Abstract
Who would be the first to notice, and able to intervene, with individuals considering acts of violent extremism? Study 1 found evidence that those best positioned to notice early signs of individuals considering acts of violent extremism might be those individuals’ friends: perhaps more so than school counselors, clergy, or family members. Furthermore, participants indicated that the predominant reason underlying individuals’ reluctance to reach out to countering violent extremism (CVE)-relevant service providers was fear of the potential repercussions for such actions. Additionally, that fear generalized not only to a reluctance to reach out to law enforcement agencies, but also to others within prospective CVE-relevant networks (i.e. religious officials, or family members). An option for addressing such reluctance (via an evidence-based, anonymous, texting-oriented crisis hotline for associate-gatekeepers) is discussed. Given that reluctance, what factors might affect individuals’ willingness to intervene in CVE contexts? Study 2 revealed two extensions to the bystander intervention model [Darley, J., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4), 377–383], necessary for it to be applied more accurately, and usefully, to CVE contexts. Specifically, individuals’ reluctance to dissuade their friends or family members from committing violence appeared to be moderated by their level of fear that doing so might damage their relationships with them. Furthermore, there was evidence that individuals’ level of personal identification with friends or family members might reduce both their willingness to intervene, and their ability to recognize violent extremism in the making.
Acknowledgements
The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication/program/exhibition are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice. NIJ defines publications as any planned, written, visual or sound material substantively based on the project, formally prepared by the award recipient for dissemination to the public.
ORCID
Michael J. Williams http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5630-9814
Notes
1. Primary prevention focuses on protecting normal/healthy people from developing a given problem. Secondary prevention focuses on halting progress toward a given problem among those for whom warning signs have been identified. Tertiary prevention is the remediation of a problem for those who concretely manifest a given problem.
2. The inclusion of Muslim participants, from Los Angeles, served two functions. First, this complemented the sample of Muslims from the East coast (i.e. Metro DC): both samples were part of a broader intention to ensure the inclusion of Muslim voices in the present study. The authors deemed those intentions important, given (as mentioned) that CVE in the USA, is focused on the ‘grassroots’ prevention of a range of violent extremism, including that which claims Islam as its basis. Second, the LA-based Muslim participants also were party to a concurrent, unrelated research project: an evaluation of the LAPD's ‘Chief Charlie Beck's Muslim Forum'.
3. This question was not included in surveys administered to police.
4. Therefore, the endorsement percentages, across response options, could sum to greater than 100%.
5. In all but the aforementioned case, participants erroneously endorsed the ‘other’ response option, such that their stated reasons either fit squarely within the other response options (e.g. ‘I may hesitate due to concern about them getting in trouble’) or avoided the question by making statements to the effects that ‘nothing would prevent me from doing so'.
6. This question was not assessed in surveys administered to police.
7. These questions were not assessed in surveys administered to police.
8. See note 7.