The terrorist and the mercenary: Private warriors against Nigeria’s Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the 2015 intervention of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP International Ltd), a South African private military company (PMC), against Boko Haram, the Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria. The origins of PMCs are highlighted before an in-depth analysis of the mercenary intervention against Boko Haram is performed, with an eye on previous major PMC interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the paper emphasises the unprecedented use of PMCs against Islamic extremist groups but on the other reveals that PMC interventions have not changed much. Finally, the article assesses STTEP’s intervention in light of the current debate on private security involving those who advocate its use and regulation and those who question the legitimacy of PMCs as a tool of conflict resolution.

KEYWORDS:

• PMC
• STTEP
• Boko Haram
• Nigeria
• mercenary
• Executive Outcomes

Note on contributor

Antonino Adamo is a researcher at the National Research Council of Italy (CNR). He holds a master’s degree in international relations at the University of Bologna, Italy and a PhD in Asian and African studies at the University of Cagliari, Italy. His main research focus is private security and PMCs in sub-Saharan Africa and his research interests comprise conflict analysis, foreign interventions, and regional peacekeeping in Africa. He has published extensively on private security issues in Italian journals, as well as in a 2003 monograph.

Notes

1 Based on this view, it can be assumed that globalisation has ultimately revealed the myth of modernisation, showing that simply assimilating European states’ prerogatives is not enough to enforce Western-style sovereignty (Carbone 2005).

2 In the same way, 18 years earlier, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister Julius Chan, nearing the end of his term in office, realised that a solution to the military crisis on the island of Bougainville (the insurgency of the Bougainville Resistance Army) would give him a great chance of political success, securing his re-election. He thus hired Sandline International, a United Kingdom based PMC, starting what would later become known as the ‘Sandline Affair’ (Dorney 1998).

3 In January 1999, a combined rebel force made up of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council – a RUF-allied group of Sierra Leone soldiers who were ruling the country after the May 1996 Koroma military coup – and the RUF itself invaded the capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown, to loot, rape and kill indiscriminately: it was the most notorious mass killing of the Sierra Leone civil war. A Human Rights Watch report estimated that more than 7 000 people were killed and that at least half of them were civilians. Reports from survivors describe widespread atrocities and perverse brutality.

4 However, some observers highlight the African National Congress government’s tolerance of EO, as this PMC did help the post-1994 South African government by employing, and then moving to foreign countries, ex-SADF's soldiers who could have threatened the political transition (Howe 1998, 327).

5 In September 2007, employees of Blackwater Security Consulting (since renamed Academi), a PMC, shot at Iraqi civilians, killing 17 and injuring 20 in Nisour Square, Baghdad while escorting a US embassy convoy. The killings outraged Iraqis and strained relations between Iraq and the United States. Moreover, this incident also sparked US criticism of the role of private security employees operating in the field, and there has been demand for adequate military oversight. Prosecution proved difficult in this case, as the status of Blackwater was unclear, as was its accountability.

6 For a comprehensive report, see Roberts (2006).

7 According to this theory, which has been tested in three cases (Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan), different market structures explain the variance in PMC level of performance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative. If market competition is present – it is claimed – PMC performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected.

8 Starting with the analysis of the impact of PMC activity on civil wars in Africa from 1990 to 2008, the ‘opportunity structure’ theory claims that while PMCs are profit-oriented entities, the prevalent opportunities in conflicts will determine how they behave in war zones. Empirical findings in civil wars with at least 1 000 casualties show that as the level of competition among government-hired PMCs increases, these companies are more likely to deliver optimal services and help bring an end to violence. In the absence of competition, PMCs in conflict zones tend to underperform in order to stay longer – thereby maximising profits.

9 Current peacekeeping bodies on the continent include the African Union’s African Stand-by Force (Kent & Malan 2003) and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Aning 2000, 2004; Ero 2000; Gberie 2003). The former has been deployed within the framework of the African Union Monitoring Mission in Sudan (2003–2007) and the African Mission in Somalia (2007 to date). The latter was deployed in Liberia (1990–1998), Guinea Bissau (1998) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000).