Who cares about development outcomes? Market failures and the role of the evaluation function

Abstract

Development agencies expend large amounts of money and manpower ostensibly to achieve development outcomes that improve living conditions in developing countries. If development agencies cared only about development outcomes and these were easily observable in a timely manner, development agencies would ‘buy’ the best outcomes they could get for their money. And if someone else could get it for them at a lower cost, they would transfer the funds to this other agency. Unfortunately, outcomes are not easily observable, they often take years to appear, and frequently the ‘shopper’ cares more about being seen shopping than about what ends up in the cart. So how do we go about creating a functioning market for development outcomes? What role can the evaluation function play in helping the process of internalising development outcomes into the development agencies’ objective functions and thereby aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives? We present the development business through the lenses of the literature on externalities, principal–agent problems, and decision-making under uncertainty. We also present examples of solutions from multilateral and bilateral development institutions.

Keywords:

• market failure
• principal–agent
• development outcomes
• evaluation function
• externalities

Notes

1. As a direct result of this report, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 3ie, was created devoted to ‘enhancing development effectiveness through supporting the production and use of evidence from rigorous impact studies’ (Gaarder and White 2009, 2).

2. If fuel prices go up, some people may decide to use public transport, thereby leading to a decrease in congestion and travel time even without any road improvements.

3. The alternative is the introduction of a carbon tax which fixes the price of carbon, but allows the amount of carbon emissions to vary. Proponents argue that a carbon tax is more easy and simple to enforce on a broad-base scale than cap-and-trade programmes.

4. For further insights about theory of change and theory-based evaluations, refer to White (2009).

5. Federal Public Administration decentralised organisation, with autonomy and technical capability to generate objective information on the social political situation and the measurement of poverty in Mexico, allowing better decision making in the matter.

6. http://www.iadb.org/en/office-of-evaluation-and-oversight/about-the-office-of-evaluation-and-oversight-ove,6655.html; accessed 9 September 2014

7. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/about-us, accessed 9 September 2014.

8. http://www.norad.no/en/evaluation, accessed 9 September 2014.