A puzzle about excuses

References

• Adams, Robert. 1985. “Involuntary Sins.” The Philosophical Review 94: 3–31. doi:10.2307/2184713.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Armstrong, David. 1999. “The Open Door.” In Causation and Laws of Nature, edited by H. Sankey, 175–185. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
   Google Scholar
• Arpaly, Nomy, and Timothy Schroeder. 2014. In Praise of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Beebee, Helen. 2004. “Causing and Nothingness.” In Causation and Counterfactuals, edited by J. Collins, N. Hall and L. A. Paul, 291–308. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Coates, Justin. 2017. “The Basic Argument and Modest Moral Responsibility.” Analytic Philosophy 58: 156–170. doi:10.1111/phib.12095.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dowe, Phil. 2001. “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 216–226. doi:10.1080/713659223.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fara, Michael. 2008. “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.” Mind 117: 843–865. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Franklin, Christopher Evan. 2011. “Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.” Philosophical Studies 156: 199–230. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9583-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2001. “Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82: 178–200. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00124.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hieronymi, Pamela. 2008. “Responsibility for Believing.” Synthese 161: 357–373. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9089-x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kane, Robert. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David. 1997. “Finkish Dispositions,” reprinted in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (1999), 133–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Markovits, Julia. 2010. “Acting for the Right Reasons.” The Philosophical Review 119: 201–242. doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-037.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McGeer, Victoria, and Philip Pettit. 2015. “The Hard Problem of Responsibility.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, edited by David Shoemaker, Vol. 3, 160–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mele, Alfred. 2006. Free Will and Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pickard, Hanna. 2015. “Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90: 135–163. doi:10.1111/phpr.12025.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schlosser, Markus. 2014. “The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay.” Philosophical Studies 167: 375–385. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0102-1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sher, George. 2009. Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Smith, Michael. 2003. “Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.” In Practical Irrationality, edited by S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, 17–38. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Smith, Angela. 2005. “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.” Ethics 115: 236–271. doi:10.1086/426957.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strawson, Peter. 1962. “An evaluation of studies on ultrastructure of tonoplast in sieve elements.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 48: 1–8. doi:10.1073/pnas.48.1.1.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strawson, Galen. 2003. “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” In Free Will, 2nd ed., edited by G. Watson, 212–228. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Whittle, Ann. 2010. “Dispositional Abilities.” Philosophers’ Imprint 10: 1–23. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0010.012.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wolf, Susan. 1990. Freedom Within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar