Abstract
I present a comparative historical study of the economic growth in the four mandate territories of Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Trans-Jordan. In all four areas, the ruling western powers, Britain and France, attempted to introduce inclusive economic institutions with a strong emphasis on private property. These institutions advanced economic growth in all four regions, but there were differences in their growth rates. For example, Palestine had the best growth, even though the British were more successful in instituting inclusive institutions in Trans-Jordan. In Palestine, there was also a huge increase in the proximate causes of growth that did not happen in Trans-Jordan. The paper suggests a refined formulation of the relationship between inclusive institutions, proximate causes of growth, and economic growth. Inclusive institutions will generate economic growth, but at a slower pace. If a country is able to enhance its proximate causes of growth, then the joint effect of the proximate causes of growth and inclusive institutions will lead to much quicker growth.
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Notes
4 The data for Syria, Trans-Jordan, and Lebanon is from CitationStatistical Handbook of Middle Eastern Countries (1944, 97, 101, 117, 119) and the estimates of cultivable land for Syria and Lebanon are from 1934 and for Trans-Jordan from 1938. The estimate for Palestine is from CitationSa’id B. Himadeh (1938, 43, 44). These estimates of cultivable land are very subjective. For example, CitationAlbert Khuri (1936, 73) wrote that the cultivable land in Syria, including the sanjaq of Alexandretta and Lebanon was just 40,000 km2.
5 CitationDror Ze’evi (1996, 130-135) notes that, unofficially, peasants did sell land, but the contracts were devised in a way as to formally appear as if no sale had occurred.
6 CitationRaphael Patai (1949, 41) noted that, in 1917, in Palestine “about 70 percent of the village lands were still cultivated under the mushà system.” CitationJohn Hope-Simpson (1930, 33) reported that, in 1923, 56 percent of village lands were mushà and the remainder 44 percent were divided (mafruz). CitationMichael Fischbach (1994, 83) writes that, in the 1920s, “two-thirds of Transjordanian villages were mushà villages” (see also CitationFischbach 2000, 41, 42). CitationKhuri (1936, 57) noted that, in the early 1930s, in Syria, the mushà system “prevailed to a large extent in the eastern part of the country where miri land is the rule” (see CitationBirgit Schaebler [2000] for a discussion of the mushà system in Syria). In Lebanon, where relatively more agricultural land was private property (mulk), the mushà system existed, but was less common (CitationFirro 2003, 88; CitationKhuri 1936, 53).
7 An eyewitness in Palestine, in 1913, described the mushà system in the following manner: “The lands were held in mushà ownership. Every second year the fields were measured by stick and rope and distributed among the cultivators. Division of land always led to strife and bloodshed” (CitationHMSO 1937, 233).
8 One exception to this lack of development was Palestine, where the Jewish farmers and the even smaller community of German farmers began to use modern implements (CitationAvitsur 1975; CitationRuppin 1918, 26-33). Another exception is that, starting in the 1890s, mostly in Lebanon, hydraulic olive oil presses began to be used, and they constituted around 16 percent of the olive oil presses in the region by 1914 (CitationIssawi 1988, 377).
9 There were raids from Bedouins in Saudi Arabia, in eastern Trans-Jordan, in the late 1920s and early 1930s that were finally stopped in 1932 by the desert force of John Glubb (see CitationAlon 2009, 84-98).
16 For example, CitationGeorge F. Walpole (1948, 56), the director of the department of lands and surveys in Trans-Jordan from 1936 until 1954, stated: “The first objective of Land Settlement, therefore, was to break the mushà system of communal ownership.”
21 According to a 1937 survey of the registered lands by that time, the size of an average holding was about 55 dunams, and was valued at £P 80. In addition, it seems that most of the landholders were small landowners, as 81 percent of the holdings were valued under £P 100 (CitationShwadran 1959, 194, 195).
22 This development would be an example of CitationDavid Dequech’s (2002) third type of influence of institutions, the motivational or teleological function
23 The percentage of cultivable land for Syria is a very rough estimate, not even counting the question of how to define cultivable land. The percentage above is derived from the estimate of 35,449 km2 of land that was settled for Syria in 1943, including the sanjaq of Alexandretta and Lebanon, as reported by CitationAbdallah Hanna (2004, 462) and CitationDoreen Warriner (1957, 97). From that number, I deducted Lebanon’s 4,000 km2 that were settled (based on Firro 2003, 88), and I deducted another 1,463 km2 that was the amount of settled land in the sanjaq of Alexandretta in late 1933 (CitationKhuri 1936, 64). The resulting number of 29,986 km2 I then divided by the estimate of cultivable land for Syria, listed in the beginning of the paper, 53,136 km2. It is unclear how much more land settlement occurred in Alexandretta after 1933 since CitationPhilip S. Khoury (1987, 63) notes that the survey was suspended in 1934 for some time, and then, in 1936, the crises of Alexandretta began (CitationArsuzi-Elamir 2004).
24 The evidence with regard to the size of the land holdings is also somewhat contradictory. CitationKhoury (1987, 62) records that “in the Aleppo province the number of small privately-owned holdings decreased as a percentage of the total number of privately-owned holding in the province from 33 to 16 percent between 1924 and 1944. During the same period, the number of medium sized holdings (10 to 100 hectares) increased from 22 to 39 percent and the number of large holdings (over 100 hectares) increased from 24 to 45 percent … Similarly in the Homs district in the late 1930s, 55 percent of all privately-owned lands belonged to big landowners; and of the 144 villages in the Hama district in 1933, 92 were completely owned by four families. In both Homs and Hama, the number of owners cultivating their own lands declined under the Mandate.” However, CitationIssawi (1988, 286) writes: “Rough estimates for 1913 show 25 percent of Syria’s total area was in small holdings, 15 percent in medium holdings and 60 percent in large holdings; more accurate figures for the Syrian Republic in 1945 are 15, 33 and 29 percent with 23 percent in state holdings.” CitationFirro (2003, 88) claims that the land registration process in Lebanon also benefited the large landholders, who “were able to transfer most of the registered lands into private estates.”
31 The Palestine Royal Commission (CitationHMSO 1937, 168) claimed that, in Palestine, these changes “meant a reduction of 70 percent on the average in taxation payable by cultivators of cereals.”
36 Jacob Metzer presents data for the Jewish and Arab sectors separately, and I (CitationSchein 2007) provide the combined data.
39 CitationKhoury (1987, 11, 12). If one excludes Bedouins, the urbanization rate was 34 percent, whereas, if one includes 350,000 Bedouins to the overall population figures, the urbanization rate falls to 31 percent.
40 Statistical Handbook of Middle Eastern Countries (CitationKonikoff (19461944, 99). CitationWidmer (1936, 9) argued that there were no reliable figures for the urban population in Syria and Lebanon before 1932. A comparison of Widmer’s figures for Syria and Lebanon for 1932 reveals little change from 1932 to 1942/1943.
44 League of Nations (Citation1933–1934, Table 107, and 1942-44, Table 93). Export data include re-exports and transit trade. Norman Burns and CitationAllen Edwards (1936, 242) wrote that “[i]n a normal year about 35 percent of Syrian general export trade is made up of transit.”
45 Re-exports fell by around 80 percent during the Great Depression due to tariffs imposed by other countries (CitationBurns and CitationEdwards 1936, 245). During WWII, exports initially fell, and then they returned to their pre-WWII levels (£S 34,000,000 in 1944 as opposed to £S 36,000,000 in 1939, see League of Nations [Citation1942–1944, Table 93]).
50 Statistical Abstract of Palestine (Citation1944–1945, 63, 72). In terms of output, the number of cases of oranges increased from 1,385,000 in 1921 to 16,960,900 in 1939 (CitationMetzer 1998, 221). For the period from 1921 to 1939, approximately 85 percent of the oranges grown were exported.
51 Statistical Abstract of Palestine (Citation1944–1945, 74). The refinery received oil from Iraq that was sent to Haifa via a pipeline.
52 CitationHMSO (1931, 177). This figure does not include transit trade and re-exports. It took longer to begin collecting trade data in Trans-Jordan, and the early trade data is less reliable.
53 An anonymous reviewer of this paper suggested that the growth in this period might have been due to the Arab revolt in Palestine since this caused a larger presence of British troops in Palestine. Also, there were disruptions in Palestine’s agricultural production due to the revolt, and possibly the demand from Jews and Arabs in Palestine for Jordanian grains increased as part of their mutual economic boycotts.
58 CitationAlbert Y. Badre (1971, 162); CitationHakim (1936, 137); CitationPaul Saba (1976, 18). CitationFirro (2003, 82) notes that, before WWI, there were approximately 200 spinning mills in Lebanon, while, at the end of the mandate period, there were about 16. The average production of citrus fruits from 1930 to 1933 was 32,000 tons and from 1938 to 1942, 58,000 tons. Output of grapes in both Syria and Lebanon also increased significantly, from 42,000 tons in 1924 to 201,000 tons in 1938 (CitationKhuri 1936, 86; Statistical Handbook of Middle Eastern Countries 1944, 102, 110).
60 Statistical Handbook of Middle Eastern Countries (Citation1944, 18, 107, 123).
63 Annual fixed capital formation in the Jewish sector of Palestine’s economy averaged £P 2,354,800 from 1922 to 1932, and then, from 1933 to 1938, it averaged £P 8,419,000 (CitationSzereszewski 1968, 74). CitationMetzer (1998, 104, 105) notes that the ratio of investment to output in the Jewish sector was “extremely high” in an “international context as well.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Andrew Schein
Andrew Schein is a senior lecturer at Netanya Academic College, Netanya (Israel).
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