Modesty, Confucianism, and active indifference

Abstract

How do people acquire modesty? A simple answer is: if people see that modesty is a worthy trait, they will incorporate it into their character. However, sometimes the knowledge that one is modest would undermine one’s modesty. So, Driver claims that the modest person must not know his merits. If we are to accept Driver’s claim, it would be difficult for us to conceive how learners can consciously acquire this virtue. In response, Bommarito puts forward a more moderate claim. The modest person does not need to be ignorant of his good qualities; even if he knows about them, he must not pay attention to them. Bommarito’s explanation opens a space for Asian philosophers to engage in the debate. Asian philosophers generally emphasize the importance of practice and how practitioners must attend to the state of their consciousness so that they are not carried away by their desires. With regard to this, I put forward two ideas in this paper. First, I propose a third account of modesty, the knowledge account. I argue that modesty, in its worthy form, requires an agent’s understanding of his temptations and weaknesses. Second, I will explain the Confucian view of moral education in regard to this discussion. I introduce strategies regarding learners’ acquisition of virtues, including self-cultivation and cultivation through following rituals in interpersonal affairs. I believe that the Confucian view of moral education would enable agents to acquire virtues without the self-denial that troubles Driver and Bommarito.

Keywords:

• Modesty
• virtue ethics
• comparative philosophy
• Confucianism

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Constantine Sandis, Jae Park, and participants of my research seminar of IE Department in April 2021 at the Education University of Hong Kong for discussion and invaluable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 In this paper, I do not distinguish between the concepts of humility and modesty. Many contemporary philosophers think they are interchangeable, including Hare (1996), Schueler (1997), Hurka (2001), Raterman (2006), Garcia (2006), Kellenberger (2010), and Um (2019). For those who think humility and modesty are different, there is no consensus regarding the exact distinctions between them. For example, Statman (1992, p. 438n45) holds that modesty applies in an external domain while humility public; Sinha (2012, p. 265) thinks the reverse is true. Ben-Ze’ev (1993, p. 240) and Nuyen (1998, p. 101) hold that humility involves underrating oneself while modesty does not; Driver (1989, p. 378f5) argues that the opposite is the case. For an overview of this matter, see Bommarito 2018.

2 ‘Distraction’ may mean different things to different agents, depending on the kind of superiority that they might feel and have over others. It may be their intelligence, achievement, or even their modesty through which they obtain gratification.

3 Driver (2001, p. 18): ‘It is important to note here that the modest person must still think his character and deeds to be of some worth. …The degree of underestimation must be limited in order to differentiate modesty from a vice such as self-deprecation.’

4 It might be arguable how much the modest agent is ignorant of his achievement. A reviewer disagrees with my expression of ‘no knowledge’ here, upholding that Driver means the agent has only ‘some ignorance’ or ‘ignorance of some degree’ regarding his qualities. I think there is a vague boundary in relation to the extent of this self-knowledge. However, under Driver’s characterization of modesty, the agent must not know about the fact that he is ‘so good.’ Otherwise he would be insincere and his modest behavior would indicate his false modesty.

5 Aristotle denies that modesty is a real virtue; he thinks that the agent who thinks lower than what he is worthy of is pusillanimous, which means being weak or cowardly. He praises the magnanimous agent, who thinks greatly of himself and is truly worthy of great things (NE 1123b). See also Raterman (2006, p. 222) and Brennan (2007, p. 112).

6 Even Confucius himself had not reached that level until he is seventy. See footnote 12.

7 Roberts and Wood: “A person with a certain kind of damage to the frontal lobes of his brain lacks completely both the concern to appear excellent to others and the desire to be the author of other people’s minds, but this does not give him any kind of virtuous humility. … We cannot induce virtue by damaging frontal lobes, because such damage undermines concern across the board, while virtue consists in selective differentiation of concern: intense concern for what is worthy of it and relatively little concern for what is less worthy” (2007, p. 255).

8 E.g., Wittgenstein: ‘It always strikes me frightfully when I think how entirely my profession depends on a gift which might be withdrawn from me at any moment (Klagge & Nordmann, 2003, p. 11).

9 Describing a swordsman’s state of mind in the midst of a confrontation, Takuan Sōhō (1573-1645) says: ‘What is called Fudo Myo-o (a wrathful manifestation of the central Buddha Vairocana) is said to be one’s unmoving mind and an unvacillating body. Unvacillating means not being detained by anything. Glancing at something and not stopping the mind is called Immovable’ (Takuan 2002, p. 6).

10 Varela (1999, p. 7) describes the nature of practical knowledge in this way: ‘the proper units of knowledge are primarily concrete, embodied, incorporated, lived; that knowledge is about situatedness; and that the uniqueness of knowledge, its historicity and context, is not a ‘noise’ concealing an abstract configuration in its true essence. The concrete is not a step toward something else: it is both where we are and how we get to where we will be.’

11 On some Confucian view, virtues can be basic in two senses. First, their instantiation involves other virtues; second, alternatively, they are seeds from which other virtues evolve. For instance, an agent may have straightforwardness and bravery without being benevolent; but a benevolent agent would be brave and self-honest (The Analects 1979: 6.18, 14.4, 17.8). And filial piety would be a seed that promotes other virtues such as obedience and faithfulness (The Analects 1979: 1.2; Guo 2007).

12 In Zhuxi’s (1130-1200) commentary of Mencius, he quotes Cheng Yi (1033-1107), who argues that Mencius is superior to Xunzi for his grand and heroic spirit (yingqi 英氣). See Zhu (2005), p. 195.

13 Besides Mencius, Confucius also reviews his moral achievements in life without trying to elude them: ‘At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right’ (The Analects 1979: 2.4).

14 In Mencius (1970: 3A1), in the context of traditional society, the Duke Wen of Teng won political recognition of the ruling class in his nation after he handled his father’s funerals excellently and expressed melancholy in an appropriate way.

15 Liji, ‘Fang Ji’: ‘The rules of propriety recognize these feelings of men, and lay down definite regulations for them, to serve as dykes for the people’ (Legge 1885b, pp. 245–285). Also Liji, ‘Qu Li I’: ‘They are the rules of propriety, that furnish the means of determining (the observances towards) relatives, as near and remote; of settling points which may cause suspicion or doubt; of distinguishing where there should be agreement, and where difference; and of making clear what is right and what is wrong’ (Legge 1885a, p. 62).

16 From Confucius’s point of view, morality is more a practical exercise than an exercise of verbal discussion. The essence of this exercise consists in self-reflection as well as the agent’s compliance with the demands of rituals. So he says: ‘To subdue one’s self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him’ (Legge 1861: 12.1).

17 Hume also stresses that an adequate virtue theory must take into account the role that established institutions play in the formation of children’s moral character. Quoting Hume, Paul Russell states: ‘Any accurate moral philosophy, it is argued, must acknowledge and take note of the forces that ‘mould the human mind from its infancy’ and which account for ‘the gradual change in our sentiments and inclinations’ through time’ (Hume [1748] 2000, p. 16; Russell 2013, p. 106).

Additional information

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William Sin

William Sin is an assistant professor at the Education University of Hong Kong, the Department of International Education. He works on moral and comparative philosophy. His recent publications include ‘Bruce Lee and the Trolley Problem: An Analysis from an Asian Martial Arts Tradition’ (Sports, Ethics and Philosophy, 2022), ‘Esoteric Confucianism, Moral Dilemmas and Filial Piety’ (Metaphilosophy, 2020), and ‘If Confucius met Scanlon—Understanding filial piety from Confucianism and Contractualism’ (Philosophy Compass, 2021).