A Kantian quality of will account of excuses

ABSTRACT

It is a common picture that Kant is committed to an uncompromising account of moral responsibility that leaves no room for excuses. I argue that this picture is mistaken. More specifically, I reconstruct a Kantian quality of will account of excuses according to which an agent is excused for performing a morally wrong (or omitting a morally obligatory) action if and only if the action (or omission) does not manifest a lack of good will on the part of the agent. Based on this Kantian quality of will account of excuses, I explain why agents are often excused in cases that involve physical constraint, unintentional bodily movement, ignorance, coercion or necessity.

KEYWORDS:

• moral responsibility
• Kant
• blame
• transcendental freedom
• free will

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Notable exceptions are Frierson (2014, Ch. 5) and Blöser (2015). Saunders (2019) criticises their views. Frierson (2018) is a response to this criticism.

2 A comment on the textual sources is in place. I will regularly draw on lecture taken by Collins (academic year 1784–1785) and Vigilantius (academic year 1793–1794). These lecture notes document the development of Kant's views leading up to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). These textual sources should be treated with caution for two reasons. First, it is subject to debate how well the lecture notes represent Kant's actual teaching. Despite uncertainties concerning their precise origin, however, most Kantians by now regard the lectures on ethics as authoritative. Strictly speaking, quotes from the lectures should be introduced by means of the phrase “Kant is reported as saying that x.” Since this device becomes rather dull when used repeatedly, I will ask the reader to add the phrase while reading. Second, given that Baumgarten's Initia Philosophae Practicae and Ethica Practicae served as textbooks for the lectures, it is subject to debate to what extent the lectures represent Kant's own views. It is clear, however, that Kant never simply presented Baumgarten's views, but always subjected them to criticism or gave his own views instead (Schneewind 1997, xxvii). I will base myself only on the account of responsibility developed in the lectures. This account remains relatively stable throughout the years, is congruent with the views expressed in the published works, and was eventually published in abbreviated form in the introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals. In view of this, there is good reason to think that the account of responsibility developed in the lectures represents Kant's own view.

3 Here, I am assuming a so-called two-aspect reading of transcendental idealism (see Allison 2004).

4 All references to Kant's works are to the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. With the exception of the references to the Critique of Pure Reason, all references are to the volumes and pages of the standard edition of Kant's works by the Royal German Academy of the Sciences. The references to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the page numbers of the A and B pagination of the first and second edition. I will use the following abbreviations:

A/B  Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1998).Anth Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in Kant (2007).GMS  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant (1996a).KpV   Critique of Practical Reason, in Kant (1996a).MS     The Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant (1996a).RGV   Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Kant (1996b).VE      Lectures on Ethics, Kant (1997a).VM    Lectures on Metaphysics, Kant (1997b).

5 In Scholten (2020), I argue that Kant is not committed to the view that transcendental freedom is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.

6 Compare Kant's parallel example of a theft in the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV 5:95–98).

7 For an overview of the discussion, see Gressis (2010a, 2010b).

8 For an elaborate interpretation of Kant's conception of affects and passions, see Frierson (2014, 215–232). See also Blöser (2015, 202–203).

9 This example is Rosen’s (2008).

10 These examples are due to Austin (1957, 11n.). I simply stipulate that it is morally permissible to shoot one's own donkey and morally wrong to shoot someone else's donkey.

11 The following analysis is based on Scholten (2016). The examples are inspired by Parfit (2011, Ch. 7).

12 See also Scholten (2016).

13 I do not think that Kant's account of degrees of moral responsibility is able to solve all the thorny issues surrounding difficulty and responsibility. For an analysis of some of these issues, see Nelkin (2016). For a closer analysis of Kant's take on degrees of responsibility, see Blöser (2015).