Limitations of Virtue Ethics in the Social Professions

Abstract

The re-emergence of virtue ethics (henceforth VE) as both an academic theory and as an approach to applied ethics has contributed to the re-invigoration of ethical debate. It has encouraged reflective consideration of the nature of professionals' commitments to various values that constitute their personal and professional character, both collectively and individually. This paper argues that whilst there may be some value in the re-orientation of applied ethics towards questions of character, it has its limitations, including a tendency to be reduced rather too easily to self-serving ends that ultimately favour dominant social groups. It should therefore be treated with caution by social professionals.

Keywords:

• Virtue Ethics
• Social Professions
• Oppression

Notes

1. Throughout this paper I refer to ‘oppression’ and ‘anti-oppressive’ values, but do not elaborate on either. The former is discussed in some philosophical detail in works by O'Connor (2002) and Cudd (2006), and is taken as a usable concept in works by feminist philosophers such as Tessman (2008). Both concepts are well-known in the social professions, in applied ethics and professional practice (Dalrymple & Burke 2006; Baines 2011). A key point is that oppression is understood not only in terms of individual actions but also systemically as part of the dominance of powerful social groups (Clifford 2008, 2009).