Territorial Power Sharing and the Regulation of Conflict in Africa

Abstract

The article argues that there is a relative lack of territorial power sharing in sub-Saharan Africa, but that this should not surprise us given the socio-ethnic context of most African countries which lack both majoritarian ethnic groups and clear culturally based distinctions between contending groups. A comprehensive analysis of the various federal systems and of some decentralising countries reveals a sobering record of conflict management and discusses some explanatory variables. In this context, forms of power sharing that include provisions on territorial autonomy, amounting to full-fledged federalism or restricted to some degree of decentralisation, should be regarded with caution. Regional autonomy as a solution to civil war will not work in most cases.

Acknowledgements

A first version of the paper was presented at the project workshop on Institutions for Sustainable Peace at the International Studies Association Conference in San Diego in April 2012. I thank all participants and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.

Notes

^1. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1977).

^2. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, ‘Territorial Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Settlement’ in Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff (eds) Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict (London: Routledge 2011) pp.249–65.

^3. Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008); Andreas Mehler, ‘Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements’ (Hamburg, German Institute of Global and Area Studies 2008); Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2005).

^4. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, ‘Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the Transition from Civil War’ in Roeder and Rothchild (note 3) pp.83–106.

^5. Pippa Norris, Driving Democracy. Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008).

^6. Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder, ‘Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy’ in Roeder and Rothchild (note 3) pp.29–50.

^7. Anna Jarstad, ‘Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint Government’ in Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) pp.105–33.

^8. Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power-Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal of Political Science 47/2 (2003) pp.318–32.

^9. Mehler (note 3).

^10. Ibid. p.7; Jarstad (note 7).

^11. Hoddie and Hartzell (note 4).

^12. Ibid.

^13. Ibid. p.103.

^14. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements’, in Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2005) pp.109–32.

^15. Uppsala Conflict Data Program/StinaHögbladh, Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook Version 2.0 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2012). This definition of peace agreement clearly extends beyond the idea of power-sharing.

^16. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985); Kristin M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels, ‘Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States’, World Politics 59/1 (2006) pp.1–50; Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson, ‘The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?’ Regional and Federal Studies 19/2 (2009) pp.191–202; Dawn Brancati, ‘Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?’, International Organization 60/3 (2006) pp.651–85 and Stefan Wolff, ‘Conflict Management in Divided Societies: The Many Uses of Territorial Self-Governance’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20/1 (2013) pp.27–50.

^17. Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel, ‘Let's Stick Together: Understanding Africa's Secessionist Deficit’, African Affairs 104/416 (2005) pp.399–427.

^18. Andrea Iff, Peace-Preserving Federalism. Making Sense of India and Nigeria (Saarbrücken: Südwestdt. VerlagfürHochschulschr. 2010).

^19. Eghosa Osaghae, ‘Federalism and the Management of Diversity in Africa’, Identity, Culture and Politics 5/1–2 (2004) pp.162–78 and Shaheen Mozaffar and James R. Scarritt, ‘Why Territorial Autonomy is Not a Viable Option for Managing Ethnic Conflict in African Plural Societies’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 5/3–4 (1999) pp.230–53.

^20. Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis, and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience (Washington, DC: World Bank 1983).

^21. William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1964) and Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press 1987).

^22. Ugo M. Amoretti, and Nancy Bermeo (eds), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press 2003) and Jonathan Rodden, ‘Comparative federalism and decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement’, Comparative Politics 36/4 (2004) pp.481–500.

^23. Ronald Watts, ‘Models of Federal Power Sharing’, International Social Science Journal 167 (2001) pp.23–32; Rodden (note 22).

^24. Norris (note 5).

^25. Yash P. Ghai, ‘Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy’ in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002) pp.141–70 and Watts (note 23).

^26. Brendan O'Leary, ‘An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation?’ Nations and Nationalism 7/3 (2001) pp.273–96.

^27. See references in note 16.

^28. Alfred Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’, Journal of Democracy 10/4 (1999) pp.19–34.

^29. But see Kent Eaton and Ed Connerly, ‘Democracy, Development, and Security as Objectives of Decentralization’, in Ed Connerly, Kent Eaton, and Paul Smoke (eds), Making Decentralisation Work (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2010) pp.1–24 and Joseph Siegle and Patrick O'Mahony, ‘Decentralization and Internal Conflict’, in E. Connerly, K. Eaton, and P. Smoke (eds) Making Decentralisation Work (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2010) pp.135–66.

^30. For Africa, compare Andreas Mehler, ‘Decentralization, Division of Power and Crisis Prevention: A Theoretical Exploration with Reference to Africa, in Tobias Debiel (ed.), Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence, and Development in Crisis Regions (London: Zed Books 2002) pp.72–86 and Christof Hartmann, ‘Decentralisation and the Legacy of Protracted Conflict – Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa’ in Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP 2008) pp.169–90.

^31. Graham K. Brown, ‘Decentralisation and Conflict: Introduction and Overview’, Conflict, Security and Development 8/4 (2008) pp.387–92, 389.

^32. Nancy Bermeo, ‘Conclusion: The Merits of Federalism’, in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (eds) Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore, CA: John Hopkins UP 2003) pp.457–82.

^33. Will Kymlicka, ‘ Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are They Relevant for Africa?’, in David Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (London: James Currey 2006) pp.32–64 and John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, ‘Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation’ in J.R.S. Noel (ed.) From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (Toronto: McGill-Queens UP 2005) pp.263–96.

^34. Erk and Anderson (note 16) p.192.

^35. Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions. The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1999); Svante E. Cornell, ‘Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective’, World Politics 54/2 (2002) pp.245–76 and Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York, NY: W.W. Norton 2000).

^36. Philip G. Roeder, ‘Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms’, Regional and Federal Studies 19/2 (2009) pp.203–19, 206.

^37. Stepan (note 28); Bermeo (note 32) and McGarry and O'Leary (note 2).

^38. Daniel J. Elazar, ‘Federalism and Consociational Regimes‘, Publius: Journal of Federalism 15/2 (1985) pp.17–34.

^39. Stepan (note 28).

^40. Horowitz (note 16) p.623.

^41. E.g. Bakke and Wibbels (note 16).

^42. Erk and Anderson (note 16).

^43. O'Leary (note 26).

^44. Henry Hale, ‘Divided We Stand: International Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse’, World Politics 56/4 (2004) pp.165–93.

^45. McGarry and O'Leary (note 2).

^46. Horowitz (note 16).

^47. Brancati (note 16).

^48. Nancy Bermeo, The Import of Institutions, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002) pp.96–110, 108.

^49. Roeder (note 36).

^50. Rotimi Suberu, ‘Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective’, Ethnopolitics 8/1 (2009) pp.68f.

^51. Stepan (note 28).

^52. Suberu (note 50).

^53. Ibid. p.67.

^54. Daniel Bach, ’Indigeneity, Ethnicity and Federalism’, in Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and OyeleyeOyediran (eds) Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1997) pp.333–49; Osaghae (note 15); Anthony Smith, ‘Fractured Federalism: Nigeria's Lesson for Today's Nation Builder in Iraq’, The Round Table 94/1 (2005) pp.129–44 and Suberu (note 50).

^55. Christopher Clapham, ‘Afterword’, in D. Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (London: James Currey 2006).

^56. Edmond J. Keller, ‘Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia’, African Journal of Political Science 7/1 (2002) pp.21–50, 46.

^57. International Crisis Group 2009, ‘Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents’, Africa Report 153 (September 2009).

^58. Clapham (note 55) p.237 and David Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (London: James Currey 2006).

^59. For details see Romuald R. Haule, ‘Torturing the Union? An Examination of the Union of Tanzania and its Constitutionality’ Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 66 (2006) pp.215–33.

^60. Rohan Edrisinha, Lee Seymour, and Ann Griffiths, ‘Adopting Federalism: Sri Lanka and Sudan’ in Ann Griffiths (ed.) Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005 (Montreal: Mc Gill-Queen's UP 2005), p.445.

^61. Edmond J. Keller, and Lahra Smith, ‘Obstacles to Implementing Territorial Decentralization: The First Decade of Ethiopian Federalism’, in Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2005).

^62. Horowitz (note 16); Rotimi Suberu and Larry Diamond, ‘Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict-Management and Democracy in Nigeria’, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.) The Architecture of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002) pp.400–28.

^63. Suberu (note 50) p.73.

^64. On Ethiopian federalism see particularly Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991–2000 (Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute 2002).

^65. Kymlicka (note 33).

^66. Ibid. p.52.

^67. Aaron Schneider, ‘Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement’, Studies in Comparative International Development 38/3 (2003) pp.32–56.

^68. Brancati (note 16).

^69. Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa. A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP 2008).

^70. Mehler (note 30).

^71. P.S. Reddy, Local Government Democratisation and Decentralisation. A Review of the Southern African Region (Kenwyn: Juta 1999).

^72. On Burundi Daniel P. Sullivan, ‘The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi Through the Lens of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy’ Journal of Modern African Studies 43/1 (2005) pp.75–95 and René Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs 106/422 (2006) pp.1–20.

^73. Jennifer C. Seely, ‘A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali’, Journal of Modern African Studies 39/3 (2001) pp.499–524.

^74. For a more detailed historical account and political-economic explanation see Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2003) pp.94ff.

^75. On Senegal compare Vincent Foucher, ‘Pas d'alternance en Casamance? Le nouveau pouvoir sénégalais face à la revendication séparatiste casamançaise’, Politique Africaine 91 (2003) pp.101–19.

^76. Pierre Englebert, ‘Born-Again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40/3 (2002) pp.345–68.

^77. Anna Katharina Schelnberger, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Kibaale, Uganda’, in Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa. A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP 2008) pp.191–212; Elliot Green, ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security & Development 8/4 (2008) pp.427–50.

^78. Mozaffar and Scarritt (note 19).

^79. John Markakis, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa’, in Paris Yeros (ed.) Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan1999) pp.65–80, 77.

^80. Mozaffar and Scarritt (note 15) p.241.

^81. Kymlicka (note 33) p.48.

^82. Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2002).

^83. For a similar argument Englebert and Hummel (note 17).

^84. The terminology goes back to Horowitz (note 16).

^85. Kymlicka (note 33) p.48.

^86. The idea of signaling, and ‘costly signals’ is based here on the discussion by Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, ‘Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements’, Journal of Peace Research 40/3 (2003) pp.303–20.