Rethinking the heuristic traps paradigm in avalanche education: Past, present and future

Figures & data

Table 1. FACETS Definitions and Relevance

Decision bias	Definition	Backcountry Skiing Relevance
Familiarity	Based on the availability heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) (see McCammon, 2004 footnote #4). Because of our limited cognitive abilities, we are better at remembering things that we have seen often, or recently, and we have a problem imagining things that we have not seen. Our ability to evaluate the frequency or probability of events is biased toward those we have experienced in the past.	In avalanche terrain we may fail to realize that even though we have never experienced an avalanche on a particular slope, we cannot assume it must be safe.
Acceptance	Inspired by research in psychology on social norms (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Sherif, 1936), stereotypes e.g., (Broverman et al., 1972) and self-presentation (Baumeister, 1982). Humans are social beings, with both a physical and psychological need to belong to and be an accepted member of a social group. Group membership increases our chances for survival and success. Our dependency on the acceptance by others makes us prone to conform to social norms and adapt our behavior to what we think is expected from us.	While skiing, we may have reservations about a particular slope but may “give in” to peer or group pressure (gender or peer acceptance). Further, McCammon suggested that when females are present males may engage in riskier behavior in order to impress them.
Consistency^1	Cognitive dissonance may evoke a negative emotional state we seek to avoid (Aronson, 1969, Aronson, 1992). Individuals have a need to maintain a reliable	We may think of ourselves as a careful expert skier and make a decision to descend a risky slope. The decision may be ill-informed, but we maintain our self-
	and positive self-image. If we do things that do not match our self-image, we tend to rationalize our behavior so that our perception of the situation changes in favor of our behavior and our self-image is left intact.	defined expert status and later rationalize as being not as dangerous as initially thought if the slope did not fail. McCammon sought to apply this concept to groups as well as individuals.
Commitment	Behavior is to sunk costs that cannot be recovered once spent. (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Sleesman et al., 2012; Thaler, 1980, Thaler, 1985, Thaler, 1999). If we make an investment of money or time in something (a plan, a relationship, an asset), we tend to continue investing in the face of failure because we would otherwise perceive the initial investment as a loss.	In avalanche terrain we may proceed with a plan to ascend a peak even though we agree that the plan is bad, because we made an initial investment of time and effort to start the ascent. In the process we may ignore weather, time, or hazard.
Expert halo	Related to the need to belong and gain acceptance in a valued group (the acceptance bias) and do so in such a way as to conform to and not destabilize the group (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Also identified as “Groupthink” in 1972 (Janis, 1972) where cohesive groups try to reach a common goal and maintain social cohesion. The desire to maintain membership in the group, the respect for authority, and the desire reach unanimity, may override the motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.	The expert halo effect allows us to rationalize our group decision given the presence of an “expert” in the group. Some members (novices, women in mixed groups) may express self-doubt and lack of confidence and so tend to defer to a perceived expert. Fatigue, cold, fear may also cause deferment.
Scarcity motivation (later known as the tracks heuristic in FACETS)	The increased value of potential loss of scarce resources that occurs due to competition (Cialdini, 2009 in McCammon, 2004, p. 6) (Lancaster, 1966; Mittone & Savadori, 2009). We overvalue and	Skiers refer to “powder fever” “first tracks” or “first descents” as rival goods and as they compete, they may engage in illogical behavior and miss or ignore avalanche warning signs.
	compete for rival goods and aggressively bid to consume them (Massey & Thaler, 2013).
Social facilitation	The presence of others improves and deteriorates humans’ performance (Uziel, 2007). Those who are confident in their skills may be emboldened when they are not alone and may take more risk when they have an audience (Zajonc, 1965). Results in an invalid selection and understanding of the available evidence	The presence of encountering others on a slope may act as a false demonstration of slope stability.

1Consistency and Commitment are not necessarily the same notions although McCammon conflates them in his findings and FACETS. See: I. McCammon (2004) (footnote #5).

Table 2. Operationalization of Familiarity Heuristic

Variable	Dimensions	Metric
Familiarity of slope	Number of times skied by a member of the group/individual	Frequency, scale (i.e. trail, slope, drainage basin).
	Experience	Real or virtual information (e.g., detailed guide, Goggle earth, maps and photos). In person or verbal report/web page. Time of year.
	Attributes of destination	Local trail head, clearly demarked trail, ease of access, recognizable place name.
	Temporal dimensions	Last visited, change in snowpack conditions.

Table 3. Integrative Cognitive Processes for Decision Making

Perception	Sorting out the important data from “noise”
Attention	Directed focus on the problem at hand
Memory	Ability to store and activate knowledge from past experience
Reasoning	Employing logic in the face of ambiguity
Decision Making	Use all available data to make a decision
Goal Conflicts	Recognizing and satisfying multiple sometimes competing goals
Tradeoffs	Recognizing and weighing that all decisions entail tradeoffs

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80(4), 237. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

McCammon, I. (2004). Heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents: Evidence and implications. Avalanche News, 68(1), 42–50. https://snowpit.com.

 Google Scholar

Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance.

 Google Scholar

Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms.

 Google Scholar

Broverman, I. K., Vogel, S. R., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson, F. E., & Rosenkrantz, P. S. (1972). Sex‐role stereotypes: A current appraisal. Journal of Social Issues, 28(2), 59–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1972.tb00018.x

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 91(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.91.1.3

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Aronson, E. (1969). The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective. In Advances in experimental social psychology. Leonard Berkowitz, ed. (Vol. 4, pp. 1–34). Elsevier.

 Google Scholar

Aronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback. Psychological Inquiry, 3(4), 303–311. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0304_1

 Google Scholar

Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35(1), 124–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Sleesman, D. J., Conlon, D. E., McNamara, G., & Miles, J. E. (2012). Cleaning up the big muddy: A meta-analytic review of the determinants of escalation of commitment. Academy of Management Journal, 55(3), 541–562. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.0696

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1(1), 39–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Thaler, R. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science, 4(3), 199–214. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.3.199

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12(3), 183. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::AID-BDM318>3.0.CO;2-F

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annual Review of Psychology, 55(1), 591–621. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes.

 Google Scholar

Cialdini, R. B. (2009). Influence: Science and practice (Vol. 4). Pearson education Boston.

 Google Scholar

Lancaster, K. J. (1966). A new approach to consumer theory. Journal of Political Economy, 74(2), 132–157. https://doi.org/10.1086/259131

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Mittone, L., & Savadori, L. (2009). The scarcity bias. Applied Psychology, 58(3), 453–468. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2009.00401.x

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Massey, C., & Thaler, R. H. (2013). The loser’s curse: Decision making and market efficiency in the National Football League draft. Management Science, 59(7), 1479–1495. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1657

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Uziel, L. (2007). Individual differences in the social facilitation effect: A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Research in Personality, 41(3), 579–601. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2006.06.008

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social facilitation. Science, 149(3681), 269–274. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.149.3681.269

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar