Abortion, Rights, and Cabin Cases

Abstract

Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus, with abortion opponents arguing fetuses are persons with a right to life. Judith Jarvis Thomson bypasses this debate, arguing that even if we assume fetuses have a right to life, this is not a right to use other people’s bodies. Recently Perry Hendricks attempts to bypass discussion of rights, assuming that if he can show that some people have a right to use other’s bodies, then we ought to restrict abortion (and perhaps compel organ donation, charity, etc.). Hendricks attempts to illustrate this by way of a Feinberg-style cabin case. I argue Hendricks’ restrictivist argument fails.

KEYWORDS:

• Abortion
• cabin case
• rights
• Hendricks
• Boonin
• Thomson

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Notes on contributors

William Simkulet

William Simkulet received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Kansas and serves as a philosophy instructor at Park University and Dodge City Community College.