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Abstract
Much has been written about the effects of China’s rising role in global economic governance, but the consequences for the development policy space have received little attention. This article examines whether China’s mode of insertion in the international patent regime widens the restricted policy space of its developing country partners to shape their national patent system in a way that facilitates technical progress. Results show that China adopts a minimalist interpretation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement as it incorporates its flexibilities at the bilateral and national levels, thus preserving and potentially widening its partners’ development policy space.
Notes
1 Three additional Chinese FTAs with developing countries (Cambodia, Mauritius, and Maldives) are not considered by the analysis as their text is not yet available.
2 When the analysis refers to elements present in both versions of the CPL, we use the term “CPL.” We use CPL Citation2008 or CPL Citation2020 when the issue being analyzed is present in only one of them.
3 A rule-shaker challenges through adaptation the norms established by the hegemonic power.
4 In particular the Doha declaration (see RCEP: Article 11.8, China-South Korea Article 15.5, China-Peru Article 144.6, China-Costa Rica Article 112, and China-Chile Article 111) the Convention on Biological Diversity (China-South Korea Article 15.17.2, China-Peru Article 145.2, China-Costa Rica Article 111.2) and the Nagoya Protocol (China-South Korea Article 15.17.2).
5 RCEP: Article 11.1, China-South Korea Article 15.1, China-Peru Article 144.1 and 144.2, China-Costa Rica Article 109, and China-Chile Article 111.1.
6 Article 27 (1)
7 TRIPS: Article 27.1 footnote
8 Article 27.3 (a, b).
9 RCEP: article 11.36.
10 China-South Korea FTA: Article 15.18.3
11 Article 22.
12 RCEP: Article 11.42
13 Article 24.
14 Article 9.
15 Article 25.
16 Article 25.
17 Article 29
18 Article 26.
19 RCEP: Article 11.53, Article 145 China-Peru FTA, Article 111 China-Costa Rica FTA, and Article15.17.4 China-South Korea FTA.
20 Article 15.17.2 China-South Korea FTA.
21 Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations, 1992, Article 15.
22 Article 26.
23 Article 5.
24 Article15.3.e China-South Korea FTA
25 Article 33
26 TRIPS: Article 32.
27 RCEP: Article 11.41.2.(c, d).
28 CPL Citation2020: Article 42.
29 Article 1.12.
30 CPL Citation2020: Article 76.
31 Article 8 of Trial Implementing Measures of Early Resolution Mechanism for Drug Patent Disputes.
32 See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 355 (J) of Hatch-Waxman Act.
33 Article 31
34 TRIPS: Article 31.h.
35 Article 31.j
36 RCEP: Article 11.8, China-South Korea Article 15.5, China-Peru Article 144.6, China-Costa Rica Article 112, and China-Chile Article 111.
37 Article 11.39, article 11.8.2 of the RCEP commit parties to article 31 and article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement and its annex.
38 CPL Citation2008 articles 48 to 54; in CPL Citation2020 article 53 to 59.
39 CPL Citation2020 articles 50, 51, and 52.
40 Article 6.
41 Article 5.d.
42 RCEP: Article 11.6.
43 CPL Citation2008 article 69 (1); CPL Citation2020 article 75 (1).
44 See UNCTAD (Citation2000) “Canada-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the WTO Panel, WT/DS114/R.”
45 RCEP: Article 11.40
46 TRIPS: Article 31.h.
47 CPL Citation2008 article 69 (4), CPL Citation2020 article 75 (4).
48 According to WIPO statistics.
49 Article 20, CPL Citation2020.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Salam Alshareef
Salam Alshareef is an assistant professor at the Grenoble School of Management and an associate researcher at University Grenoble Alpes.