Towards methodological adventure in cost overrun research: linking process and product

Figures & data

Table 1. Articles obtained from Journal Databases.

Journal	Number of Articles
Construction Management and Economics	7
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management	11
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management	12
International Journal of Construction Management	11
Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction	8
Journal of Infrastructure Systems	9
Journal of the American Planning Association	14
International Journal of Project Management	9
Transport Policy	12
Public Works Management and Policy	5

Figure 1. Method of study.

Table 2. Dichotomous explanations for cost overruns in public projects.

Reference	Technical explanations	Theoretical explanations	Methodological underpinning
		Poor value judgment public proprietorship of public projects is inherently challenging	CROSS- PARADIGMIC Positivist Analysis-exploratory statistics) with Interpretivist Interpretation
		Deliberately flawed nature of the forecasting techniques adopted	NON-EMPIRICAL
	Technical neglect in project formulation and management.	Thinly spread government budget A vicious cycle of delays and intentional short funding	MONO-PARADIGM ((Interpretivist) Qualitative case study
		unrealistic land use forecasts and optimistic ridership forecasts	NON-EMPIRICAL
		Strategically promoted unviable projects chosen over competing less capital-intensive options	NON- EMPIRICAL
		Deliberate Deception due to self-interest or political motives; Physiological delusion due to economic motives	CROSS-PARADIGMIC Positivist Analysis (exploratory statistics) Interpretivist Interpretation
		Rent-seeking behaviour of special interest groups, and the tendency to underestimate tenders to get proposals accepted”.	NON-EMPIRICAL
		Strategic ignorance feigned by project sponsors under imperfect market conditions	NON-EMPIRICAL
	Technical project factors		MONO-PARADIGM Positivist Analysis – Regression Modelling of cause-effect
	Impact of Project variables		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Regression Modelling of cause-effect
	Length of project implementation, geographic location		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Trend analysis of project data
	larger cost overruns linked to smaller project size		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) -Correlation/Trend analysis
	Poor estimating methodologiesand Incomplete technical details used in generating estimates		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) -Trend/correlation analysis
	The inaccuracy of initial estimates due to reliance on judgment, expertise, and experience.		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist analysis)- Neural network modelling of cause-effect
	design-error induced rework	embedded behavioral inefficiencies: “time boxing and costly consultants’ complacency	MIXED-PARADIGM Mixed Methods Case study
		Delusion and deception by planners	NON-EMPIRICAL
	re-work leading to cost overruns		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Statistical analysis of mixed data.
		Physiological and Political bias leading to lock-in	MONO-PARADIGM (Interpretivist) Qualitative case study
		Unintentional pathogens in organizational practice that trigger an additive chain of costly errors	MONO-PARADIGM (Interpretivist) Qualitative case study
	Regional and country-specific peculiarities		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Comparative trend analysis
		Relay race between technical and nontechnical expertise and politics of megaproject governance	MONO-PARADIGM (Interpretivist) Qualitative case study
		Strategic behaviour of principal actors in public projects	MONO-PARADIGM (Interpretivist) Qualitative case study
	Unreliable initial cost estimates non-linear interactions amongst project variables		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Quantitative analysis of Mixed data Neural network modelling
		Strategic ignorance leading to the survival of the most unfit projects	NON-EMPIRICAL
	Technical risk exposure		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Quantitative analysis of Mixed data- Regression /CBR modelling
	High level of unaccounted risks and uncertainties		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Quantitative analysis of mixed data- Factor analysis/Regression Analysis
	Insufficient technical competence and expertise in cost forecasting	Corruption Political motives	CROSS-PARADIGMIC Positivist Analysis (exploratory statistics) Interpretivist Interpretation
	Low technical expertise, Inadequate geotechnical risk management, and local geological parameters		MIXED-PARADIGM Mixed methods case study
	Geographic/regional peculiarities, the type of infrastructures, and time of project implementation		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) econometric meta- analysis
	Change orders leading to unintended consequences		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Quantitative Case Study
	Geotechnical risks and uncertainties	Oppressive pressure on professionals, preferential practices of public agencies and unethical practices Subconscious attitudes of stakeholders	MIXED-PARADIGM Mixed methods case study
	Technical Knowledge Deficiencies in organizations.	Psycho-Social Constructs and	MONO-PARADIGM (Interpretivist) Qualitative case study
	unreliable contingency forecasts due to lack of reliable benchmarks and probabilities		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Probabilistic analysis
	Deviations from Geotechnical best Practices	Organizational and institutional environment	Mono-method (Interpretivist) Qualitative Case study
		Salami tactics adopted politicians and planners in blame management	MONO-PARADIGM (Interpretivist) Qualitative Case study
		Risk aversion of contracting authorities and opportunities behaviour during project execution	CROSS-PARADIGMIC Positivist Analysis (exploratory statistics) Interpretivist Interpretation
	Level of accuracy associated with preliminary cost estimating models		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Comparative modelling.
	Political, institutional, and governance peculiarities		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Trend/econometric analysis
	Exogenous economic variables		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Systematic literature Survey/content analysis.
	Scope creep, rework, construction delays, and lowest bidder contract award criteria		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Quantitative analysis of Mixed data
	Size, nature, and type of project		MONO-PARADIGM (Positivist) Descriptive statistics/ Trend analysis

1. Hall (1980) 2. Wachs (1989) 3. Morris (1990) 4. Kain (1990) 5. Pickerel (1992) 6. Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) 7. Bruzelius et al. (20020 8. Ganuza (2003) 9. Trost and Oberlender (2003) 10. Attala and Hegazy (2003) 11. Flyvbjerg (2004) 12. Odeck (2004) 13. Baccarini (2004) 14. Sodikov (2005) 15. Love et al. (2008) 16. Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) 17. Love et al. (2009) 18. Cantarelli et al. (2010b) 19. Love et al. (2012) 20. Cantarelli, et al. (2012) 21. Gil and Lundriganm (2012) 22. Cantarelli et al (2013) 23. Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014) 24. Flyvbjerg (2014) 25. El-Kholy (2015) 26. Creedy (2010) 27. Sarmento and Reeneboog (2017) 28. Amadi and Higham (2017) 29. Odeck (2019) 30. Love et al (2017) 31. Amadi and Higham (2018a) 32. Amadi and Higham (2018b) 33. Love et al (2018) 34. Amadi and Higham (2018c) 35. Hinterleitner (2019) 36. Cavalieri et al. (2019) 37. El Kholy (2019) 38. Catalão et al (2019) 39. Asamoah et al (2019) 40. Annamalaisami and Kuppuswamy (2019) 41. Heravi and Mohammadian (2019).

Figure 2. A typically adventurous mix of methods in cost overrun research (Amadi 2016).

Figure 3. Deductive/inductive based research reasoning.

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