Control over the utilization of the loan and the pattern of the gendered division of labor in the loan-funded activity: A case of Duterimbere MFI in Rwanda

Figures & data

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

Variables	Categories	Sample statistics (n = 338)
Age (Years)	Mean	37.28
Sex (%)	Male	27.8
	Female	72.2
Education level (%)	None	4.1
	Primary	47.3
	Secondary	20.9
	Tertiary	27.7
Marital status (%)	Married	78.7
	Others	21.3
Household size (number)	Mean	4.97
Number of years of membership in Duterimbere MFI (number)	Mean	4.26
Access to training (%)	Yes	38.5
	No	61.5
Loan amount obtained(number)	Mean	2,161,568 Rwf
Loan-financed activity (%)	Small and medium trade	41.4
	Agriculture	27.2
	Handcraft and artisans	4.7
	Transport business	8.3
	Business at large scale	14.8
	Housing and other non-business activities	3.6

Table 2. Gender division of labor in the loan-financed activity

Tasks	Decision-maker	Frequency		Percentage		Mean of the level of participation		Comparison of means
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	t-stat
Decision to take the last loan	No involvement	0	2	0.0%	0.8%	2.34	2.37	−0.474
	Joint	62	150	66%	61.5%
	Self	32	92	34%	37.7%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Decision on investment activity	No involvement	2	4	2.1%	1.6%	2.49	2.51	−0.353
	Joint	44	111	46.8%	45.5%
	Self	48	129	51.1%	52.9%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Procurement of the inputs	No involvement	2	24	2.1	9.8	2.64	2.40	3.106**
	Joint	30	98	31.9%	40.2%
	Self	62	122	66.0%	50.0%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Provision of labor in the production process	No involvement	6	12	6.4%	4.9%	2.23	2.40	−2.397**
	Joint	59	122	62.8%	50.0%
	Self	29	110	30.9%	45.1%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Decision on where to sell the product	No involvement	5	16	5.3%	6.6%	2.68	2.60	1.132
	Joint	20	66	21.3%	27.0%
	Self	69	162	73.4%	66.4%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Decision about the price of the product	No involvement	6	19	6.4%	7.8%	2.66	2.60	0.811
	Joint	20	60	21.3%	24.6%
	Self	68	165	72.3%	67.6%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Marketing of the product/ service	No involvement	5	23	5.3%	9.4%	2.61	2.52	1.151*
	Joint	27	72	28.7%	29.5%
	Self	62	149	66.0%	61.1%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Keeping accounts	No involvement	5	13	5.3%	5.3%	2.70	2.73	−0.344
	Joint	18	41	19.1%	16.8%
	Self	71	190	75.5%	77.9%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Use of the income gained	No involvement	2	9	2.1%	3.7%	2.49	2.49	−0.036
	Joint	44	106	46.8%	43.4%
	Self	48	129	51.1%	52.9%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Repayment of the loan	No involvement	0	5	0.0%	2.0%	2.73	2.68	0.965*
	Joint	25	69	26.6%	28.3%
	Self	69	170	73.4%	69.7%
	Total	94	244	100	100
Mean Score of labor provision						2.56	2.53	0.634

^* Significant at 5%.

^** Significant at 1%.

Table 3. Females and males’ economic decision-making within household

Indicators of economic decision-making	Mean		t
	Males	Females
Family income	4.64	4.53	1.033
Buy a new asset	4.18	4.07	0.828
Nutritious food	3.93	4.14	−1.604
Small purchases	4.25	4.33	−0.731
Large purchases	4.36	3.97	3.535**
Children’s education	3.84	3.98	−1.281
Household’s investment	3.97	3.86	0.890
Social events	4.14	4.07	0.656
Household saving	3.93	3.89	0.353
Job creation	3.97	3.88	0.583
Mean economic decision	4.13	4.08	0.805

^** Significant level at 1%.

Table 4. Freedom from domination in cultural oppressive decisions

Indicators of freedom from domination	Mean		t
	Males	Females
Mobility	4.33	4.09	1.77
Family planning	4.00	3.79	1.61
Participation in household chores	3.94	3.06	6.07**
Marriage of the children	4.22	3.55	4.68**
Participate in social events	4.24	3.76	3.46**
Domestic violence	4.22	4.08	1.28
Actions to promote gender equality	4.02	4.11	−0.71
Participate in politics	3.69	3.63	0.41
Participate in MFI activities	4.24	4.06	1.73
Equality in inheritance	4.31	4.07	2.23*
Mean score in freedom from domination	4.12	3.82	6.96**

^** Significant at 1%.

^* Significant at 5%.

Table

	Sex of respondents	Mean	SD	N
Labor provision	Male	2.56	0.345	94
	Female	2.53	0.395	244
	Total	2.54	0.382	338
Economic decision	Male	4.13	0.498	94
	Female	4.08	0.499	244
	Total	4.09	0.498	338
Freedom from domination	Male	4.12	0.369	94
	Female	3.82	0.371	244
	Total	3.90	0.394	338

Table

Box’s M	13.956
F	2.296
df1	6
df2	1.990E5
Sig.	0.032

Table

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial eta squared
Intercept	Pillai’s trace	0.992	1.356E4^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.992
	Wilks’ lambda	0.008	1.356E4^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.992
	Hotelling’s trace	121.805	1.356E4^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.992
	Roy’s largest root	121.805	1.356E4^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.992
Sex	Pillai’s trace	0.127	16.162^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.127
	Wilks’ lambda	0.873	16.162^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.127
	Hotelling’s trace	0.145	16.162^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.127
	Roy’s largest root	0.145	16.162^a	3.000	334.000	0.000	0.127

Table

	F	df1	df2	Sig.
Total participartion in labor	3.278	1	336	0.071
Total economic decision	0.306	1	336	0.581
Total freedom	0.033	1	336	0.855

Table

Source	Dependent variable	Type III sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.	Partial eta squared
Corrected model	Labor provision	0.059^a	1	0.059	0.402	0.527	0.001
	Economic decision	0.161^b	1	0.161	0.648	0.422	0.002
	Freedom from domination	6.144^c	1	6.144	44.736	0.000	0.117
Intercept	Labor provision	1756.420	1	1756.420	1.202E4	0.000	0.973
	Economic decision	4566.191	1	4566.191	1.837E4	0.000	0.982
	Freedom from domination	4278.270	1	4278.270	3.115E4	0.000	0.989
Sex	Labor provision	0.059	1	0.059	0.402	0.527	0.001
	Economic decision	0.161	1	0.161	0.648	0.422	0.002
	Freedom from domination	6.144	1	6.144	44.736	0.000	0.117
Error	Labor provision	49.092	336	0.146
	Economic decision	83.501	336	0.249
	Freedom from domination	46.144	336	0.137
Total	Labor provision	2225.120	338
	Economic decision	5739.778	338
	Freedom from domination	5202.111	338
Corrected total	Labor provision	49.150	337
	Economic decision	83.662	337
	Freedom from domination	52.287	337