Another Cog in the Ideological Machine? Social Cognition, Ideology and the First-Personal Perspective

ABSTRACT

Sally Haslanger’s Cognition as a Social Skill offers a rich and sophisticated system-theoretic analysis of ideological oppression; yet this seems to come at the expense of the approach’s ability to accommodate a similarly developed first-personal viewpoint capable of identifying ideological oppression. I will argue that the combination of Haslanger’s commitment to mindshaping, and her claim that social nodes, rather than individuals, are the locus of ideological oppression undermines the epistemic value of the embodied experiences critical theories have tended to take as central for situated critique. Given the claim of structural homogeneity among social meanings, the loss of these resources leaves the occupants of ideologically oppressed nodes without a horizon of judgment capable of distinguishing between genuinely ameliorative projects, and the enactment of new ideological regimes. I suggest further work is needed to ease this tension in levels of critique, and realise the emancipatory potential of the project.

KEYWORDS:

• ideology critique
• alienation
• social cognition
• first-personal experience

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.