Why American grand strategy has changed: international constraint, generational shift, and the return of realism

ABSTRACT

From Clinton to Bush to Obama to Trump: the personalities, rhetoric, and policies of Presidents charged with defining US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era could hardly appear more different. Yet recent treatments of American grand strategy have sought to highlight a lack of debate about grand strategy, and to emphasize groupthink and “habit” within the US foreign policy establishment. This article argues that US grand strategy has changed, and suggests that those who prioritize continuities rely on an overly restrictive definition of grand strategy. Employing policy paradigms as an analytical framework, this paper finds significant variation in US grand strategy across the four post-Cold War presidencies. Where the variation between Clinton and George W. Bush’s presidencies can be explained by differing strategic ideas among American foreign policymaking elites, a trend towards less active hegemonic management running through the Obama and Trump presidencies is more structural in nature, reflecting both international constraints and generational change.

KEYWORDS:

• United States
• grand strategy
• Trump
• policy paradigms, Obama

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors and contributors of this Special Issue for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, in particular Oz Hasan and Hilde Restad. Mick Cox, Gustav Meibauer, and Adam Quinn also offered helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Note on contributor

Nicholas Kitchen is Lecturer in International Relations and Co-Director of the Centre for International Intervention at the University of Surrey. He is also a Visiting Fellow at LSE IDEAS. He has written extensively on US grand strategy, concepts of power, and neoclassical realism.

Notes

1 In this period, a vast literature seeks to conceptualise the United States’ dominance, the most popular frameworks being “empire” (Colas, 2008; Cox, 2001; Hardt & Negri, 2000) and “unipolarity” (Guzzini, 2005; Ikenberry, Michael, & William, 2009; Jervis, 2009; Wohlforth, 1999).

2 Much of the work on aggregate ‘power shifts’ rest on flawed underpinnings in terms of the measurement of power (Kitchen & Cox, 2019; Quinn & Kitchen, 2018). However, more specific work that specifies scope and domain does indicate an decreasing ability for the United States to dictate terms. See, for example (Long, 2015).

3 Hall’s concept is central to analyses of public policy, but it has rarely been operationalised in International Relations or Foreign Policy Analysis. Hassan’s ‘constructivist institutionalist’ methodology is the only application of Hall’s concept to US foreign policy (Hassan, 2012). Other invocations in FPA include (Brighi, 2007; Exadaktylos, 2015; Kleistra & Mayer, 2001).

4 Anthony Lake recalled finding Clinton’s mantra ‘not an immediately attractive concept’ (Klein, 2002, pp. 78–79).

5 Missile defense is a good example. With its roots in Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, space-based ballistic missile defense required withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in order to pursue a “vital shield that would free the United States to play its leading role.” (Kagan & Schmitt, 1998, p. 25).

6 It is important to note the significance of perception in interpretations of the balance of power (Guzzini, 2009, p. 5).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Charles Koch Foundation.