Embodied Learning

Abstract

This article argues that psychological discourse fails miserably to provide an account of learning that can explain how humans come to understand, particularly understanding that has been grasped meaningfully. Part of the problem with psychological approaches to learning is that they are disconnected from the integral role embodiment plays in how I perceive myself, other persons and other things in the world. In this sense, it is argued that a central tenet of any educational learning involves being taught to perceive, come to know ourselves and the world around us. This may seem like stating the obvious, but there is a general tendency to take the experience of perception for granted. Since phenomenology according to Merleau-Ponty recognises that perceptual experience is the basis of ‘all rationality’ makes it particularly apt for explaining the significant role embodiment plays in understanding what has been learned, and understanding that has been grasped meaningfully. What makes this account of embodied learning educationally significant is that the whole person is treated as a whole being, permitting the person to experience him or herself as a holistic and synthesised acting, feeling, thinking being-in-the-world, rather than as separate physical and mental qualities which bear no relation to each other.

Keywords:

• Merleau-Ponty
• embodiment
• experience
• meaning
• learning

Notes

1. Wilson (2002) outlines six claims involved in embodied cognition. These are as follows: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; and (6) Off-line cognition is body based. Whereas, it is interesting to note that Shapiro (2004, 2007, 2011) outlines three themes in embodied cognition: (1) conceptualisation; (2) replacement; and (3) constitution.

2. The author is cognisant that there exists considerable literature concerning the body and embodiment in education, particularly from a distinctly sociological point of view. I have intentionally not engaged with this literature for three reasons: firstly, such an approach would distract from the central thesis of this article which is to draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty and make new connections with my conceptual understanding of embodied learning; secondly, due to space restrictions an extensive critique of the socio-cultural influences of the ‘embodied learner’ within schools and/or education—although interesting—is not possible, and arguably not relevant; and, lastly, my intention in this article is to explain learning from a distinctly philosophical point of view, and not from a psychological or sociological perspective.

3. Hamlyn (1973) refers to ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ as the ‘two great theories of knowledge’ that bring with them not only different conceptions of knowledge, but different conceptions of acquiring knowledge primarily because these conceptions are based on different philosophies of mind.

4. Educationalists should heed more closely Wittgenstein’s (2009) criticism of psychology and maybe question its influence on educational theory taking into consideration that psychology is all ‘experimental methods and conceptual confusion’ and should not be exempt from condemnation because it is a ‘young science’ (see Part II, section xiv; § 371).

5. Talk of ‘constructing’ knowledge or ‘meaning-making’ belongs to what is commonly referred to in the educational literature as ‘constructivism’. Depending on the author there are numerous different versions of ‘constructivism’ which provide a wide variety of perspectives. See D. C. Phillips (Ed.). (2000). Constructivism in Education. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

6. My account of van Manen’s work in this section borrows from an earlier critique that was published in Educational Philosophy and Theory (Stolz, 2013).

7. Although the term ‘habit’ has negative connotations in its English usage surrounding a lack of volition, this is not how Merleau-Ponty intended it to be used in this context. Others, like Dreyfus use the term ‘skill’ instead of ‘habit’, but one needs to be cognisant that Merleau-Ponty ascribed ‘habit’ as an in situ ability to act in a flexible way.

8. The five stages are as follows: (1) Novice; (2) Advanced beginner; (3) Competence; (4) Proficient; and (5) Expert. For a detailed account refer to Chapter 1 from Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). A shorter version of this earlier account can be found in Dreyfus (2002a). It is the fifth level that is of interest in this case because the expert performer acts without conscious deliberation and becomes one with what he or she is doing. For instance, the expert batsman in cricket becomes one with his batting and experiences himself batting, rather than consciously deliberating about how to play certain shots as a batsman whilst playing.