helmets to hostile, violent acts, such as adverse fire, and mines and improvised explosive devices hazards.
6 This article adopts the understanding that the UN legitimacy to use force in a specific peacekeeping mission corresponds to the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force. Thus, the terms ‘UN legitimacy to use force’ and ‘peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force’ are interchangeable here.
7 Yasuaki, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law.
8 In the case of states and collective security organizations, such as the UN, power includes military force, which is the focus of this article.
9 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 11.
10 Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement, 20.
11 Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy,” 574.
12 Whalan, How Peace Operations Work, 6; Howard et al. “Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic / MINUSCA,” 31.
13 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 131.
14 Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” 368.
15 Popovski and Turner, “Legitimacy as Complement and Corrective to Legality.”
16 Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, 190.
17 Henkin, How Nations Behave; Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations.
18 Yasuaki, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law, 125.
19 Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement.
20 Interestingly, the UN Charter has no specific chapter dedicated to peacekeeping and does not even mention this term.
21 Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UNSC to authorize the use of force in the name of collective security to counter threats to the peace or breaches of the peace.
22 See Peter, “Political Legitimacy,” for procedural and substantive legitimacy features.
23 Sabrow, “Local Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Peace Operations.”
24 As Paddon Rhoads puts it, impartiality allows for pre-established rules to guide judgement, whereas neutrality requires withholding judgement (‘Putting Human Rights up Front’).
25 Berdal, “What are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?”; Karlsrud, “The UN at War.”
26 United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines; United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Use of Force by Military Components.”
27 Howard et al. “Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic / MINUSCA”; Von Billerbeck, “UN Peace Operations and Conflicting Legitimacies”, Whalan, How Peace Operations Work.
28 Von Billerbeck, “UN Peace Operations and Conflicting Legitimacies,” 287.
29 Whalan, “The Local Legitimacy of Peacekeepers.”
30 Wiharta, "The Legitimacy of Peace Operations."
31 Berdal, “What are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?,” 123.
32 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 318.
33 Aoi, De Coning, and Karlsrud, “Addressing the Emerging Gap between Concepts, Doctrine, and Practice in UN Peacekeeping Operations.”
34 Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” 1045.
35 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power; Yasuaki, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law.
36 Kratochwil, “On Legitimacy.”
37 See Kellet, Combat Motivation; Oetting, Motivation und Gefechtswert; and Goulart, Ação sob Fogo, for references on combat motivation literature.
38 Kellet, Combat Motivation; Oetting, Motivation und Gefechtswert; Wyatt and Gal, eds., Legitimacy and Commitment in the Military.
39 Goulart, “Blue Helmets, Armed Groups, and Peace at Stake”; Biehl and Keller, “Hohe Identifikation und Nüchterner Blick.”
40 Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition.
41 Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail. “Organizational Images and Member Identification.” Self-concept has been defined by Baron and Byrne as ‘one’s self-identity, a schema consisting of an organized collection of beliefs and feelings about one-self’ (Social Psychology, 152).
42 According to Shamir, self-concept internalizes self-esteem in two dimensions: esteem based on a sense of competence and achievement, and esteem as a sense of possessing attributes that have been culturally invested with positive values, such as virtue and moral worth. (“Meaning, Self and Motivation in Organizations,” 412).
43 Coicaud, “International Organizations as a Profession.”
44 Shamir, “Meaning, Self and Motivation in Organizations,” 413.
45 Coicaud, “International Organizations as a Profession,” 17.
46 The acronyms refer to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
47 Heinecken and Ferreira, “Fighting for Peace.”
48 Mendonça, “Brazil in Haiti, a Success History”; Dziedzic and Perito, “Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince.” MINUSTAH stands for UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
49 United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual.
50 Gal, “Unit Morale,” 562.
51 Fröhling and Rausch, “Entscheiden und Verantworten,” 10–11.
52 Edwards, “The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and Change.”
53 Edwards, “The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and Change,” 204; Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat, 28–29.
54 Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition; Edwards, “The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and Change.”
55 Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat, 25–26.
56 Oetting, Motivation und Gefechtswert; Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat; Goulart, Ação sob Fogo!
57 Manstead, “Social Psychology of Emotion.”
58 Jenne, “¿Aumenta la Participación en Operaciones de Paz la Capacidad de las Fuerzas Armadas en Interactuar con Actores Civiles?,” 38 (translation is ours).
59 Aguilar, “Uma Cultura Brasileira de Missões de Paz”; Mendonça, “Brazil in Haiti, a Success Story.”
60 Heinecken and Ferreira, “Fighting for Peace,” 53–4.
61 These are TCCs’ designations of specific units, generically treated by the UN as BRABAT, URUBAT and INDOBAT. UNIFIL stands for UN Interim Force in Lebanon.
62 These three countries have different cultures and different national security profiles, which was beneficial for the study. Furthermore, they differ in the regularity with which they participate in UN PKOs. Brazil has contributed troops since 1957, when it sent a contingent to UNEF I. However, the country's participation in PKOs has been intermittent. In turn, Uruguay has become, in recent decades, a very regular troop contributor. For over twenty years, the country had at least one battalion deployed on a UN mission. Indonesia has a long history of involvement in PKOs and was the seventh-largest troop contributor to UN missions at the time of writing.
63 I interviewed LtGen Ricardo A. Costa Neves and LtGen Marcos Affonso da Costa, former MONUSCO FCs, and MGen Michael Beary, former UNIFIL Head of Mission and FC, who told me about the conditions under which the Uruguayan and Indonesian battalions operated and their good impressions of their performances. Regarding BRABAT 6, information on its above-average performance came from statements by the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Edmond Mullet, and Secretary-General’s reports to the UNSC.
64 These questions were directed to officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) leading units, subunits, platoons, or sections. Given their responsibility to maintain troop morale and the frequent interaction with their underlings, leaders usually gain a sense of their perceptions and level of motivation.
65 One respondent in Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K did not answer the question about the peacekeeping mission’s legitimate condition (Appendix 1) but did not explain why he declined.
66 Interview with Captain Nicolás Alberto Curbelo Laveglia, by the author (translation is ours).
67 Interview with Major Andre Luiz Pereira da Siva, by the author (translation is ours).
68 This question was addressed to seven members who were corporals or privates at the mission time. BRABAT 6 was the only unit appointing such low-rank participants.
69 The scrutiny of interview notes and responses in questionnaire forms reveals that most respondents who recognised the mission as entirely legitimate were strongly motivated by the legitimacy factor.
70 In the scatter plot, ‘FL’, ‘PL’, and ‘I’ stand for ‘fully legitimate’, ‘partially legitimate’, and ‘illegitimate.’
71 Capie, “Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power,” 14–5, 18, 20.
72 Maxwell, “Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research,” 283.
73 Creswell, Research Design; Maxwell, “Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research.”
74 For the UN efforts in this regard, see the ‘Revised Model Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and TCCs with the Annex “We are the UN Peacekeeping Personnel”’ and the ‘Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions’.
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Fernando Rodrigues Goulart
Fernando Rodrigues Goulart is a PhD and International Relations researcher. He also holds a PhD equivalent certificate in Military Sciences from the Brazilian Army Command and Staff College and a specialisation diploma from the German Armed Forces Command Academy (2002). Fernando Goulart participated, as a military observer, in UN peacekeeping operations in Mozambique (1993) and Nepal (2007), and served in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN Headquarters in New York (2008/2010). In 2012/13, he commanded the UN multinational Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH).