How governance under the ‘grand compromise’ affects refugee preferences for relocation: evidence from Syrian refugees in Lebanon

Figures & data

Table 1. Distribution of Survey Sampling Population For Syrian Refugees by Governorate-Pair.

	Refugee Population	Syrian Refugee Population	Sample
North Lebanon & Akkar	251299	25%	472 (27%)
Beirut & Mount Lebanon	287651	27%	531 (30%)
South Lebanon & Nabitieh	117750	12%	148 (8%)
Bekaa & Baalbek-Hermel	360733	36%	600 (34%)
Total	1017433	100%	1751 (100%)

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

	N (non-missing)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Aspiration to resettle	1,718	4.22	2.25	1	7
Ability to resettle	1,646	2.81	1.72	1	7
Effectiveness UNHCR	1,688	3.65	1.18	1	5
Effectiveness LBN. Gov	1,650	2.61	1.26	1	5
Conf. Justice System	1,638	0.43	0.49	0	1
Age	1,733	35.11	12.35	18	90
Displ. Duration (Yrs.)	1,746	4.73	1.74	0	8
Networks Abroad	1,751	0.06	0.24	0	1
Male	1,751	0.50	0.50	0	1
Married	1,746	0.88	0.32	0	1
Employed	1,746	0.19	0.40	0	1
Exp. Phys. Abuse, LBN	1,732	0.07	0.26	0	1
Exp. Verbal Abuse, LBN	1,736	0.29	0.45	0	1
Live in camp	1,750	0.30	0.46	0	1
Registered with UN	1,748	0.66	0.48	0	1
Sit. Worse LBN	1,745	0.24	0.43	0	1
Would never return to SYR	1,748	4.34	2.08	1	7

Table 3. Aspiration and ability to relocate: Regression results.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4
	Aspiration	Ability	Aspiration	Ability	Aspiration	Ability	Aspiration	Ability
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Effectiveness UNHCR	−0.32${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.34${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.32${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.32${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.25${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.25${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.20${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.22${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Effectiveness LBN Gov.	0.64${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.57${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.63${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.56${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.56${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.37${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Conf. Justice System							0.93${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.57${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
							(0.12)	(0.09)
Age			−0.01${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.00	−0.01${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.00	−0.01${}^{\ast \ast }$	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Displ. Duration (Yrs.)			0.10${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	-0.01	0.09${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.00	0.11${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.01
			(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Networks Abroad ($=1$)			0.67${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.07	0.63${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.17	0.75${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.21
			(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.16)
Male			0.07	0.33${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.18	0.14${}^{\ast }$	0.26${}^{\ast \ast }$	0.13
			(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Married			−0.04	−0.04	−0.02	0.02	−0.09	0.03
			(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Employed ($=1$)					−0.24${}^{\ast }$	0.08	−0.31${}^{\ast \ast }$	0.11
					(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Exp. Phys. Abuse, LBN ($=1$)					0.05	−0.17	−0.01	−0.14
					(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.16)
Exp. Verbal Abuse, LBN ($=1$)					0.04	0.53${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.06	0.59${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
					(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Living in camp ($=1$)					0.06	−0.23${}^{\ast \ast }$	−0.27${}^{\ast }$	−0.10
					(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Registered with UN ($=1$)					0.15	−0.35${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.37${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.44${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
					(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Sit. Worse LBN					−0.07	−0.80${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.13	−0.68${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
					(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Would never return to SYR					0.12${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.14${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	0.17${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$	−0.20${}^{\ast \ast \ast }$
					(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	1565	1512	1545	1492	1508	1456	1501	1442
Adjusted R${}^2$	0.14	0.19	0.16	0.20	0.16	0.30	0.12	0.27

Note: ${}^{\ast }p<0.1$; ${}^{\ast \ast }p<0.05$; ${}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<0.01$.

Table 4. Attributes and Levels.

Attributes	Levels
Level of abuse	No verbal or physical
	Some verbal
	Some physical and verbal
	Frequent physical and verbal
Ease of finding work	Easy
	Moderate
	Difficult
Size of diaspora Syrian diaspora	Syrian diaspora
	Only Middle Eastern diaspora
	No Middle Eastern or Syrian diaspora
Resettlement	Resettlement for you and your family
	Resettlement for you only
	No legal resettlement so would have to make your own way
	No legal resettlement so would have to use a smuggler

Figure 1. Survey experiment results. Treatment is the opportunity to relocate legally. Coefficients reflect interactions between treatment and perceived effectiveness of external (UNHCR) or host government. OLS Models include standard errors clustered by respondent, and Governorate-level fixed effects.