Domestic Terrorism and Democratic Regime Types

Abstract

Using logistic regression on the 36 democracies studied in Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy, we find statistically significant correlations between the index of consensus democracy and a higher incidence of fatal domestic terror incidents in the period 1985–2010. We further find that the risk of fatal terrorist attacks is almost six times higher in majoritarian democracies than in their consensus counterparts, and that this indicator is stronger than factors such as economic development and a large youth population and levels of urbanisation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank the two anonymous referees for incisive, constructive and perceptive comments and criticisms. The authors are also grateful for information received by Dahlia Scheindlin (Tel Aviv University), Meir Elran (Tel Aviv University), Selwyn Ryan (University of the West Indies), Richard English (St Andrews University) and Bjorn Erik Rasch (Oslo University). We are especially grateful to Karim Zahidi (University of Antwerp) for commenting on the statistical analysis – and for combining mathematical prowess with political sensitivity. The usual caveat applies.

Notes

^1. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarianism and Consensus Government (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1984).

^2. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2012).

^3. A classic in this literature is Burt L. Monroe and Amanda G. Rose, ‘Electoral Systems and Unimagined Consequences: Partisan Effects of Districted Proportional Representation’, American Journal of Political Science 46/1 (2002) pp.67–89.

^4. For examples of earlier studies, see R. K. Weaver and B. A. Rockman (eds), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1995); Rein Taagepera and Matt Qvortrup, ‘Who Gets What, When, How – Through Which Electoral System?’ European Political Science 11 (2012) pp.244–58.

^5. For a review, see Arend Lijphart, ‘The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85’, American Political Science Review 84/2 (1990) pp.481–96.

^6. See Richard English, ‘21st Century Terrorism: How Should We Respond?’ Political Insight 1/3 (2010) pp.76–8; C. Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002).

^7. See Lijphart (note 2).

^8. Walter Laqueur, ‘Interpretation of Terrorism – Fact, Fiction and Political Science’, Journal of Contemporary History 12/1 (1977) pp.1–42, p.22.

^9. Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, Comparative Politics 13/4 (1981) pp.379–99, p.379.

^10. For a review, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (2nd ed.) (New York: Columbia UP 2006).

^11. H. Hegre, T. Ellingsen, S. Gates and N. P. Gleditsch, ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992’, American Political Science Review 95/1 (2001) pp.33–48.

^12. M. Reynal-Querol, ‘Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars’, Defence and Peace Economics 13/6 (2002) pp.465–83.

^13. Quan Li, ‘Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/2 (2005) pp.278–97.

^14. Sara E. Jackson and Dan Reiter, ‘Does Democracy Matter? Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) pp.329–48.

^15. N. F. Campos and M. Gassebner, International Terrorism, Political Instabilityand the Escalation Effect, Working paper, CEPR Discussion Papers, Center for Economic Policy Research, 2009.

^16. K. Kis-Katos, H. Liebert and G. Schulze, ‘On the Origin of Domestic and International Terrorism’, European Journal of Political Economy 27/Suppl.1 (2011) pp.17–36.

^17. For a review of the literature, see J. K. Young and L. Dugan, ‘Veto Players and Terror’, Journal of Peace Research 48/1 (2011) pp.19–33; M. H. Qvortrup, ‘Terrorism and Political Science’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 14/4 (2012) pp.503–517

^18. H. Urdal, ‘A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence’, International Studies Quarterly 50/3 (2006) pp.607–29.

^19. Fernanda Llussá and José Tavares, ‘The Economics of Terrorism: A Synopsis’, Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2/1 (2007) pp.62–70.

^20. Claude Berrebi, Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians, Working Paper 477, Princeton University, Department of Economics Industrial Relations Section, 2003.

^21. J. A. Piazza, ‘Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism’, Journal of Peace Research 48/3 (2011) pp.339–53

^22. A. Krueger and J. Malečková, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9074, 2002, p.119.

^23. See Lijphart (note 1).

^24. J. McGarry and B. O'Leary, ‘Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and Its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland’, Government and Opposition 41/1 (2006) pp.43–63; B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering for Conflict Management (Oxford: Oxford UP 2006).

^25. John H. Aldrich, James E. Alt and Arthur Lupia, ‘The EITM Approach: Origins and Interpretations’, in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford UP 2008) pp.828–43.

^26. W. Enders and T. Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2006) p.117.

^27. See English (note 6).

^28. Enders and Sandler (note 26) p.116. See also Landes' original paper, W. H. Landes, ‘An Economic Study of US Aircraft Hijackings 1961–1976’, Journal of Law and Economics 21/1 (1978) 1–31.

^29. See Lijphart (note 2).

^30. Alternatively, the hypothesis can also be stated as a hypothesis about the probabilities. If we make the following extra assumption that the p and q probabilities are related by and , and similarly for dashed probabilities, then a quick calculation shows that . We owe this insight to Dr Karim University of Antwerp.

^31.http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr1955#summary/libraryofcongress. It should be noted that this act only was passed by the house of representatives, and rejected by the senate.

^32. See e.g. Qvortrup (note 17).

^33. Ibid.

^34. Townshend (note 6) p.113.

^35. B. Taylor, ‘Religion, Violence and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front’, Terrorism and Political Violence 10/4 (1998) pp.1–42.

^36. G. H. Aldrich, ‘The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants’, The American Journal of International Law 96/4 (2002) pp.891–8.

^37. R. Spaaij, ‘The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33/9 (2010) pp.854–70.

^38. Qvortrup (note 17).

^39. G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Harvard University Press 1984).

^40. Monroe and Rose (note 3).

^41. See Taagepera and Qvortrup (note 4).

^42. See Lijphart (note 2).

^43. Ibid.

^44. Urdal (note 18) p.607.

^45. Crenshaw (note 9) p.382.

^46. Krueger and Malečková (note 22).

^47. S. M. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic-Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53/1 (1959) pp.69–105.

^48. Piazza (note 21).

^49. J. P. Azam and A. Delacroix, ‘Aid and the Delegated Fight against Terrorism’, Review of Development Economics 10/2 (2006) pp.330–44.

^50. Hoffman (note 10) p.62

^51. Laqueur (note 8) p.1.

^52. ‘Economic Focus: Exploding Misconceptions’, The Economist 18 Dec. 2010.