Refining the Line of Distinction between Ethnic Conflict and Security Dilemma: Towards a Theory of Identity Driven Ethnic Conflict

ABSTRACT

The concept of security dilemma has been widely applied to ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the post-Soviet space. This paper argues that for both methodological clarity and policy formation, we should distinguish between ethnic conflicts caused by security dilemma and ones triggered by ethnic identity. It is argued that identity plays a different role in security dilemmas, but a major one in identity-based ethnic conflicts. Although ethnic identity may be at stake in the operation and dynamics of security dilemma, it is not the causal variable in the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Identity-based conflicts may reproduce many of the features of the security dilemma but have other causal factors. Distinguishing between the differing role of identity in security dilemma and identity based-ethnic conflicts may further our understanding of why certain conflicts have become so intractable, while others are relatively easier to resolve. For testing the hypothesis, empirical evidence is presented from two conflicts in the post-Soviet space with variations in the causal variable.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For example, a previous study by Snyder and Jervis (Snyder and Jervis 1999) had identified that ethnic conflicts driven by security/uncertainty and by predatory motivations are difficult to be distinguished, and should therefore be treated as security dilemmas.

2. Emerging anarchy for the purpose of this paper is used to refer to a situation of collapse of a central state, government or any other situation of state weakness when the state is no longer capable of providing security for the ethnic groups.

3. Equally Kaufman, basing it upon the earlier work of Jack Snyder (Snyder 1985), argues that in a ‘structural security dilemma’ one side’s security necessitates the other side’s insecurity (Kaufman 1996b).

4. Adjaria is an autonomous republic within Georgian, populated by Georgian muslims. There was a dispute on power-sharing between Ajarian leader and the Georgian central government in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, which got resolved in 2004.

5. It is to be noted that actually, Fearon distinguishes commitment problem from security dilemma in explaining ethnic conflict in new states, emphasising more the majority’s failure to commit itself to the minority’s present and future.

6. South Ossetia, which was an autonomous oblast within Georgia first appealed for more autonomy within Georgia due to fear of loss of identity after Soviet Union’s disintegration, but as Georgian President Gamsakhurdia dispatched troops to the region, it voted for unification with North Ossetia.

7. Though in 1992, the Abkhaz leader suggested a new treaty regulating the relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia, which secured Georgia’s territorial integrity, but built the relations on a confederative basis. See Toft (2005).

8. For a discussion of the limited role of elites in NK conflict, see A. Voronkova, ‘Nationalism and Organised violence in Nagorno-Karabakh: A microspatial perspective’, Nationalism and ethnic politics, 19, pp. 102–118, 2013.

9. According to the 1979 census, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was 162,000, comprising 123,000 (76 per cent) Armenians and 23,000 Azeris (23 per cent) (Yamskov 1991).

10. Armenians identified the neighbouring Azerbaijanis as ethnic Turkic.

11. For a detailed analysis of the argument that the war was not inevitable, see Erik Melander, ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict revisited: Was the war inevitable?’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 3, No 2, Spring 2001, pp. 48–75.

12. Scholars as Kaufman (1998) and Melander (2001) have seen the incident as a result of the competition between rival elites within NK, and the gradually evolving military phase of the conflict unfolded because of the dominance of the radical elites in the region. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that would suggest about the existence of different elites in NK with divergent views and agendas on the status of the region, not to speak of competition between them.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the GCRF COMPASS.

Notes on contributors

Kavus Abushov

Kavus Abushov is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at ADA University. is research interests include civil wars, security studies and state-building. PhD in Political Science, University of Muenster, GermanyPostdoc, MIT, Center for International StudiesMA in Political Science and Economics,  Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt.