Religious teaching and political context: the case of Cyprus

Abstract

In this article I aim to explore some philosophical issues involved in teaching religion in Cyprus and suggest some preconditions in order for this teaching to be sensitive to the multicultural character of the island and conducive to the vision of reconciliation and reunification. First, I shall clarify some particularities of the political problem of Cyprus, since many misconceptions obscure the understanding of the real stakes at issue, having crucial repercussions for demarcating the role of religious belief. For the Cyprus problem has been misconceived by many people as a kind of religious and ethnic conflict, thus raising various kinds of false dilemmas and expectations in relation to the local religions (Christian Orthodoxy and Islam) and their future cultivation in the schools of the two communities. I shall attempt to ‘put the record straight’ in a way, showing that the Cyprus issue is not reducible to the religious difference of the peoples involved, and suggest what I believe is the real challenge now regarding the teaching of religion in this part of the world.

The independence treaties left Cypriots—particularly Greek Cypriots—with a political half‐life. If the NATO allies thought the contrived constitutional arrangement would enable the two communities to live peacefully together, they were badly mistaken. (O’Malley & Craig, 2002, p. 87)

Like forgetting, forgiving permits starting over. But unlike forgetting, political forgiveness requires that the past be recalled and acknowledged for what it is. (Digeser, 1998, p. 716)

Notes

1. Makarios, despite some mistaken moves (e.g. his following the British suggestion to alter the constitution on 13 points in order to make it more workable that fuelled Turkish Cypriot discontent or, throughout his presidency, the pacifist and over‐lenient treatment of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot underground organizations), proved himself a cosmopolitan leader with a significant role in the non‐aligned group. His internationalism prevailed over his episcopal commitment and proof for that was the widespread recognition and friendship he enjoyed on the part of leaders and peoples of other creeds. Moreover, on many occasions, he had shown a much more reconciliatory stance than other, more secular actors in the Cyprus drama (see for instance how appalled and full of contempt he was for Brigadier Ioannides’—the Greek dictator with the most manifest dependence on US military aid and political sympathy—criminal plans against Turkish Cypriots in Hitchens, 2002, p. 39). Long before that, in 1964, as O’Malley and Craig write, Makarios suggested measures to support the Turkish Cypriots the Turkish rejection of which ‘exposed the Turks’ opposition to making the unitary state work’ (2002, p. 106).

2. For my suggestion as to what they should do instead, see Papastephanou (2002b, p. 581).

3. As Hitchens rightly remarks, if the Greek government was not headed by that King the offer would have been accepted. ‘By the time that the republican Venizelos had become Prime Minister in 1917, Greece was already committed to the Allies in any case and the offer, now otiose, was not repeated’ (2002, p. 34).

4. For further evidence on why and how Britain encouraged Turkey to oppose enosis so as to ‘protect’ British interests and why Turkey seized the opportunity, see O’Malley and Craig (2002, pp. 21–48).

5. According to O’Malley and Craig’s account of the incident, ‘a British investigation found that the furniture in the front of the office [of Turkish information centre—M. P.] had been removed to a safe place before the explosion occurred. After the bombing, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots took to the streets armed with sticks, cudgels and other weapons, and began to attack police cars, burn Greek buildings and loot shops … The tactics bore all the hallmarks of preplanned concerted action. … Mob riots, brutal killings and pitched battles between Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued for days. Lloyd told the Cabinet that the Turkish Cypriots “appeared to be deliberately attempting to create the impression that it was impossible for the two communities in Cyprus to live together harmoniously”’ (2002, pp. 61–62).

6. For instance, as O’Malley and Craig remark, British rule formed an auxiliary police force that was made up entirely by Turkish Cypriots (2002, p. 21). On the disastrous effects of Grivas’ tactics that stopped many Greeks joining the police and Harding’s criteria of police recruiting that increased the risk of ethnic conflict, see O’Malley and Craig (2002, p. 35).

7. Further, O’Malley and Craig explain that the most controversial (and, as proved by later developments, fatal, I would add) feature of the agreements was the Turkish Cypriot power of veto. ‘It meant that if both sides did not proceed in a spirit of compromise, the political process could be halted indefinitely on areas as fundamental as the budget and the setting of taxes’ (O’Malley & Craig, 2002, p. 79). On the many weaknesses and faults of the Treaty of Independence see further in the same source, pp. 84–86. To illustrate their point that Cypriots (Greek and Turkish) were given very limited freedom, O’Malley and Craig ask: ‘What would British MPs say if the Americans were given the power to take over at will Heathrow airport—Britain’s equivalent of Nicosia airfield—for military purposes in peacetime or war, and even if the United Kingdom was not involved in that conflict?’ (2002, p. 85).

8. For information about the inter‐ethnic violence of 1963–64 and 1967 see O’Malley and Craig (2002) and Hitchens (2002).

9. The former because the ‘island was descending into civil war, threatening the viability of the bases and spying facilities’ (O’Malley & Craig, 2002, p. 92); the latter because of the danger all this was representing for NATO allies.

10. For more on Packard’s views against the separatist route that was favoured by some extremists as well as the American and British strategic planners and led to the Turkish invasion in 1974, see his interview in the Guardian, 2 April 1988 and 7 April 1988.

11. He was ‘sent back to England on a transporter plane with only one seat bolted to its fuselage’ (O’Malley & Craig, 2002, p. 110).

12. See for instance, Stern (1977), Hitchens (2001, pp. 80–87; 2002), O’Malley and Craig (2002, pp. 113, 126, 131ff.).

13. For instance, Hitchens refers to a 1976 report adopted by the European Commission on Human Rights. That report was ‘prepared by eighteen distinguished jurists and chaired by Prof. J.E.S. Fawcett’ and ‘resulted from a year’s research into the consequences of the Turkish invasion. It found that the Turkish army had engaged in the deliberate killing of civilians, in the execution of prisoners, in the torture and ill‐treatment of detainees, in the arbitrary collective punishment and mass detention of civilians, and in systematic and unpunished acts of rape, torture, and looting. A large number of “disappeared” persons, both prisoners of war and civilians, are still “missing” from this period’ (Hitchens, 2001, p. 88).

14. Why the Annan plan can be characterized as unfair is explained by Shlomo Avineri (2004) and why it seems to have been contrived in order to facilitate Turkey’s EU accession rather than justly solve the issue see Sener Levent’s (Turkish Cypriot journalist) articles (2004).

15. Largely, the Republic of Cyprus does not have faith schools because religious lessons are part of the curriculum in all state schools. Yet, after a reunification, the prospect of faith schools may open here too.

16. Besides, a relatively wealthy island can recover from an economic blow with the much‐advertised promise of help by independent sponsoring (for the moment estimated roughly to 1% of the total cost for the Republic).

17. As O’Malley and Craig describe their book in their introduction, it ‘explodes the myth that Cyprus is divided today purely because of ethnic hatred. It reveals an astonishing international plot, developed from a blueprint evolved first under British rule, then by US President Johnson’s officials, the goals of which were finally realized in 1974’ (2002, pp. vii–viii). And further, ‘this book argues that the Cyprus crisis was no failure of American diplomacy, but a deliberate Cold War plot to divide the island and save the top secret spying and defence facilities from the twin threats of communist takeover or British withdrawal’ (2002, p. x).

18. The parting of the ways is no option, for it reflects a racist essentialist view that some nationalities are incompatible and incorporates the great injustice of Turkish and Greek permanent loss of their respective hometowns and villages.