ABSTRACT
This article examines the potential for Shiʿa clerics to engage in religious peacebuilding in post-2003 Iraq. By drawing upon theoretical insights from other post-conflict settings and interviews with clerics, I demonstrate that there are two key challenges facing clerics who seek to engage in peacebuilding. First, the association of the Shiʿa religious establishment with political actors has created a crisis of legitimacy for clerics. Secondly, the structure of authority within the religious establishment has made it difficult for activist clerics to introduce theological reforms to aid peacebuilding efforts. I argue that these challenges are neither insurmountable nor unique.
KEYWORDS:
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Shamiran Mako for inviting me to take part of the workshop that launched this special edition, as well as the Pardee School at Boston University for hosting the workshop. I would additionally like to thank the participants of the workshop for their comments and engagement. I am grateful for the extensive and thoughtful comments given to me by two anonymous peer reviewers as well as by the excellent editors at the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. Finally, I am grateful to the clerics who spoke with me and shared their experiences of dialogue and peacebuilding, this work would not be possible without them.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Interview with Ali Al-Taleqani (Kerbala, Iraq – December 2018).
2 See full text of Friday sermon on this issue here.
3 See here an example of peacebuilding efforts amongst other religious leaders.
4 It also refers to the other elite Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf including Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim, Bashir Al-Najafi and Muhammad Ishaq Al-Fayadh, who recognize the leadership of al-Sistani but run their own offices, seminaries, charities and organizations.
5 [Dirasa Muqadima lilhizb Hawl Al-Shiʿa wa Madarisahum wa ‘Ulama’hum] (023-4-7-0003.), [Ba'th Arab Socialist Party Regional Command collection dataset (BRCC)], Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives.
6 Interview with anonymous elite cleric (Najaf, Iraq – December 2018).
7 Link to full letter here.
8 For more information on the history of the Daʿwa Party, see: (Talib Citation2019).
9 Interview with Mohammad Taqi Al-Modaressi (Kerbala, Iraq – December 2017).
10 Interview with Izz Al-Din Al-Hakim (Najaf, Iraq – December 2018).
11 Interview with Mohammad Hadi Al-Modaressi (London, UK – October 2018).
12 Interview with Muhammad Al-Qubanchi (Najaf, Iraq – December 2018).
13 Interview with Jawad Al-Khoei (Najaf, Iraq – December 2018). Al-Khoei puts the number of Hawza students at approximately fifteen thousand.
14 Interview with unnamed Hawza teacher (Najaf, Iraq – January 2019).
15 Interview with Ali Al-Taleqani (Kerbala, Iraq – December 2018).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Marsin Rahim Alshamary
Marsin Rahim Alshamary is a non-resident fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and a non-resident fellow with the Institute for Regional and International Studies at the American University of Iraq in Suleiymaniyah. She holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT and her research focuses on the role of elite Shi'a clerics in anti-government protest in Iraq.