Local governments in the driving seat? A comparative analysis of public and private responsibilities for adaptation to climate change in European and North-American cities

Figures & data

Table 1. Overview of rationales for public, private and public–private responsibilities.

Rationales	Description
Rule of law	Conformance to the regulations to which the adaptation issue is subject (Driessen & van Rijswick, 2011). National regulations and constitutions often assign certain duties of care to local public authorities concerning the liveability of the environment.
Fairness	A reasonable distribution of costs, benefits and responsibilities. Fairness often leads to public responsibilities, to safeguard an equitable distribution of burdens and benefits (e.g. Eakin & Lemos, 2006; Osberghaus et al., 2010; Paavola, 2008).
Securing adaptation action (effectiveness)	Attainment of predefined adaptation goals to secure the supply of sufficient levels of an adaptation good (as a specification of effectiveness). Market failure may result in under-adaptation (insufficient levels) or mal-adaptation (undesired forms of adaptation). It may motivate public actors to provide the adaptation good themselves, or to stimulate private adaptation action (e.g. Aakre & Rübbelke, 2010; Berkhout, 2005; Mendelsohn, 2006).
Efficiency	Optimum allocation of scarce resources by supplying an adaptation good at the lowest cost. According to economists, the private sector is generally more efficient in allocating scarce resources and in spurring innovations (e.g. Agrawala & Fankhauser, 2008). Efficiency is an important rationale for assuming responsibilities with private actors.
Legitimacy	Acceptance by stakeholders and society of certain adaptation goals/measures, and of the way in which decisions about these goals/measures are made (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007). Legitimacy often induces public–private arrangements through deliberative processes in which a wide range of stakeholders participate, and particularly those most affected (e.g. Adger et al., 2009).
Accountability	Clarity of responsibilities and transparency of information on the content and process of policy-making, so that actors can be held accountable. As a rationale, it tends to foster the creation of networks in which responsibilities are shared between public and private actors and in which communication, information and knowledge are exchanged (e.g. Bodin & Crona, 2009; Bogason & Musso, 2006).

Table 2. Overview of empirical research.

	Green roofs	Adaptive building	Heat prevention
Adaptation issue	Storm-water retention: surface water flooding from excessive rainfall	Water safety: flooding from high river discharge levels, storm surges and sea-level rise	Heat prevention: morbidity and mortality of vulnerable citizens from extreme heat events
Adaptation measure	Green roofs are roofs with vegetation (sedum, grass, moss, etc.). They help to store excessive rainfall and also reduce excessive heat build-up in houses, without consuming scarce space in dense urban areas	Adaptive building measures are applied to buildings to reduce the impact of a flood, such as the waterproof finishing of floors and walls inside the house, the elevation of electricity sockets, use of the ground floor for parking/storage, etc.	Heat stress prevention measures through health care, in particular care that stimulates the adjustment of individual behaviour (e.g. drinking more water, ventilating rooms, seeking cooler places and refraining from heavy exercise)
Base-case unit	Rotterdam	Rotterdam	Rotterdam
Comparative case units	Basel, Chicago, London, Stuttgart	Hamburg, Helsinki	Arnhem (workshop) 10 foreign cities (desk research): Chicago, Kassel, London, New York, Paris, Philadelphia, Rome, Stuttgart, Tatabanya and Toronto
Data collection methods	Policy documents analysis In-depth interviews stakeholders (n = 53) experts (n = 1)	Policy documents analysis In-depth interviews stakeholders (n = 36) experts (n = 4)	Policy documents analysis Two multi-stakeholder workshops (n = 63) One focus group (n = 14) Expert interviews (n = 3)

Table 3. Comparison of responsibilities across the three adaptation measures for all cities.

Stages	Roles	Green roofs for storm-water retention	Adaptive building for water safety	Health-care measures for heat prevention
Planning	Agenda setting	Public (all cities)	Public (Ha&He)	Data not available
		Private (consultants, ecologists) (L&B)	Private (He only for floating houses)
		Public–private (industry association) (B only)	Public–private (R only)
	Risk/vulnerability assessments	Public (all cities)	Public (all cities)	Public (all cities)
		Private (consultants, ecologists) (L&B)
	Initiation of policy	Public (all cities)	Public (Ha&He)	Public (all cities)
			Public–private (R only)
Implementation	Strategy making	Public (all cities)	Public (Ha&He)	Data not available
			Public–private (R only)
	Planning and coordination	Public (all cities)	Public (Ha&He)	Data not available
			Public–private (R only)
	Financing and implementation	Public (financial incentives) (all cities except L)	Public (public infrastructure) (all cities)	Public–private (HC measures) (all cities)
		Private (property owners) (all cities)	Private (adaptive measures) (all cities)	Public (early warning system) (all cities)
Evaluation	Monitoring	Public (tracking of installations) (all cities)	Public (during planning permission) (all cities)
		Public (quality control) (B only)
		Private (product norms/quality label) (B&S)	Private (housing corporation) (R only)
	Enforcement	Public (B&S)	Not applicable	Not applicable
Maintenance	Maintenance of measure	Public (for public buildings only) (all cities)	Public (for public infrastructure only) (all cities)	Not applicable
		Private (property owners) (all cities)	Private (property owners) (all cities)
	Risk communication	Not applicable	Public (Ha&R, no risk communication in He)	Public (all cities)
	Flood damage control	Not applicable	Public (flood evacuation planning) (all cities)	Not applicable
			Private (residents, Flutschutzgemeinschaften) (all cities)
	Recovery of damage	Not applicable	Private (residents) (all cities)	Not applicable

B = Basel, Ha = Hamburg, He = Helsinki, HC = health-care, L = London, R = Rotterdam, S = Stuttgart.

Table 4. Comparison of rationales for public responsibilities in the city of Rotterdam.

Responsibility	Stages/roles	Green roofs for storm-water retention	Adaptive building for water safety	Health-care measures for heat prevention
Public	Plan: knowledge creation incl. risk/vulnerability assessments	Securing adaptation action: uncertainty of costs and benefits of GRs leads to inaction of private actors	Securing adaptation action: private actors do not have the means to perform flood risk assessments	Efficiency and rule of law: the local authority is considered most efficient at gathering information from public and private organizations; duty of care of local authority for the health of its citizens (Dutch Health Act 2008)
Public	Plan: agenda setting/initiation of policy	Rule of law: duty of care of the local authority for the prevention of surface water flooding on public grounds (Dutch Water Act 2008)	Not applicable (see public–private responsibility)	Fairness and rule of law: only the local authority can guard the interest of the weakest; duty of care of the local authority for the health of its citizens (Dutch Health Act 2008)
Public	Do: strategy making	Efficiency: choice of GRs as water retention measure because they are less costly than infrastructural measures and costs can be shared with the private sector	Not applicable (see public–private responsibility)	Data not available
Public	Do: financing and implementation	Securing adaptation action: high upfront installation costs discourage private actors; local authority offers a subsidy for installation of GRs	Securing adaptation action: local authority increases the protection level of the neighbourhood to a minimum security level through a partial levy	Not applicable (see public–private responsibility)
Public	Check: monitoring	Fairness and accountability: local authority monitors GR installations in line with granted subsidies		Not applicable
Public	Maintenance: risk communication	Not applicable	Securing adaptation action: local authority provides advice due to a lack of awareness for and sense of urgency of citizens	Rule of law: duty of care of the local authority for the health of its citizens (Dutch Health Act 2008)
Private	Do: financing and implementation	Efficiency GRs have many co-benefits that make them attractive for private property owners, thus providing economies of scope		Legitimacy and personal empowerment interventions by others are impingement on one's independence and easily viewed as paternalism
Private	Plan: knowledge creation incl. risk/vulnerability assessments	Efficiency GR industry develops knowledge about the benefits of GRs to make them more efficient for property owners		Not applicable
Private	Check: monitoring	Efficiency GR industry creates voluntary quality norms for product attributes to create market demand		Not applicable
Private	Maintenance: of measure	Efficiency adequate maintenance reduces costs; GR industry often integrates maintenance in their contracts		Not applicable
Public–private	Plan: agenda setting/initiation of policy	Not applicable	Legitimacy: All parties that are taking on responsibility for flood risk governance should be able to influence the decision-making process (throughput legitimacy); involvement of all parties encourages a wide endorsement of the arrangement (output legitimacy)	Not applicable
Public–private	Do: strategy making	Not applicable	Legitimacy: All parties that are taking on responsibility for flood risk governance should be able to influence the decision-making process (throughput legitimacy); involvement of all parties encourages a wide endorsement of the arrangement (output legitimacy)	Not applicable
Public–private	Do: financing and implementation	Not applicable		Securing adaptation action and efficiency neighbourhood teams of public and private actors can pull their collective resources together; ideally heat health concerns are integrated into existing teams to be cost effective

Notes: Not applicable: the role does not exist or the role is taken on by/allocated with other actors.

GR = Green roof.

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