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ABSTRACT
M.M. McCabe argues that in Plato’s Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus hold a view she calls ‘chopped logos’. Chopped logos implies that nothing said is false, or opposed to any other statement, or entailed by any other statement. We focus on a key piece of evidence for chopped logos, the argument concluding that there is no such thing as contradiction (285e9–286b6), and defend a competing interpretation. The argument in question, and the eristic exchanges as a whole, are simply examples of a dialectical game, a contest that is the verbal equivalent of physical competitions like wrestling or the pankration. The argument has no doctrinal significance and no deep connection with the other arguments of the dialogue. Its interest proves to be broadly methodological rather than doctrinal, a showpiece of eristic display.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 In comparing the brothers’ form of competition to Aristotelian dialectic, we do not mean to suggest that the former is a version of the latter. Rather, we see Aristotelian dialectic as standing to eristic combat as wrestling stands to the pankration: like the pankration, eristic combat is governed by the bare minimum of rules necessary for allowing the contest to continue for a respectable length of time; but in Aristotelian dialectic, as in wrestling, there are more grounds for calling foul. Because the allowable moves are more tightly controlled, Aristotelian dialectic is a better method for philosophical training and discovery, though the brothers’ game can still suggest such a method to the person who can see past its potential abuses.
2 We prefer ‘contradict’ to McCabe’s [Citation2021] ‘countersay’ as a translation of ‘ἀντιλέγειν’ both because of a general preference for rendering ordinary Greek with ordinary English and because ‘contradict’ gets the sense exactly right. Using ‘say’ and the like for every occurrence of ‘λέγειν’ and its compounds (as well as their cognate nouns) tends to obscure rather than clarify, as McCabe sometimes implicitly acknowledges by offering various glosses on her translations.
3 We follow Burnet's text throughout and offer our own translations.
4 As does Gifford [1905], ad loc. and on 286a5.
5 See for instance Hawtrey [Citation1981: 105–6, 108]; Burnyeat [Citation2002: 52]. Depending on the background assumed and on one’s understanding of its import, the character of the logos will vary, as will the corresponding conception of an entity—whether it is a bundle of ‘characters’, a ‘substance’ having a ‘nature’, or whatnot.
6 Burnyeat [Citation2002: 52] reads Dionysodorus’ first question as a ‘slightly disguised version of Antisthenes’ slogan that each thing has its own proprietary account.’ Yet Burnyeat nowhere explains what dramatic sense the disguise would make. How could one plausibly read Ctesippus as signing on without demur to a crypto-Antisthenean program, let alone to one that has not been expressed with any clarity? Ctesippus is neither dense nor overly compliant.
7 McCabe’s [Citation2021] occasional glosses on her translation ‘saying’ are sometimes at odds with the force the term must have here. See for instance [Citationibid.: 135] ‘what is said or stated,’ and contrast [Citationibid.: 135–6n22].
8 The ‘Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;’ at 286a3 is here challenging, not concessive, as is indicated by the stubborn question that follows.
9 See 283e1–6, 284b1–2, 284c7–8, 284d7–285a1, 285d3–6, and 285e5–6. Even when Dionysodorus scores a victory at the end of the present argument, Ctesippus pointedly refuses to concede the conclusion of the argument. That, we take it, is the best explanation of his remaining silent.
10 Dionysodorus’ move here is also directly at odds with chopped logos, a point to which we return below.
11 Proponents of the idea that ‘logos’ means something like ‘definition’ often find awkward the absence of a definite article before the noun. Many of them follow Heindorf in reading ‘<τὸν> τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον’. (For examples to the contrary, see Hawtrey [Citation1981: 108] and Burnyeat [Citation2002: 52]). Since we favor the meaning ‘account’, we see no need to emend the text.
12 It would be possible to read the phrase ‘τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμϕότεροι λέγοντες’ at 286a5–6 in such a way that Dionysodorus and Ctesippus are speaking different true accounts of the same thing. That reading could still count as a denial of contradiction so long as each account is understood to contain all the relevant qualifications (of time, respect in which a thing is considered, and relations to other things). However, the reading would fit questionably with the idea that the two are here saying the same thing (ταὐτὰ).
13 After all, there is nothing special in the first case about the particular account or the particular thing: the point applies to any account of any thing. So merely varying one or the other does not introduce a distinct case. For a similar reason, one could not plausibly suppose that Dionysodorus is thinking of a case in which he and Ctesippus speak accounts that belong to different things, where neither of those things is the one about which they were speaking initially: that interpretation would make the second case collapse into the third.
14 Most interpreters read Dionysodorus’ final two questions as if the situation being described is one in which Ctesippus remains silent. Yet that cannot be right. As is clear from the parallel wording in the first and second cases, the ‘ἤ’-construction beginning the penultimate question here is meant to provide an alternative judgment about the situation just mentioned, the one in which Ctesippus speaks another λόγος of another thing. One must therefore understand ‘τὸ πρᾶγμα’ as the object of ‘λέγεις’ (in the penultimate question) and ‘λέγων’ (in the final). (To our knowledge, Burnyeat is the only interpreter who clearly renders the passage in the correct way. See Burnyeat [2002: 52]. Chance [Citation1992: 99] offers the usual translation but partially restores the proper interpretation in his subsequent gloss.) In reconstructing the argument, McCabe [Citation2021: 134] treats Dionysodorus as setting out a new, fourth possibility with his final two questions. But for that to be the case, one would need a repetition of ‘ὅταν’, or some equivalent construction. As it is (and as McCabe’s [Citationibid.] translation suggests), Dionysodorus’ remark is merely a further comment on the situation just described. That is what prompts Hawtrey [Citation1981: 109], who adopts the common reading, to propose that Dionysodorus is ‘slip[ping] quietly’ from the idea that Ctesippus is not talking about the thing to the idea that he is not speaking at all. We find that proposal implausible since the trick would serve no purpose.
15 Burnyeat [Citation2002: 52] says of this passage:
[T]he argument forces the account (λόγος) of a thing to function as an unstructured whole. No distinction is allowed between speaking of something and saying something, so there is no room for the idea that speaking of or mentioning something is only part of what is involved in saying something true or false.’
16 See McCabe [Citation2021: 135] for the idea.
17 McCabe [Citation2021: 136]. This last point suggests that McCabe is thinking of logoi as discrete utterances, since it is of course plausible to say that any token utterance can be uttered only once. Less clear is why, even on chopped logos, two token utterances couldn’t be type-identical. In any case, Dionysodorus’ comment at 286a6 (case 1) makes plain that two people could utter the same logos, so surely he isn’t committed to denying the possibility of repeating the same logos.
18 See McCabe [Citation2021: 136n23].
19 One might argue that their victory is achieved by making their opponent look silly insofar as he agrees to something that he cannot stomach, even if the brothers themselves find it completely innocent. Perhaps. But then one must explain why they themselves seek to avoid this very fate and take themselves to lose when they succumb to it. See 297a5–8.
20 At points, McCabe [Citation2021: 132n7; 137n29] suggests that the brothers themselves are not committed to chopped logos, but that they foist it on others as a dialectical ploy. Our account raises trouble for this proposal too: the brothers are constantly demanding that their opponents make inferences and recognize contradictions—just the sorts of practice that are patently inconsistent with chopped logos. It would perhaps be possible to read them as making inconsistent demands—requiring a commitment to chopped logos and insisting on a dialectical practice that contravenes it—but such a reading would strain the bounds of credibility by introducing unrelenting dissonance into the brothers’ every maneuver.
Our alternative may seem to face a similar difficulty: How can the brothers drive every argument to a contradiction, on the basis of which they declare victory, and yet argue against the very possibility of contradiction? We answer that the latter argument is just another strategic set piece (see below), one meant to score an immediate dialectical victory but not to introduce a bit of logical theory.
21 Chance [Citation1992: passim, but esp. 43–47] handles this point well.
22 The radical nature of their claims is only to be expected, since they aim to make others contradict themselves, and others will generally begin with commonsensical positions. But maintaining radical claims also serves to enhance their reputation as arguers: just as Lucian was so skilled an orator that he could compellingly praise even the lowly fly, they are so skilled as arguers that they can refute any thesis whatsoever, no matter how obvious or commonsensical it may be [272a7–b1].
23 As mentioned previously, a presumed Antisthenean background is an especially important theme of Burnyeat [Citation2002]. For an Eleatic connection, see Sprague [Citation1962: ch 1]. Contrast both those approaches with Chance [Citation1992], whose general outlook is much closer to ours.