Territorial Control, Levels of Violence, and the Electoral Performance of Former Rebel Political Parties After Civil Wars

Abstract

This paper explores debates about electoral patterns in post-civil war societies. In particular, we examine whether the ability of rebels to capture and control territory and the level of violence at the local level explains the electoral performance of former rebel political parties, focusing on the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikstan (IRPT) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)). Using data from the 2000 legislative election in Tajikistan and the 2008 Nepalese Constituent Assembly election, this paper finds that rebel control over districts did explain rebel party's electoral performance in Nepal. However, rebel control of districts in Tajikistan during the civil war did not predict the electoral performance in the first post-conflict election in that country. This is largely due to the disconnect between the IRPT and the constituencies that had supported it during the civil war, and because the level of control that the party exerted was far less than that of the CPN (M).

Notes

^1. A major single exception is the work of Michael Allison; however, his work concentrates largely on Latin America, and specifically on El Salvador and Guatemala. Michael Allison, ‘The Legacy of Violence on Post-Civil War Elections: The Case of El Salvador’, Studies in Comparative International Development 45 (March 2010) pp.104–24; Michael Allison, ‘The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America’, Latin American Politics and Societies 48 (Winter 2006) pp.137–62.

^2. D. Curtis and Jeroun de Zeeuw, ‘Rebel Movements and Political Party Development in Post-Conflict Societies: A Short Literature Review’ (2009), online at www.statesandsecurity.org/_pdfs/CurtisZeeuw.pdf, accessed 25 May 2010; Jeroun de Zeeuw (ed.), From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 2007); Carrie Manning, ‘Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique’, Studies in Comparative International Development 39 (March 2004) pp.54–76; Carrie Manning, ‘Party-Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique’, Democratization 14 (April 2007) pp.1–20.

^3. Ian Smith and Carrie Manning, Former Rebel Groups As Political Parties: Factors Facilitating Integration Into Electoral Politics, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference: ‘Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition’, Le Centre Sheraton Montreal Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2011; B. Berti, Armed Groups as Political Parties: New Approaches on Regulation and Integration, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference: ‘Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition’, Le Centre Sheraton Montreal Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2011.

^4. John Ishiyama and Anna Batta, ‘Swords into Plowshares: The Organizational Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties’, Communist and Post Communist Studies 44 (April 2011) pp.369–79; Curtis and de Zeeuw (note 2); Manning, ‘Party-Building on the Heels of War’ (note 2).

^5. Manning, ‘Party-Building on the Heels of War’ (note 2); de Zeeuw (note 2).

^6. Terrence Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2005).

^7. Benjamin Reilly, ‘Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies’, Democratization 13 (December 2006) pp.811–27; Ishiyama and Batta (note 4).

^8. Allison (note 1).

^9. Ibid. see also, Allison (note 1).

^10. Krishna Kumar (ed.), Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998).

^11. Benjamin Reilly, and Per Nordlund (eds) Political Parties in Conflict Prone Societies: Regulation Engineering and Democratic Development (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2008); de Zeeuw (note 2); Manning (note 2).

^12. By political parties, I mean, taking from Downs (1957), a team of individuals running under a common label that seek office via a duly constituted election. Clearly the former rebel groups in this study qualify as parties under this definition. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper 1957).

^13. Ishiyama and Batta (note 4); Curtis and de Zeeuw (note 2); Manning (note 2).

^14. Manning (note 2); de Zeeuw (note 2); Kalowatie Deonandan, David Close, and Gary Prevost (eds) From Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007); M. Söderberg Kovacs, From Rebellion to Politics (Stockholm: Uppsala Universitet 2007).

^15. Ibid.

^16. See Manning (note 2); Deonandan, Close, and Prevost 2007; Lyons (note 6).

^17. Allison ‘The Legacy of Violence on Post-Civil War Elections’ and ‘The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition’ (note 1).

^18. See de Zeeuw (note 2).

^19. Stathis Kalyvas, ‘Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria’, Rationality and Society 11 (1999) pp.243–85, p.259.

^20. Allison (note 1).

^21. Ibid.

^22. T. P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Rebels and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1992).

^23. Allison (note 1).

^24. Ibid.

^25. Ibid.; for a similar point, see John Ishiyama, ‘Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe’, Comparative Politics 27 (January 1995) pp.146–77.

^26. Ishiyama and Batta (note 4).

^27. David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009) pp.570–95, p.581.

^28. Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, ‘Between Democracy and Revolution: Peasant Support for Insurgency Versus Democracy in Nepal’, Journal of Peace Research 45 (November 2008) pp.765–82.

^29. Scott Gates, ‘Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (March 2002) pp.111–30; Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: CUP 2007); Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: CUP 2006).

^30. Shirin Akiner and C. Barnes, ‘The Tajik Civil War: Causes and Dynamics’, Accord 10 (2001) pp.20–32.

^31. Monica Whitlock, Land Beyond the River: The Untold Story of Central Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press 2003); Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Frédéric Grare, and Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence (New York: St. Martin's Press 1997); Shahram Akbarzadeh, ‘Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?’ Europe-Asia Studies 48 (November 1996) pp.1105–29.

^32. DJalili et al. (note 31).

^33. International Conflict Group (ICG), Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, ICG Asia Report No 30, Osh/Brussels (December 2001) p.8.

^34. Ibid.

^35. Ibid.

^36. Ibid., p.9.

^37. Ibid.

^38. R. A. Nickson, ‘Democratization and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making?’ Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 20 (April 1992) pp.358–86.

^39. These included Communist Party of Nepal (Masal), the Nepal Communist Party, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist).

^40. Weinstein (note 29) p.301; C. Millard, ‘Perceptions of Democracy and Dissent in the Valley of Dhorpatan’ in David N. Gellner (ed.) Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences (New Delhi: Social Science Press 2002) pp.281–305, p.298.

^41. K. Ogura, ‘Seeking State Power. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)’, Berghof Series Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transitions to Politics 3 (2008) pp.1–56, p.7.

^42. H. Skar, ‘PLA CPN (M). The Insurgency of the People's Liberation Army of the Communist Party of Nepal’ in Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Lemy, and John Tilman (eds) Terror, Insurgency and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2007) pp.358–86, p.361.

^43. Ogura (note 41) p.7.

^44. S. B. Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy (New Dehli: Adhayayan Publishers 2007).

^45. Ogura (note 41) p.7.

^46. Skar (note 42) p.359.

^47. Ogura (note 41) p.7.

^48. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Nepal: Country Profile 2007 (London: EIU 2007), p.8.

^49. Ibid., p.10.

^50. N. Nayak, ‘Maoists in Nepal and India: Tactical Alliances and Ideological Differences’, Strategic Analysis 32 (March 2008) pp.459–75, p.468.

^51. Ogura (note 41) p.7.

^52. EIU (note 48) pp.7–9. The CPN (M) were awarded the ministries of Physical Planning and Works, Information and Communication, Forest and Soil Conservation, Local Development, and Women, Children and Social Welfare.

^53. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Nepal: Political and Economic Update (Manila: ADB 2007) pp.329–407.

^54.Nepalnews 21 Jul. 2008; Xinhua (China Daily) 7 Jul. 2008.

^55.Nepalnews 16 Aug. 2008.

^56.BBC News 4 May 2009.

^57. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR), The Republic of Tajikistan: Elections to the Parliament 27 February 2000 Final Report (Warsaw: OSCE 2000).

^58. See online at www.election.gov.np/reports/CAResults/reportBody.php

^59. Magnus Hatlebakk, LSMS Data Quality in Maoist Influenced Areas of Nepal, CMI Working Paper (2007) p.6, online at www.cmi.no

^60. Hatlebakk argues that the best indicator of Maoist control of a district was the government classification of districts as reported in S. Sharma, ‘The Maoists Movement: An Evolutionary Perspective’ in D. Thapa (ed.) Understanding the Maoists Movement of Nepal (Kathmandu: Chautari Books Series 2003) pp.42–55; 2003 (note 59).

^61. Although data made available after a civil war by either side may be viewed with some suspicion, we used these data for two reasons. First, although the accuracy of the data may be questionable, the rank order reported is probably accurate. In other words, it is likely that the data can be trusted to identify whether certain areas had higher levels of violence than others (although we may not be able to determine the exact level of violence). Given the fact that we are interested in the significance of the relationships as opposed to the strength of the relationships in our models, this should be sufficient. Second, these are the only data available.

^62. Stina Torjesen, Christina Wille and S. Neil MacFarlane, Tajikistan's Road to Stability: Reduction in Small ArmsProliferation and Remaining Challenges, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 17, 2005, online at www.smallarmssurvey.org/fles/sas/publications/o_papers_pdf/2005-op17-tadjikistan.pdf

^63. These data were derived from reports in several secondary works and reports, most notably ICG, Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, Asia Report no. 205 (24 May 2011) and ICG (note 33); Barnett Rubin, Causes and Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan (New York: Columbia UP 1995); Sergei Gretsky, ‘Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments and Prospects for Peace' in Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower (eds) Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change(Chevy Chase, MD: CPSS Press 1995) pp.217–47.

^64. Olga Shemyakina, ‘The Effect of Armed Conflict on Accumulation of Schooling: Results from Tajikistan’, Unpublished manuscript (2009).

^65. I would like to thank Olga Shemyakina for pointing out these sources to me.

^66. World Bank, Living Standards Measurement Survey (New York: World Bank 1999) online at http://go.worldbank.org/GSJX8RLT50

^67. Oleg Panfilov, Tadzhikistan: zhurnalisty na grazhdanskoi voine (Tajikistan: Journalists on the Civil War) (Moscow: ‘People's Rights’ 2003); Davlat Nazriev, Respublika Tadzhikistan: Istoriia nezavisimosti (The Republic of Tajikistan: History of Independence) (Dushanbe: Irfon 2002).

^68. INSEC, ‘No. of Victims Killed by State and Maoists in Connection with “People's War”’ (13 Feb 1996–8 Oct 2006), online at www.inseconline.org; Hatlebakk (note 59).

^69. This is approximately equal to the national average of about 12,000 people killed during the civil war out of a population that increased from approximately 20 million in 1996 to approximately 25 million in 2006.

^70. Larissa Jones, Richard Black, and Ronald Skeldon, Migration and Poverty Reduction in Tajikistan (Sussex: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2007).

^71. Harka Gurung, ‘Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency’ in Sarah Webster and Om Gurung (eds) ILO Convention No. 169 and Peace Building in Nepal (Kathmandu, Nepal: International Labor Organization 2005), online at www.ilo.org/indigenous/Resources/Publications/lang–en/docName–WCMS_100657/index.htm

^72. Republic of Tajikistan, Regionii Tadzhikistana: Statisticheskii Sbornik (Dushanbe: State Committee of Statistics 2005).

^73. Pitamber Sharma, ‘Urbanization and Development’ in Population Profile of Nepal 2003 (Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics 2003), chapter 10.

^74. Allison (note 1).

^75. Gurung (note 71).

^76. Ibid.

^77. Ibid.

^78. In order to optimize comparisons with the Allison findings, we employ similar techniques in conducting the quantitative analysis.

^79. John Fox, Regression Diagnostics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1991).

^80. Allison (note 1).