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Original Articles

An Opportunity Structure for Terrorism: Moderate Leadership Departures in Nationalist Movements

Pages 104-127 | Published online: 25 Oct 2018
 

ABSTRACT

Why does terrorist violence escalate from some ethnic groups but not others? According to theoretical insights, many groups endure conditions that should spur on terrorist campaigns, but in reality only some carry them out. In contrast to studies emphasising motivations, this article constructs a framework centred on opportunity structures that contributes to our understanding of the rise of terrorism waged along ethnic lines. It argues that beyond grievances or other motivations, terrorist campaigns develop from communities when moderate political leaders depart from their positions in nationalist movements, causing terrorists to fill the subsequent power vacuum, while little terrorism occurs when leaders do not relinquish the nationalist agenda. This argument is evaluated with evidence from the Tamil and Muslim cases in the context of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Tamil United Liberation Front leaders left the Tamil nationalist movement in the early 1980s, enabling the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s rise to dominate the nationalist agenda for three decades, while the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress did not relinquish the Muslim cause, which in part precluded the normalisation of violence in the community.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Per Hoffman’s (Citation2006) definition, the LTTE classifies as a terrorist organisation. It had political motives and objectives, used and threatened violence, operated to produce widespread psychological effects beyond immediate targets, and was a non-state entity. I do not label the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in order to frame the analysis in a way to favour the Sri Lankan state or Sinhalese majority, denounce the Tamil community, or validate the Sri Lankan state’s continual use of the term terrorism as a political strategy for domestic and international support. Indeed, despite its consistent use of terrorist violence, many sympathised with the organisation’s grievances, plight and separatist ambitions.

2. Other opportunities for terrorism have been evaluated at the international level and consider processes like globalisation. See, for example, Cronin (Citation2002–2003) and Blomberg and Hess (Citation2008).

3. For an exploration of the relationships between political parties and terrorist groups, see Weinberg et al. (Citation2009).

4. For a discussion of the subnational comparative method, see Snyder (Citation2001).

5. Sri Lankan Tamils differ from Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka (also called Hill Country or Up-Country Tamils), who reside predominantly in the central highlands.

6. Under the auspices of the ISPA, the Sri Lankan government united the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1988, resulting in the North Eastern Province, but the Supreme Court deemed this merger unconstitutional in 2006, leading to the separation of the provinces.

7. Because the Moors make up the vast majority of the Muslim community, some interchange the terms ‘Moor’ and ‘Muslim’. Other small Muslim groups include Indian Muslims, Memons and Bohras.

8. A minority of Sinhalese and Tamils are Christian.

9. Muslims predominantly speak Sinhalese in the southern region of the country.

10. The most notable of these other Tamil organisations are the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), EROS, People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and EPRLF. Respectively, these organisations were founded in 1974, 1975, 1979 and 1980. These groups, along with the LTTE, are considered the ‘Tamil Five’. See O’Ballance (Citation1989).

11. The exact number of deaths caused by the LTTE is unknown, but an approximate estimate is over 10,000 between 1970 and 2008. See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). This is likely a low estimate since some incidents have failed to be reported altogether and others are unable to be attributed to the LTTE even when the organisation likely committed them. The Sri Lankan Civil War has claimed approximately 80,000 lives in total. See BBC News (Citation2009).

12. It is important to note, however, that Tamil terrorist groups also forced Muslim support in the form of finances, logistical provisions and labour. See McGilvray and Raheem (Citation2007, p. 20).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Brandon M. Boylan

Brandon M. Boylan is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. His research focuses on international security, terrorism, ethnic conflict and separatist movements.

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