Not only Relational but also Structural: revisiting the resolution of the 1998 October crisis through elements of structural power

ABSTRACT

The 1998 October Crisis between Turkey and Syria has long been studied in various aspects. However, these studies are limited to an understanding that depicts the crisis as a relational power relationship in which Turkey forced Syria to cease its support for the PKK, which Syria would not have done otherwise. While not rejecting the relational explanation, this paper attempts to complement it with a structural approach, drawing on the post-positivist structural power conceptualization, by investigating how Syria’s structurally shaped subjective interests in the post-Cold War international structure and norms regarding international terrorism disempowered it resisting Turkey’s demands.

KEYWORDS:

• Turkey
• Syria
• 1998 October Crisis
• relational Power
• structural Power

Acknowledgments

This article is based on my Ph.D. dissertation, entitled “Genesis and Genealogy of the Concept of Power: The 1998 October Crisis between Turkey and Syria.” I would like to thank anonymous reviewers of Journal of Political Power for their comments and criticisms.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Kurdistan Workers Party, or Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, is recognized as a terrorist organization by the European Union, NATO, the USA, Australia, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and many other countries and international organizations. However, other countries and international organizations have not yet recognized it as such, including the United Nations, Russia, China, India, Switzerland, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

2. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’.

3. According to the logic of appropriateness, actors may adopt the specific behaviors associated with their identities without engaging in a strategic calculation of the costs and benefits of those behaviors (March and Olsen 1998, p. 951).

4. As the case is about Turkey’s successful military threat of using force against Syria, the paper focuses on those resources mainly related to war-making capabilities.

5. ‘The weight of an actor’s power refers to the probability that B’s behavior is or could be affected by A’ (Baldwin 2013 [2002], p. 275).

6. Following Giddens (1979, p. 5), practical consciousness is ‘tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity.’

7. This utilization of relational power and structural power is clearly similar to Gwynn’s comparison. Gywnn (2019, p. 204) suggests that ‘in situations involving relational power, A takes intentional measures (threats, promises, agenda-setting, or persuasion) to secure B’s acquiescence, whereas in situations of structural power, the institutional context shaped B’s preferences and incentives, independent of A’s specific actions or statements, which can lead B to conform its behaviour to A’s preferences’.

8. The dimensions of power operating within or across these domains of social reality are very well outlined in Lukes 2005 [1974], pp. 14–29) Mann (1986, pp. 22–32, 1993, p. 6–10), Caporaso and Haggard (1989, pp. 99–120), Guzzini (1993, pp. 448–467), Barnett and Duvall (2005, pp. 45–57), Berenskoetter (2007, p. 3–12) and Haugaard (2012, pp. 35–50).

Additional information

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Buğra Sarı

Buğra Sarı holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from İ.D. Bilkent University, Ankara. His Ph.D. dissertation title is ‘Genesis and Genealogy of the Concept of Power: The 1998 October Crisis between Turkey and Syria.’ He is currently Assist. Prof. Dr. at Turkish National Police Academy, Institute of Security Sciences, Department of International Security.