ABSTRACT
An excuse is an event or condition that exonerates an agent for a wrongdoing. An excuse may be an event or condition that interferes with the exercises of a person’s rational capacities, thereby preventing them from doing the right thing. I argue that a person who fails to do the right thing always has an excuse for their failure. This puzzle has troubling consequences, for it means that we are never to blame for our wrongdoings.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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