Divine law divided: Francisco de Vitoria on civil and ecclesiastical powers

ABSTRACT

Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1485–1546) is well-known for his philosophical contributions to natural rights and international law. However, his extensive work on the conflict between civil authority and the authority of the Catholic Church has been largely neglected by political theorists and intellectual historians. While scholars have recently recognized the significant role played by natural law in the history of political secularism, they have focused almost exclusively on the “modern” natural law theories of Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Thomasius, as opposed to the “scholastic” natural law of early modern Thomists like Vitoria. This essay undertakes an analysis of Vitoria’s use of natural law theory in his approach to civil–ecclesiastical conflict. Contrary to critiques from the “modern” natural lawyers, it argues that Vitoria’s idea of natural law spearheads a forceful defense of the autonomy of civil power from ecclesiastical power. Based on his sharp distinction between the natural and the supernatural spheres of human life, Vitoria argues for a “dualist” position in which civil and ecclesiastical powers are independent and equally binding on human consciences. The essay acknowledges that Vitoria’s dualism ultimately gives way to his endorsement of papal supremacy over all Christian princes. However, this papalist conclusion does not follow from Vitoria’s natural law theory but rather from an opposing political principle: the notion of the universal Christian commonwealth.

KEYWORDS:

• Francisco de Vitoria
• natural law
• divine law
• civil authority
• ecclesiastical authority
• papal power

Acknowledgements

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 2016 Cambridge Graduate Conference in Political Thought and Intellectual History, during which I received extensive comments and suggestions from Joseph Canning as well as comments from Annabel Brett and Daniel Allemann. I am grateful for comments from Jean Cohen, Camila Vergara, Benjamin Mueser, Rob Goodman, Aaron Zubia, Brian Pietras, and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1 See Brunstetter, “Tale of Two Cities”; Koskenniemi, “Vitoria and Us”; Bain, “Saving the Innocent”; Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 40–50; Cavallar, “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff”; Muldoon, “Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention”; Tuck, War and Peace; Anghie, Imperialism; Pagden, Fall of Natural Man; Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy; Hanke, Spanish Struggle; Scott, Spanish Origin.

2 See Castaño, “La Summa Potestas”, 107–17; van Liere, “Vitoria, Cajetan, and the Conciliarists”, 597–616. Two notable exceptions are Tung, “Supernatural and Natural Sovereignty”, 45–68, and Barbier, “Pouvoir Spirituel et Temporel”, 297–310.

3 References to these lectures are from the Latin manuscripts in Urdánoz, Obras. All English translations are from Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings.

4 Molina, De iustitia et iure, Part I, Tract II, disp. 21, 22, 26, 29, 30; Bellarmine, De Laicis, ch. 11, and Bellarmine, De potestate summi Pontificis, preface, chs 5, 35, 36, both translated in Tutino, On Temporal and Spiritual Authority, 46, 136, 186, 376, 381; Mariana, De Rege, I.1, 19–22; Suárez, De legibus ac deo legislatore, II.14, and Suárez, Defensio fidei, III.5, both translated in Pink, Selections from Three Works, 306, 768.

5 For the anti-scholastic projects of Pufendorf and Thomasius, see Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, 6–7, 149–50, 201. For the influence of Grotius and Hobbes on these projects, see Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law”.

6 Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law”; Hont, “Sociability and Commerce”; Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 66.

7 Christian Thomasius argues this in his foreward to the 1707 edition of Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. See Thomasius, “History of Natural Law”, 41–3. Detlef Döring attributes this view to Pufendorf. See Döring, “Säkularisierung und Moraltheologie”, 156–74, cited by Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, 150. For a contemporary critique of scholastic natural law along these lines, see Hunter and Saunders, Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty, 2–5.

8 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §1, 151; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 4.

9 As we will see, these arguments cut in several different directions. Lutherans used this idea to argue that Christians are not obligated in conscience to obey human laws. Defenders of ecclesiastical supremacy argued that kings rule only by human law and are thus subordinate to the Church. Defenders of democracy argued that kingship was a human institution and could thus be altered or challenged by the commonwealth as a whole. Vitoria rejects all of these political doctrines in this lecture.

10 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §8, 161–2; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 14.

11 Vitoria uses both “ius naturale et divinum” and “ius divinum et naturale”. See De Potestate Civili, 159, 161, 166.

12 For a summary of this debate, see Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 257.

13 Deckers, Gerechtigkeit und Recht, 188–90; Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 123–37.

14 Vitoria, Comentarios, Vol. III, Q. 62, a. 2, n. 5. Richard Tuck focuses on this passage in his objective interpretation of Vitoria. See Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 46.

15 Comentarios, III, 62, 1, 29, translated and cited by Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 131. See also Oliveira e Silva, “Francisco de Vitoria”, 153.

16 For a similar discussion of ius naturale as natural necessity, see Comentarios, III, 57, 2–3. See also Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 125–6.

17 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §5, 157; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 9.

18 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §4, 154–6. Here Vitoria closely follows Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a4–1103b5.

19 This follows closely from Aristotle’s view of humans as political animals and the idea of “immanent impulse in all men towards an association”. See Aristotle, Politics, I. ii. 15.

20 Vitoria, De lege, §123, 169.

21 Vitoria, De indis, 3.18, 723–5. For a detailed discussion of this question, see Pagden, Fall of Natural Man, 66–108.

22 Vitoria, De indis, 1.23, 664.

23 Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 117–22.

24 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, 1.2; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 9. This same argument is found in Almain, Libellus de auctoritate ecclesiae, 135–6. Vitoria and Almain were both drawing on the subjective notion of ius developed by Jean Gerson and Conrad Summenhart. According to these thinkers, iura are the natural powers possessed by all created things in accordance with right reason: all animals have the right to use other living things for their sustenance, and the sun has the right to shed its light on the earth. Some of these rights are merely permitted by right reason because they do not contravene natural law. Other rights, however, are required by natural law because a being cannot achieve its proper ends without them. See Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 36–7, 76–85; Tierney, Natural Rights, 260–2.

25 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §5, 157.

26 Ibid., §8, 162.

27 Ibid., §10, 166; Almain, Libellus de auctoritate ecclesiae, 135–6.

28 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §9, 164–5. This point had been partially defended by Aquinas in his Secunda secundae. See Vitoria, Comentarios, I, 10, 1, 1, 200–1.

29 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §9, 165; Vitoria, De indis, 1.5, 651–2.

30 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §6, 158–9. Vitoria cites Aristotle, Physics, 254b13–256a3.

31 Vitoria and Almain adopted this idea from Aquinas, Secunda secundae, Q. 64, a. 2. See Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 118.

32 See Aquinas, Secunda secundae, Q. 64, aa. 3, 7.

33 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §7, 160. Vitoria also makes this point in his discussion of homicide. See Comentarios, III, 64, 2, 8. Vitoria offers a different explanation of capital punishment with the same conclusion in De lege, §125, 177.

34 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §8, 164.

35 Gerson, De Vita Spirituali Animae, Lecture IV, 157.

36 Vitoria addresses “evangelical liberty” (libertas evangelica) directly in De Potestate Civili §8, 163. The Roman Church saw Lutheran evangelical liberty as posing a direct threat to civil authority everywhere. See Pope Adrian VI’s letter to Cardinal Chieregati (1522), reprinted in Smith and Jacobs, Luther’s Correspondence, Vol. 2, 143. See also Decock, “Adrian of Utrecht”, 573–93.

37 Luther, “Freedom of a Christian”, 349–50; Luther, Lectures on Galatians, 1:7.

38 Brett similarly notes the voluntarist tendencies in Vitoria’s legal philosophy. See Brett, “Later Scholastic Philosophy of Law”, 344–5.

39 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §16, 184; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 34–5.

40 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §§16–17, 184–5; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 34–5.

41 Almain, De potestate ecclesiastica et laica, Question I, ch. 10, col. 1045.

42 Ibid., I.1, col. 1014.

43 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §17, 186; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 36. Although Almain is not named here, Vitoria explicitly refutes Almain’s view in De lege, §125, 177–8.

44 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, Question 5, §1, 292–3.

45 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 3, 1159–60.

46 Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty, 255–6; Berman, Law and Revolution, 113–16; Watt, “Temporal and Spiritual Powers”, 422.

47 Canning, Ideas of Power, 12.

48 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.2, 294. See also Vitoria, Relectio de temperantia, 1057; Vitoria, De Indis, 2.2, 2.7, 676, 684.

49 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.1, 292–3.

50 Ibid., 5.2, 294.

51 Hostiensis, On Decretales, 4.17.13, Per Venerabilem, excerpted in Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, 156.

52 Augustinus Triumphus, Summa de ecclesiastica potestate, Question 22, article 3, 452–3.

53 Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels, 9–17; Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, 59–62. Vitoria takes up this argument in De temperantia, 1057.

54 Canning, Ideas of Power, 31.

55 FitzRalph, Summa de Erroribus Armenorum, 75v, cited by Gwynn, English Austin Friars, 60–1; Wycliffe, De Civili Dominio, 1a. English translation in McGrade et al., Medieval Philosophical Texts.

56 Marsilius, Defender of the Peace, Discourse I, chs 17, 19, 114–22, 127–36.

57 Ibid., I. 5, 28–30; II. 23, 409–11.

58 Izbicki, “The Reception of Marsilius”, 319–22.

59 Marsilius, Defender of the Peace, II. 2, 145–6; Luther, “Temporal Authority”, 117; Luther, “Freedom of a Christian”, 354–5. Luther himself was not a true caesaropapist in Weber’s sense of the term, because he denied that civil rulers held any spiritual authority. See Luther, “Temporal Authority”, 106–10. However, the caesaropapist ambitions of civil rulers were bolstered by Luther’s break from the Church and the rise of autonomous national churches. See Skinner, Foundations, vol. 2, 81–5.

60 For Vitoria on Luther’s idea of the priesthood of all believers, see De potestate ecclesiastica relectio secunda, Question 2, 375–8. For his engagement with Luther on ecclesiastical law, see De lege, §125, 175. On Marsilius, see Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 6.9, 326–7.

61 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiastica relectio secunda, 1.4, 358; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 115.

62 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 2, 140.

63 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.4–5.8, 297–300; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 86–8.

64 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.3, 296; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 85.

65 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.1, 1094a5–15.

66 Giles of Rome, De ecclesiastica potestate, II.6, 117, 127; James of Viterbo, De regimine Christiano, 211. This idea of temporal ends as intermediate rather than final is also present in Aquinas, De regimine principum, ch. 15, 41.

67 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.9, 301–2; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 89.

68 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.4, 297–8: “Sed potest confirmari, quia respublica temporalis est respublica perfecta et integra. Ergo non est subiecta alicui extra se, alias non esset integra”.

69 Vitoria, De Indis, 1.4, 650.

70 FitzRalph, De Pauperie Salvatoris, Book II, ch. 2, 336; II. 6, 344–5. For a full discussion of FitzRalph’s theory of grace-founded dominium, see Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 68–71.

71 FitzRalph, De Pauperie Salvatoris, II. 6, 344–5.

72 Ibid., II. 11, 353.

73 Vitoria, De Indis, 1.5–6, 652–3: “Peccatum mortale non impedit dominium civile et verum dominium”.

74 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 1.8, 249.

75 Ibid., 1.12, 252–3.

76 Ibid., 1.13, 255; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 56.

77 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 2.1–2.10, 256–73.

78 Ibid., 3.6, 278: “Tota potestas ecclesiastica et spiritualis, quae nunc residet in Ecclesia, est de iure divino positivo mediate vel immediate”.

79 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I–II, 91.4: “per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna participatur altiori modo”.

80 Vitoria, De lege, §122, 160–1.

81 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 3.1–3.6, 274–9.

82 Ibid., 1.13, in Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 57. This passage is absent from the Urdánoz manuscript.

83 Ibid., 2.1, 257.

84 Ibid., 2.2–2.10, 258–73.

85 Marsilius, Defensor pacis, II. 7, 211–12.

86 Oakley, “Royal Potestas Ordinis”, 347–54.

87 Weber describes such a compromise based on the rationalization of salvation. See Economy and Society, vol. 3, 1161–2.

88 This tension has been pointed out in Fernández-Santamaria, The State, War and Peace, 101–2. However, he ultimately sees these two positions as reconcilable.

89 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.9, 301.

90 Ibid., 5.10, 302; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 90.

91 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.10, 302–4.

92 Ibid., 5.11–12, 304–6; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 91–3.

93 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.13, 306–7; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 93.

94 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 1.4–7, 243–6. For an influential articulation of this view, see Hugh of St. Victor’s De sacramentis Christianae fidei (c. 1134), which Vitoria often cites. Hugh describes the Church as composed of all the members of the faithful and is divided into two parts: the inferior laity and the superior clergy. See Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, Book II, Part 2, chs II–VII, 254–8.

95 Canning, Ideas of Power, 29; McCready, “Papal Plenitudo Potestatis”, 662; Ladner, “Church and State”, 403–22.

96 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.12, 305: “Sed hoc non spectat ad officium principum saecularium, qui ignorant proportionem rerum temporalium ad spiritualia, nec habent curam rerum spiritualium. Ergo ista cura utendi temporalibus ad spiritualia est potestatis ecclesiasticae”.

97 McCready, “Plenitudo Potestatis”, 660. McCready draws on Arquillière’s influential notion of “political Augustinianism”. See Arquillière, L’Augustinisme Politique.

98 I am indebted to Joseph Canning for pointing this out to me. See Canning, Ideas of Power, 29.

99 McCready, “Plenitudo Potestatis”, 665.

100 Ibid., 662.

101 Berman, Law and Revolution, 110–1.

102 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 1.13; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 57. This passage is absent from the Urdánoz manuscript.

103 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this important qualification.

104 John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, especially ch. 13, 152–60.

105 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.14, 309; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 95.

106 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.12, 305–6. On the argument from ratione peccati, see Tierney, “Tria Quippe Distinguit Iudicia”, 48–59. For an example of this argument, see John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, ch. 13, 153.

107 Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty, especially 265–6, 321–2.

108 Vitoria, De potestate ecclesiae prior, 5.13, 307; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 94. Vitoria also makes this argument in De Potestate Civili, §14 and De Indis, 3.14.

109 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 12.2.

110 Ibid., 11.3.

111 Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §14, 180; Pagden and Lawrance, Political Writings, 31.

112 Vitoria, De indis, 1.6, 653–5, 2.15, 697–8.

113 Vitoria makes this point explicitly in his lecture De eo ad quod tenetur homo, cum primum venit ad usum rationis, cited in Brett, Changes of State, 41.

114 Vitoria, De indis, 2.6, 682.

115 On the necessity of idolatry, see Vitoria, “Evangelization of Unbelievers”, 347. On the reasonableness of Indians’ false religion, see Vitoria, De indis, 1.23, 664.

116 Vitoria, “Evangelization of Unbelievers”, 344.

117 Vitoria does discuss this possibility, but he implies that such drastic measures would only be justified by the Indians’ violent resistance to evangelization. See Vitoria, De Indis, 3.9–3.11, 715–7.

118 Ibid., 3.14, 719–20.

119 For example, see his discussion of the justness of war between Christian countries in Vitoria, De Potestate Civili, §13, 167–8.

120 Thomasius, “History of Natural Law”, 32–3.

121 Ibid., 45.

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Nathaniel Mull

Nathaniel Mull is a postdoctoral lecturer at the Princeton Writing Program at Princeton University. He received his Ph.D. in political theory from Columbia University in 2018. He is currently working on a book manuscript based on his doctoral dissertation, entitled Natural Law and the Origins of Political Secularism.