Match-fixing in Greece and Turkey and UEFA’s policy responses to it: a comparative study

ABSTRACT

Through the increased attention match-fixing has received from both academia and policymakers in recent years, its complexity and the consequent inability to identify a one-fits-all description of the phenomenon have been underlined, highlighting that we have yet to fully capture the various forms of its manifestation in modern day sport. At the same time, and despite academic endeavours, the scholarly work on policy responses against match-fixing is remarkably scarce. In addressing these gaps, this study aims to examine two high-profile match-fixing cases in Greece and Turkey, the ‘Koriopolis’ and the ‘Şike Davası’ scandals, respectively, while considering the policy responses of UEFA, through the analysis of its normative framework and the way in which it was implemented in the two cases. This comparative study offers details of the social organisation of the two scandals, highlighting the various actors, structures and processes within them, as well as the UEFA policy responses they were met with. What is underlined through the study is not only the key role of individuals embedded in the football ecosystem but also the potentially adverse effects of adopting the ‘organised crime’ narrative in both official and media accounts, preventing us from truly capturing the phenomenon and policymakers from responding to it. Simultaneously, this study highlights that despite its existing detailed and thorough normative framework, UEFA’s inconsistency in its implementation in the two cases sends a mixed message about tolerating match-fixing, while inviting much needed further research on the matter.

KEYWORDS:

• Manipulation of sport competitions
• sport corruption
• sport integrity
• football corruption
• football integrity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. A minor but nevertheless interesting point about the relevance of these two case studies is that both Greece and Turkey have their dominant football clubs located in one city/area (Athens/Piraeus and Istanbul, respectively), in contrast to Spain (Madrid and Barcelona), Italy (Turin and Milan), France (Paris, Marseilles, and Lyon), Portugal (Lisbon and Porto) or England (Liverpool, Manchester and London).

2. Although in Hill’s work a much more diverse set of entities in match-fixing is put forward.

3. Of course, middle-men have been present in other contexts too. In ‘Calciopoli’, for instance, one of the main protagonists was the director of football at Juventus, Luciano Moggi, who was strategically situated in a wide network of politicians, administrators, referees, and journalists (Doidge 2018).