Was educational reform in China’s New Policies “genuine reform”? The critical role of political ideology (1901–1904)

ABSTRACT

The nature of the New Policies in China (1901–1911) has been hotly debated for decades. While scholars doubt the sincerity of the Qing government in their pursuit of constitutional reform, there is a general agreement on the high quality of their educational reform. Some even consider their educational innovations as “genuine reform” but condemn the political reform as “pseudo reform”. How could educational reform be independent of political influence? To understand the institutional change in education in the final decade of imperial China, this article analyses the relationship between educational reform and political ideology in the New Policies before 1905 by comparing the 1902 and 1904 Decrees on education. It will be shown that the 1902 Decrees deemphasised the imperial orthodoxy, and they were therefore unacceptable for the ruling circle and did not work out. The 1904 Decrees, on the contrary, succeeded because of their accordance with the dominant political ideology. The “genuineness” of the educational reform in the New Policies seem not to be an indicator of the central government’s determination to pursue fundamental reform before 1905. Rather, to a large extent, this determination was manifested in the substantial achievement of educational reform at the local level during 1906 to 1911.

KEYWORDS:

• Educational reform
• political ideology
• Confucianism
• the New Policies
• the Reform Movement of 1898

Introduction

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the monarchy, the traditional form of state in China, had to be changed to a more modern form as a result of the galvanising crises within the empire and China’s increasing involvement in the international state system. This also meant considering a fundamental reform of education. The renovation of the traditional educational system was on the agenda in 1901, when the Qing government¹ started the New Policies (the Xinzheng Reforms, 1901–1911). In recent decades, the various reforms in the late Qing period have attracted much scholarly attention and resulted in heated debates on the essence of the New Policies. While many scholars consider the political reform of the New Policies to be superficial and hypocritical, they regard the educational reform as “genuine reform”.² How could educational reform be independent of political influence? To understand education and its relation to politics at the outset of the fundamental changes taking place in modern China, this article deals with two attempts at reforming the state educational system and discusses the determinants of educational reform in a context of political conservatism during 1901 to 1904.

During the early years of the New Policies, in the period 1901 to 1904 to be exact, the Qing government successively promulgated two sets of decrees for reorganising the traditional educational system, namely the 1902 Decrees (renyin xuezhi, also known as qinding xuetang zhangcheng) and the 1904 Decrees (guichou xuezhi, also known as zouding xuetang zhangcheng). While the former turned out to be an abortive attempt at reforming education, the latter was promulgated and put into force successfully. It is generally accepted that the two sets of imperial decrees were similar in many respects. So, the question is why they had different results.

Existing literature tends to attribute the abandonment of the 1902 educational reform, in comparison with the 1904 counterpart, to three causes. Firstly, the 1902 Decrees were imperfect because of the defects and structural dysfunctions in the educational system that they envisaged.³ Secondly, the 1902 educational reform had weaker leadership. For instance, some scholars claim that Zhang Baixi (1847–1907), the leading official in the writing of the 1902 Decrees, was less powerful and less influential at court and that Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), a higher-status official and the leading figure in the creation of the 1904 Decrees, was more sophisticated and more suitable for conducting educational reform.⁴ Thirdly, there were political-factional struggles. Some scholars hold that the employment of the 1898 Reformers in drafting the 1902 decree documents incurred the most criticisms and objections among rival political factions and resulted in Zhang Baixi being persecuted during 1902 to 1903.⁵ These explanations shed light on the failure of the 1902 Decrees and the success of the 1904 Decrees. Yet there is still room for further inquiry.

It is true that the 1902 Decrees were imperfect in many respects. The question is why the court abolished the decrees instead of improving them, and why it was willing to wait at a moment when reforming education was considered urgent. In fact, even though the 1904 Decrees were more detailed and more complete, there were many modifications to the decrees after their promulgation. Moreover, no attention has been paid to surveying the specific regulations concerning curricular arrangements and prescriptive textbooks in the comparisons of the two sets of decrees. In addition, although the political-factional struggles might have led to debates that resulted in the abolition of the 1902 Decrees, there has been no in-depth analysis of what officials’ debates focused on and what lay behind them. The political dispositions of the two decree cohorts⁶ that were manifested in the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms, especially in their attitudes towards fundamental political reform, deserve special attention. Hence, it is necessary to re-examine the process of institutional reform in the educational system in China during 1901 to 1904. Through a closer examination of decree documents and excavation of more primary sources (e.g. essays, diaries, and correspondence of relevant personages in educational reform), this article investigates the failure and success of educational reforms by paying special attention to their relations to political ideology in China at the beginning of the twentieth century.

This article deals with the inception of institutional reform in education in modern China under the provocation of a new conception of schooling and new needs for education.⁷ As part of the empire’s strategy for pursuing survival, wealth, and power, educational reform in the New Policies not only aimed at producing men of talent who mastered Western practical learning, but also tried to reform the people in order to make them qualified citizens. The final decades of the Qing dynasty witnessed the most substantive changes in the Chinese educational system, which had profound influences on education, politics, and society in modern China. As Douglas Reynolds put it, the results of the New Policies could “provide the necessary and indispensable baseline for understanding China” in the twenty-first century.⁸ A closer investigation of educational reforms during 1901 to 1904 will provide a fresh perspective on the establishment of a modern educational system in China, as well as presenting the entanglement of educational and political reforms in the pursuit of democratic politics. Based on original policy documents and essays, diaries, and correspondence of officials and literati, this article compares the 1902 Decrees with the 1904 Decrees by examining the relationship between educational reform and political ideology. It first reviews the relationship between education and politics in imperial China and highlights the dominant role of state orthodoxy in the Chinese traditional educational and examination system. It then provides an overview of the makings of the 1902 and 1904 Decrees and the distinct destinies of the two sets of decrees. Furthermore, it analyses the attitudes of the two decree cohorts towards institutional reform by unravelling the relationship between the main contributors of the two sets of decrees and the Reform Movement of 1898 (weixin bianfa). Finally, it examines the political dispositions embodied in the two sets of decrees by analysing the curricular designs and prescriptive textbooks for Confucian classics. The article shows that the 1902 Decrees, downplaying the imperial orthodoxy, were unacceptable for the ruling circle and that the 1904 Decrees mainly succeeded because they were in tune with the exceedingly slow fulfilment⁹ of the court’s reforming promises.

Education, Confucianism, and politics in late imperial China

Traditional education in China was closely associated with Confucianism and politics. Education in the Confucian ideal was designed to promote the moral transformation of the individual self so as to build a harmonious political order, which was of twofold significance in politics. Most dynastic governments not only acquired legitimacy by showing reverence to Confucianism through promoting educational activities, but also tried to maintain a certain social, political, and moral order backed by Confucianism, especially by virtue of education. Due to its unique role in the moral transformation of the common people and the cultivation of men of administrative talent, the dynastic governments attached great importance to education.¹⁰ For one thing, the governments disseminated the official ideologies or orthodox values by means such as moral inculcation through schools, the family/clan, the Rural Compact (xiangyue), and ceremonies and rituals.¹¹ For another, the governments gained qualified men of administrative talent via examination activities, especially the civil service examinations.¹²

Long before Western influences began to be felt, China had maintained a traditional educational system, taking effect from the Han dynasty (156–87 bc) until the late Qing dynasty. The traditional school not only provided a place for educational activities but also served another function: that is, to offer sacrifices to Confucius.¹³ Confucian classics were the core content of the various forms of education. But it should be noted here that Confucianism itself did not remain unchanged, and that dynastic governments through history upheld their own orthodox Confucianism legitimised by the interpretation of a certain Confucian school. In the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties of late imperial China, Neo-Confucianism represented by the Cheng-Zhu School became the state orthodoxy, since the interpretation of Neo-Confucianism “in the hands of dogmatic Confucian moralists and formalistic political hacks” suited the needs of political control and the centralisation of power.¹⁴ Correspondingly, Neo-Confucian classics formed the core curriculum. In the civil service examinations candidates were requested to express their political loyalty and moral allegiance based on their acquaintance with Neo-Confucian classics.¹⁵

By and large, education had in large part remained fixed under the control of the dynastic governments in late imperial China, in spite of some slow changes in educational practice and the civil service examinations. The traditional content and form of education did not receive serious reflection and reorientation until the mid-nineteenth century, when destabilising elements were brought into China by Western powers. Since the Opium Wars, especially the Second Opium War (the Arrow War, 1856–1860), the severe crises brought by military defeats and domestic upheavals forced the Qing government to reflect on and reorient traditional education. In order to resist foreign aggressions and reverse the tide of defeat, from the 1860s the Qing government became tolerant of the introduction of Western educational thought and practices into China and supported the establishment of an array of Western-style schools producing men of talent who were capable of mastering foreign languages and military and industrial technologies.¹⁶ During the 1860s to 1890s, there was a perceptible shift in the discourse on educational affairs: the new concept of popular schooling in Western countries attracted enormous attention, and the new need for education in producing men of talent who mastered both classical and Western practical learning was shared by the reform-minded officials and literati.¹⁷ Yet the educational reforms initiated by the government prior to 1898 only scratched the surface, and the traditional educational and examination system basically remained intact.

China’s military defeat by Japan in 1895 clearly showed the strength of the fundamental reform conducted in Meiji Japan (1868–1912) and thereafter triggered appeals for institutional change at court and in society. In 1898, Emperor Guangxu (1875–1908), assisted by the Reformers (weixinpai) and the reform-minded officials, embarked on a programme of institutional reform, known as the Reform Movement of 1898. Although related to Confucianism, the reforming propositions advocated by the Reformers headed by Kang Youwei (1858–1927) aimed at promoting constitutional politics in China. To coordinate the political reform, a set of educational innovations were initiated, including replacing the Eight-legged Essay (baguwen) with Policy and Discourse¹⁸ (celun) in civil service examinations, transforming the traditional academies into modern schools, establishing specialised and industrial schools, and establishing the Imperial University (jingshi daxetang). However, what the Reformers advocated was intolerable for the conservative ruling circle headed by Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908). Only lasting 103 days (11 June–21 September), the Movement ended with failure because of the backlash from the conservative force.¹⁹

By scholarly consensus, the failure of the Movement resulted from its radical divergence from the ruling circle’s refusal to renounce vested interests and devolve powers. New Text Confucianism, the theoretical foundation of the Reformers’ propositions, contravened the Qing’s orthodox Neo-Confucianism.²⁰ Formulating his reforming propositions by reinterpreting Confucian classics, Kang Youwei, the leading reformer, actually separated the polity and sovereignty from the emperor.²¹ Kang not only advocated reforming the traditional forms of government and state by emulating Western constitutionalism, but also exceeded the traditional socio-political and moral order by promoting the equality of humanity and popular power (minquan) that treated people as active political agents as the basis of the nation.²² In other words, though he related his propositions to Confucianism, Kang’s ultimate goal was to promote constitutional reform within the monarchy, which would disturb the existing socio-political and moral order and was intolerable for the ruling circle. Soon New Text Confucianism was condemned as heresy at court and drew a large number of attacks from all directions.

After the crackdown on the Movement, institutional change was not proposed until 1901, when China suffered from the Boxer Rebellion and the Allied Invasion (1899–1901), which deeply imperilled the Qing’s governance. The Boxer Rebellion, expanding from conflicts between the Christian Church and common Chinese into a large-scale turbulence at the turn of the twentieth century,²³ disturbed the existing social and political order deeply. During and after the turbulence, the court finally realised the necessity of reforming the state mechanism and came to terms with institutional reform, including reform of the traditional educational system.

Educational reform in the New Policies: the 1902 Decrees and 1904 Decrees

On 29 January 1901, the Reform Edict (bianfa zhaoshu) was issued for institutional change, signifying the beginning of the New Policies. It considered that the previous knowledge acquired from the West had only scratched the surface rather than grasping the essence of Western learning. Furthermore, it claimed that “Overall, [there was] no change in institution (faling) and no break-up of chronic habits (guji); if [we] seek for strengthening, [we] should think about reforming (gengzhang).”²⁴ Facing the unprecedented governing crises brought by the Boxer Rebellion and the Allied Invasion, the Qing court eventually continued the Reformers’ advocacy of establishing a modern-style school system and reforming the civil service examinations.

However, Neo-Confucianism was still enshrined as the state orthodoxy, and the Neo-Confucian classics were kept as the main content of education in 1901. The New Policies, at least at their beginning, were still hostile to the Reform Movement of 1898, which clearly manifested in the Reform Edict:

The Three Cardinal Guidelines and Five Constant Virtues are constant axiomatically like the sun and the moon lighting the world … The calamity made by the rebellious Kang (Kang Youwei) was even much more malevolent than the Boxer was … People could hardly know that the reform advocated by the rebellious Kang was to disturb other than to reform.²⁵

The above quotation clearly shows that Neo-Confucianism remained, in essence, the state orthodoxy, even though the Qing court declared its commitment to institutional reform by implementing the New Policies. The fundamental reform, as advocated by the Reform Movement, was unwanted since the leading reformer, Kang Youwei, was condemned for his subversive words and deeds. This modest attitude of the guiding edict towards the overall institutional reform cast a pall over educational reform. On 14 September 1901, the court specifically issued a guiding edict for reforming education. Echoing the state orthodoxy accentuated by the Reform Edict, it prescribed the Neo-Confucian classics, the Four Books and the Five Classics, as the main content of schooling, though it encouraged local governments to establish modern-style schools for producing men of talent who had also mastered practical learning.²⁶ This adherence to classical learning was apparently different from that of the Reform Movement. According to the guiding edict (ding guoshi zhao) of the Movement, the Western practical learning that could tackle current problems was particularly appreciated. Traditional learning, albeit seen as the foundation of the state, was considered as possessing defects such as “tediousness, emptiness, pedantry and fallaciousness [kong shu yu miu]”.²⁷ Comparatively speaking, the New Policies at their inception still adopted an uncritical attitude towards the state orthodoxy backed by Neo-Confucianism, which indicated that propositions for fundamental reforms would be unwanted and foreshadowed the conservatism of the subsequent educational reform.

It was in this context that a group of officials and literati composed a series of draft regulations on reforming the existing educational system at the behest of the court. The leading official in the drafting process was Zhang Baixi. To a certain degree, Zhang was inclined towards reform as a result of his support for a few of the Reformers’ propositions as we will come back to in the next section. Although he was demoted in 1898 for recommending the Reformers, he was assigned as the chief leader in conducting educational reform when the court was bent on implementing the New Policies. The court finally put him in such an important position because of Zhang’s limited participation in the Reform Movement of 1898, his loyalty to the court during the Boxer Rebellion, and his close relationship to the ruling circle.²⁸

The draft decrees produced under the leadership of Zhang Baixi were promulgated by the government on 15 August 1902, and were known as the 1902 Decrees; they included five regulations concerning primary, secondary, and higher education and one regulation concerning examination and selection. The educational system envisaged by the 1902 Decrees made several breakthroughs from the traditional system. Above all, by contrast with the traditional loosely organised school system, it divided the school system into three phases (primary, secondary, and higher education) and seven gradations (kindergarten, common primary school, higher primary school, middle school, higher school, pre-university/university, and graduate school). Beyond that, the objectives, enrolment conditions, syllabi, and rules for different gradations and various types of schools were clarified. Associated with this restructured school system, the content and organisation of schooling entailed dramatic changes such as formally incorporating subjects concerning Western learning in the state curriculum, e.g. foreign languages and chemistry in secondary schooling,²⁹ and adopting the class-based system. More importantly, the popularisation of education was taken seriously. The 1902 regulations not only asked the local magistrates to establish different schools according to their administrative levels but also encouraged private funders to set up primary and secondary schools by legitimising their role in education. In addition to that, to enrol as many as children in school as possible the regulations allowed the simplified schools and exempted or reduced tuition fees.³⁰

The promulgation of the 1902 Decrees was the first effort made by the Chinese government in entrenching a state system of education. But the decrees remained on paper and were abolished in May 1903. Without any explanation concerning the abolition, the court appointed Zhang Zhidong as the leading official to redraw the regulations. Zhang Zhidong was a high-status official in the Qing government. By scholarly consensus, his involvement with educational reform went through four stages. Initially, during 1867 to 1877, he focused on reorganising traditional education, aiming at transforming the traditional Chinese classics for practical use. Then, during 1877 to 1884, he enhanced his understanding of the West, and utilitarianism became dominant in his educational thought and practice. During the period 1885 to 1889, he devoted himself to the Self-strengthening Movement (also known as the Western Affairs Movement, 1861–1895),³¹ and began to experiment with some Western-style schools in Guangdong and Hubei under his jurisdiction. Finally, during 1890 to 1907, in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War, Zhang was shocked by China’s defeat by Japan. Hence, he further promoted educational reforms in Hubei by establishing some modern schools for producing men of talent.³² Like many officials of the day, Zhang proposed to learn from Japan and establish a modern educational system according to the Japanese model.³³ It is because of his deeper involvement in educational reform that Zhang Zhidong was considered to be more sophisticated and therefore better suited to conducting educational reform, as mentioned above.

The new decrees managed by Zhang Zhidong were promulgated by the government on 13 January 1904. They were known as the 1904 Decrees, and were the first government-issued decrees to successfully entrench a state system of education in China. The decrees were much more elaborate than the 1902 ones, consisting of 22 regulations covering almost every aspect of the entire educational system. Like the 1902 ones, the 1904 Decrees aimed at overhauling the traditional educational system by regulating the aim, content, and form of education, establishing a school system with four phases (kindergarten, primary, secondary, and higher education) and seven gradations (kindergarten, lower primary school, higher primary school, middle school, higher school,³⁴ university, and graduate school). At a rough glance, the 1904 Decrees, compared with the previous ones, were indeed more detailed and complete in many respects, especially when it came to the requirements for setting up different levels and kinds of schools and the syllabus for each subject in schooling. Moreover, education became much more accessible, since official schools were allowed to be established at lower administrative levels and people who funded private schools would be rewarded.³⁵

As noted above, existing literature tends to attribute the abandonment of the 1902 educational reform to its weaker leadership, political-factional struggles, and the defects and structural dysfunctions in the educational system envisaged by the 1902 Decrees. However, these explanations seem to neglect a crucial issue – that is, why the Qing government neglected the 1902 Decrees instead of improving them when reforming education was considered to be urgent. Moreover, existing literature has paid little attention to the detailed provisions on schooling, especially regarding the curriculum. In fact, the political dispositions embodied in the two sets of decrees might provide us some additional and important insights into the failure and success of educational reforms in the first years of the New Policies. In what follows, I will first compare the political dispositions of the 1902 and 1904 decree cohorts by analysing their attitudes to the dominant political ideology and the Reform Movement of 1898. Then I will investigate the subject matter designated for orthodox Confucianism and the corresponding textbooks to see the dissimilar political dispositions manifested in the decree documents.

Ideological divergence and political-factional struggles

Many scholars have perceived the distinct fates of the 1902 and 1904 Decrees in connection with their differing leaderships. The results of the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms, especially the dismissal of the former, have been always explained as a consequence of political-factional struggles.³⁶ This section further argues that ideological divergence gave rise to the political-factional struggles over the 1902 Decrees, and that the results of the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms depended on their dispositions towards political reform as predominantly manifested in their attitudes towards the Reform Movement of 1898.

In general, the officials and literati involved in the making of the 1902 Decrees were in favour of the Reform Movement or kept close to the Reformers. Zhang Baixi, the progenitor of the decrees, was in favour of the Reform Movement; he even recommended Kang Youwei, the leading reformer, to Emperor Guangxu for Kang’s proposition to reform the civil service examinations.³⁷ Moreover, Zhang’s fellows, that is, the other contributors to the making of the decrees, were even more radical. Shen Zhaozhi (dates unknown), the drafter of most of the regulations, belonged to New Text Confucianism, which was the theoretical foundation of the Reform Movement. Shen was one of the most exceptional students of Pi Xirui³⁸ and had taken an active part in the Movement around 1898.³⁹ Zhao Congfan (dates unknown), who played an important role in drafting the regulations, came from Jiangxi as well. Although it is unclear whether he belonged to New Text Confucianism, he was pro-reform. According to Munakata Kotarou’s diary,⁴⁰ Zhao and leading figures among the Reformers, such as Wang Kangnian (1860–1911) and Tang Caichang (1867–1900), were in close touch.⁴¹ In addition, other reform-minded literati, such as Yan Fu (1854–1921) and Lin Shu (1852–1924), were employed in the educational reform as well. During the making of the 1902 Decrees, the Reformers’ enthusiasm and exhilaration showed clearly. In a letter to Wang Kangnian, Yan Shiqing (dates unknown), who was an employee at the Imperial University, celebrated the leading role of the reform-minded officials and literati and claimed “other colleagues [in the Imperial University] are familiar with us, so that we could unify for our future undertaking”.⁴² The Society of Protecting the Emperor⁴³ (baohuangdang, the Reformers) even remarked: “Our future is quite hopeful since people in the Imperial University all belong to our Reformers’ party.”⁴⁴

After their promulgation, the 1902 Decrees had drawn many attacks at court. The criticisms mainly focused on the leadership of the educational reformers and the 1902 regulations that would undermine imperial orthodoxy and disturb the existing political order. Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), an influential official and an advocate of the conservatives’ suppression of the Reform Movement, claimed that it was wrong to assign Wu Rulun, Zhao Congfan, and Shen Zhaozhi as framers, especially because Zhao and Shen were considered to be rebellious bandits who conspired to subvert the imperial order. Other officials criticised several aspects of the decrees as well. Some claimed that the modality of the proposed educational system was not consistent with the traditional one, while others claimed that the many borrowed items, such as the subject of International Relation Studies (guojixue), could be the disguised form of liberty and popular power (ziyou minquan).⁴⁵

Additionally, the Imperial University (jingshi daxuetang) drew a considerable amount of criticisms. The Imperial University had been established during the Reform Movement of 1898. Although the university survived after 1898, the court kept a wary eye on it. The university was not only the top institution in the school system, but also the supreme institution of educational administration. During the creation of the 1902 Decrees, many reform-minded literati served in the university. Yuan Shikai opposed the Imperial University, and claimed that students would be corrupted since most staff at the university advocated liberty and popular power. Others stated that most students enrolled at the university were comrades of Kang Youwei, and the establishment of the university violated the segregation between the Manchus and the Han. A student movement in 1903 protesting against Russia’s occupation of Northern China made the situation worse, since the students from the university played the leading role.⁴⁶ In the anti-Russian movement, the students surpassed “the limited type of appeal made before and during the Reform Movement of 1898 by reformers like Kang Youwei”.⁴⁷ The court soon quelled the students’ uprising in order to prevent students banding together for the purposes of conspiracy.

As noted above, the ruling circle took a hostile stance towards the Reform Movement at the beginning of the New Policies. Kang Youwei, the leading reformer, was still blamed for his “rebellious” words and deeds. Even though the court absolved most reformers and revolutionaries in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, Kang was one of the three people on the unpardonable list.⁴⁸ Although the government had initiated the New Policies and claimed to be conducting institutional reform, Neo-Confucianism was still the state orthodoxy. In other words, its attitude towards the Reform Movement and its adherence to the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy indicate that the ruling circle preferred moderate adjustments to the existing political order. Fundamental political reform as advocated by the Reformers was unwanted at court. Manifesting as debates, the political-factional struggles triggered the criticisms of the 1902 Decrees. Having realised the Reformers’ influence on the 1902 Decrees, the court soon took side with the opponents of the decrees. Consequently, the 1902 decree cohort was dismissed, and the potential negative influence on the existing socio-political order resulted in the abolition of the 1902 Decrees. Shortly afterwards, Zhang Zhidong and Rongqing (1859–1917) were appointed as co-leaders alongside Zhang Baixi to redraw the regulations.

The 1904 decree cohort was moderate, and even rather conservative. The leading authority in the making of the 1904 Decrees was Zhang Zhidong. There have been heated debates for decades concerning Zhang’s attitude towards reform. While many scholars regard Zhang as a Qing loyalist and a conservative for his adherence to the existing socio-political order and disinclination towards fundamental political reform, some consider him as reform-minded when examining his active participation in reforming the traditional education system and experimenting with Western-style schools. If conservatives are people who were opposed to radical political reform and preferred to maintain the existing political order, Zhang seemed to fall under this category. However, this conclusion comes mostly from the analysis of his discourse on politics and education. When extending research to Zhang’s educational practices, many scholars consider that Zhang was inclined to reform. No matter the outcomes of Zhang’s educational reforms in Hubei,⁴⁹ advocacy for simplifying Confucian classics⁵⁰ and utilitarianism manifested in his writings, An Exhortation to Learn (Quanxue pian),⁵¹ indicate his inclination towards reform. In fact, although the 1904 Educational System seemed to draw much inspiration from Zhang, many reforming propositions and practices in Zhang’s previous educational reforms found no place in the 1904 Decrees.

Moreover, the overall staffing in the drafting of the new decrees suggests the decline of reform-minded leadership and the conservative disposition of the main contributors of the 1904 Decrees. Although designated as co-leaders along with Zhang Zhidong, Zhang Baixi and Rongqing did not have a direct hand in the making of the 1904 Decrees. In fact, Zhang Baixi became a nominal leader after the rejection of the 1902 educational reform. His contribution to the 1904 Decrees seems to be that the 1902 regulations became a reference for the 1904 ones. Another official, Rongqing, functioned much like a superintendent. As a Mongol Bannerman in the alliance of the meritocracy of the Manchus and Mongols, Rongqing was a loyal follower of Empress Dowager Cixi and often met her during the making of the decrees.⁵² He appeared as a counterforce of the conservative camp in the educational reform. Furthermore, the other important figures involving in the making of the 1904 Decrees were against radical reforms. Luo Zhenyu (1866–1940), who had provided abundant inspiration for the drafting of the decrees, was an Old-Text Confucian scholar and against the Reform Movement of 1898. Even after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, he remained a Qing loyalist.⁵³ Chen Yi (1873–1929), the main drafter of the decree documents, was a conservative and also remained a Qing loyalist in the Republic.⁵⁴ Hence, the main contributors and drafters of the 1904 Decrees were much more likely to conduct modest and even conservative reform.

The above analysis clearly shows that the leaderships of the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms took contrasting stands towards the Reform Movement, especially with regard to the attitudes of those who made substantial contributions to the drafting of decree documents. It is fair to say that, as high-status governmental officials, the attitudes of Zhang Baixi and Zhang Zhidong towards the Movement were largely ambiguous. By contrast, the attitudes of the people who were deeply engaged in the writing of the decrees were explicit. While the 1902 leadership had a greater or lesser degree of contact with the Reformers or sympathised with the Movement, the 1904 leadership was generally resistant to the Movement. Resistance to the Movement to a large extent explains the disinclination of the 1904 leadership towards fundamental political reform. These two distinct political dispositions towards institutional reform were respectively expressed in the decree documents in 1902 and 1904.

Comparing the 1902 and 1904 Decrees

The 1902 and 1904 decree cohorts had disparate dispositions towards fundamental political reform. How were their dispositions embodied in the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms? This section tries to decipher the political significance of the two sets of decrees by investigating the role of the state orthodoxy, namely Neo-Confucianism, in the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms. To be exact, it will examine the contents of schooling that directly relate to Confucian classics by referring to the curricular arrangements in the two sets of decrees: the subject of Reading Classics in primary and secondary curricula, and classical learning and the Confucian majors in higher education. Before a closer examination of curricular arrangements for classics in the 1902 and 1904 decrees, it is necessary to reflect on the ideological significance of Confucian classics for imperial politics and education in the Qing dynasty.

The Confucian classics were not only the foundation of state orthodoxy but also the origin of a certain socio-political and moral order in most dynasties throughout Chinese history. For one thing, dynastic governments showed their reverence for Confucianism so as to claim legitimacy through establishing schools and holding learning ceremonies. For another, governments disseminated their official ideologies and gained qualified men of administrative talent through the influence of teaching, ritual, and examination activities.⁵⁵ Because of the closeness between education and politics, classical learning was the core curriculum in traditional Chinese schooling and dominated the civil service examinations. But the successive dynastic governments had their own orthodoxies represented by a certain Confucian school. In the Qing dynasty, the state orthodoxy was Neo-Confucianism represented by the Cheng-Zhu School. Did the classical learning prescribed in the 1902 and 1904 Decrees correspond with the existing state orthodoxy?

Both the school system envisaged by the 1902 Decrees and that established by the 1904 Decrees upheld a fourteen-year primary and secondary schooling in the general track, but with differences in the division of gradations and duration of each gradation.⁵⁶ The curricula associating with the 1902 and 1904 systems incorporated the traditional classical learning in the subject of Reading Classics (dujing).⁵⁷ By comparison, the 1902 and 1904 curricula attached varying degrees of importance to Reading Classics and had distinct attitudes towards the state orthodoxy. According to the decree documents, the 1902 curricula allocated approximately 16.67, 14.82, and 21.62% of its total time to Reading Classics for common primary, higher primary, and middle schools respectively; the 1904 curricula, for its part, allocated approximately 40, 33.33, and 25% to lower primary, higher primary, and middle schools respectively.⁵⁸ All the time proportions of classical learning in the 1902 curriculum were lower than those in the 1904 counterpart, which were 23.33, 18.51, and 3.38% respectively in common (lower) primary, higher primary, and middle schools. This comparison demonstrates that the 1902 Decrees, compared to the 1904 Decrees, downplayed the role of classical learning to a significant extent.

Moreover, the two sets of decrees had different levels of attachment to the state orthodoxy, which was clearly embodied in the textbooks prescribed for Reading Classics. In the 1902 curricula, Xiaoxue (the primary learning) was the only one of the Neo-Confucian classics prescribed as a textbook for common primary schools, aimed at teaching practical and lucid knowledge.⁵⁹ For higher primary and middle schools, some classics were designated but without specifying the Neo-Confucian versions. Moreover, some classics that had been appreciated by the Reformers for constitutional reform were even listed, such as the Gongyang Commentary (gongyang zhuan) and the Guliang Commentary (guliang zhuan). Aside from Confucian classics, theories of the ancient non-canonical philosophers (zhuzixue) and discourses of foreign notables were recommended to be taught at school. If the classics without designated Neo-Confucian versions downplayed Neo-Confucianism as the state orthodoxy, the parallel between Confucian classics and the non-canonical theories and Western discourses further undercut the supremacy of orthodox Neo-Confucianism.⁶⁰ Thus, the 1902 Decrees downplayed the state orthodoxy by deemphasising Neo-Confucianism and allowing the learning of other theories and discourses that might prove to be more practical and competitive than the imperial orthodoxy. In addition, the schooling envisaged by the 1902 Decrees was inconsistent with the traditional examination system. Although the civil service examinations were not abolished until 1906, the 1902 educational system deviated from the examination system and aimed at educating students differently. However, these efforts at reforming education became pointless after the inception of the 1904 Decrees.

By contrast, textbooks for Reading Classics in the 1904 curricula were restricted to Neo-Confucian and other scriptural classics, while most Confucian classics in the 1902 curricula had been just general titles without designated versions. The designated classics in 1904 outnumbered those in 1902. Almost all the designated classics for primary and secondary schools in 1904 were certain versions written, compiled, or reinterpreted by Confucian scholars like Jiang Yong, Zheng Xuan, Cheng Hao, Zhu Xi, Cai Shen, and Cheng Yi, all of whom were adherents of either Neo-Confucianism or Old Text Confucianism.⁶¹ Regardless of their possible opinions on Confucian learning or research, the works of these Neo-Confucians and Old Text Confucians basically complied with the existing socio-political order, which presented a categorical character differing from the radical New Text Confucians in the late Qing who aimed at political reconstitution. All the designated classics were required readings for the civil service examinations in the Qing dynasty. Thus, it is clear that the 1904 educational reform was rather reserved in comparison to its 1902 counterpart. For one thing, it still cleaved to the existing political ideology by underscoring the state orthodoxy, which showed little interest in the fundamental political reconstitution for which the Reformers advocated. For another, the prescribed versions of the classics suggested that the educational reform of 1904 was still connected to the traditional examination system by prescribing the content of classical learning.

The distinct attitudes towards the state orthodoxy manifested in the 1902 and 1904 educational reforms can be further confirmed by decree documents on higher education. There were different conditions for establishing colleges or universities and different regulations on the divisions of gradations and majors in the 1902 and 1904 Decrees, since for the time being the Chinese were still struggling to introduce modern university education on the basis of the traditional education system. Space considerations prohibit a recounting of the details of higher education. Here I only examine the content directly relating to the Confucian classics. In 1902, the Confucian classics occupied a certain place in pre-university and university education. While it was paralleled with the learning of the ancient non-canonical philosophers in pre-university education, Confucian classical learning was subsumed in the Literature Department (wenxueke) in university education.⁶² Besides, the 1902 decree documents were not partial to any Confucian strands.

By contrast, higher education in 1904 restricted classical learning to Neo-Confucian classics and other scriptural norms and attempted to underscore the state orthodoxy in both pre-university and university education. To specify the orthodoxy, the Gongyang Commentary, which had been interpreted by the Reformers for legitimating their reforming ideas, was criticised as being “used by the rebellious party of Kang and Liang for their subversive conspiracy”.⁶³ Abolishing the subject of philosophy (including Western philosophies) initiated in 1902, the 1904 Decrees advocated for establishing a specific department or university for classical learning rather than subsuming it in the Literature Department as the 1902 Decrees did. The 1904 Decrees required the setting up of a Classics Department (jingxueke) at pre-university level and the University for Classical Learning (jingke daxue) at university level.⁶⁴

The above analysis suggests that the attitudes of the 1902 and 1904 Decrees towards the Confucian classics were even more divergent in higher education than they were in primary and secondary education. If primary and secondary education in 1902 downplayed the Confucian classics and deemphasised the imperial orthodoxy, higher education in 1902 seemed to eliminate the ideological significance of Confucian classics by subsuming it into literature. To cater to the needs of the ruling circle, the 1904 Decrees basically followed the two edicts promulgated at the beginning of the New Policies by cleaving to orthodox Neo-Confucianism. The conservatism of the 1904 educational reform was clearly shown by the criticisms of it among reform-minded literati. For instance, having learned of the advocacy for the University for Classical Learning, Wang Guowei (1877–1927)⁶⁵ argued that “the expelling of all other theories [but Neo-Confucianism]” was no longer possible in such a “liberal era”.⁶⁶ Alongside those who believed that the traditional classics were still valid and beneficial, there were many reform-minded officials and literati who insisted that the only way to save China was to learn from the West wholeheartedly. In an article published in The Eastern Times (shibao) on 22 May 1904, the author fiercely criticised the outdatedness of the curriculum and the large proportions of time allocated to Reading Classics in 1904, and claimed: “Education is for nourishing the citizens”.⁶⁷ However, political conservativism dominated the 1904 educational reform; the Reformers’ educational ideal for fundamental political reform was barely recognised by the 1904 Decrees. Further evidence for the court’s attitude towards the Reformers is offered by the fate of the Institute of Compiling and Translating Books affiliated with the Imperial University (jingshi daxuetang bianyi shuju). During 1901 to 1904,⁶⁸ many reform-minded literati were employed in the institute. They set a series of purposes for their reforming ideal, such as “to inspire the populace and not to follow the tradition” and “to learn from others (the Western powers and the westernised Japan) and to make progress”.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, not a single textbook produced in this institute was approved by the government.⁷⁰

To sum up, the political dispositions of the 1902 and 1904 leaderships were clearly infused into the respective decree documents, as the differing roles of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy in the 1902 and 1904 curricula indicate. Comparatively speaking, the 1902 Decrees allocated much less time to classics and, more importantly, downplayed the current orthodoxy by juxtaposing Confucian classics and other competing theories and discourses. In this way, education would be more receptive to Western learning and more tolerant of fundamental reform. On the contrary, the 1904 Decrees highlighted the established orthodoxy by excluding theories or discourses of other Confucian strands, non-canonical philosophers, and Western notables in primary and secondary education, and specifically setting up a major or a university for classics in higher education. Thus, it is not hard to see the 1902 Decrees were unacceptable for the ruling circle if we look back to the two edicts issued in 1901 that underscored the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. The ruling circle preferred to pursue wealth and power through educational reform rather than a fundamental change of the established order.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Qing court declared the implementation of the New Policies for institutional reform in China. To survive various crises, it took inspiration from the Japanese experiences for pursuing wealth and power. However, at the beginning of the New Policies, the court was rather reserved in its institutional reforms, and was still hostile to the Reform Movement of 1898 that aimed at establishing a constitutional monarchy in China. Although there had been rising appeals for constitutionalism in society and even a few in the government since 1901,⁷¹ the Qing government did not take measures to conduct constitutional reform. It was only in 1905, when the Russo-Japanese War took place in Manchuria and Korea, that the circumstances became favourable for more fundamental reform. The reason for this was that Japan’s victory over Russia, at least according to the advocates of constitutionalism, proved the superiority of constitutionalism to despotism, which provoked a tide of enthusiasm for constitutionalism in Chinese society. In this scenario, the Qing government took steps towards constitutional reforms: in 1905, two groups of officials were designated to investigate the politics of the West and Japan; in 1906, the court basically consented to introduce constitutionalism and begin bureaucratic reform; in 1907, the court issued an edict for encouraging reforming proposals from society; in 1908, some basic principles for Constitutional Preparation (yubei lixian) were promulgated.⁷² Prior to this, the court did not intend to reconstitute the existing social and political order, and the process of the reform in the educational system was indicative of this political conservatism.

The ideological divergence of the 1902 Decrees gave rise to its abolition, and the ideological accordance to the existing political orthodoxy contributed to the successful implementation of the 1904 Decrees. On the one hand, it was made clear that the leadership of the 1902 Decrees was in close touch with the Reformers or sympathised with the Reform Movement of 1898 and were inclined to downplay the state orthodoxy in educational reform, which incurred the opposition of political rivals at court and the disaffection of the ruling circle. The 1902 Decrees obviously de-emphasised scriptural Neo-Confucianism and advocated theories of non-canonical philosophers and Western discourses, something that would undermine imperial legitimacy. By contrast, the leadership of the 1904 Decrees was ambiguous, and even rather conservative, in their attitude to educational reform. The Educational System established by the 1904 Decrees was a trade-off between the urgency of reform and political conservatism; it was more acceptable for the ruling circle as it still underscored the state orthodoxy and stuck to the existing socio-political order. With the ongoing constitutional reform after 1905, there were increasing conflicts between the central government and local governments and gentry, and the court gradually lost control over local governments. Reforming practices at the local level turned out to be at variance with the central government’s instruction, and the central government was hardly able to take control of the local educational practices.⁷³ Moreover, educational reforms during the constitutional reform even became a divisive force between different groups in society, in which the reform-minded gentry took modern education as an instrument of ideological and practical opposition.⁷⁴ Thus, the “genuine reform” that many scholars so appreciated seems to not refer to the educational reform around the 1904 Decrees, but to the outcomes of educational practices after 1905 at local levels. Before 1905, the top-down reform of the educational system was eclectic, the process of which manifested the efforts of leaders trying to, to borrow Weston, “tack to the winds of the court’s fundamental political and cultural conservatism”.⁷⁵

Acknowledgements

For their help and comments, I would like to thank Jeroen J.H. Dekker, Piet van der Ploeg, and Axel Schneider, none of whom should be blamed for any remaining mistakes or misinterpretations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ying Zhou

Ying Zhou is a PhD candidate in history of education at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Currently, she is working on her PhD research- Democratic Education in China: the relationship between education, citizenship, and democracy, 1901-1937. Her research interests include the history of education, citizenship education, progressive education, and the Dalton Plan.

Notes

¹ The terms “the Qing dynasty”, “the (Qing) government”, “the (Qing) court”, and “ruling circle” occur frequently in this article. “The Qing dynasty” is the period of 1644–1911, during which the Manchu rulers governed China. “The (Qing) government” consisted of the Manchu and Han officials who made decisions at both the central level and above the provincial level. “The (Qing) court” was where the emperor lived and worked; it was the supreme institute of the Qing government in Beijing, at which officials could express their opinions or ideas. “The ruling circle” was a coterie of Manchu rulers who had the ultimate power to make decisions over affairs empire-wide, which was headed by Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) in the last decades of the Qing dynasty.

² See e.g. Chen Xulu, Jindai Zhongguo shehui de xinchen daixie [The Societal Metabolism of Modern China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1992), 246–51; Zhu Yilu and Zhang Jin, Zhongguo jindai zhengzhi sichao yanjiu [A Study on the Political Thoughts in Modern China] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1998), 130–6; and Liu Zhengwei, Dufu yu shishen: Jiangsu jiaoyu jindaihua yanjiu [Governor and Gentry: A Study on the Modernisation of Education in Jiangsu] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), 153–8.

³ See e.g. Mi Long and Li Weili, “Qingmo ‘guimao xuezhi’ tidai ‘renyin xuezhi’ de yuanyin tanxi [An Analysis on the Reasons of Guimao Decrees’ Replacing Renyin Decrees in the Late Qing],” Tangshan shifan xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Tangshan Normal College] 36, no.1 (2014): 102; and Chen Ruiteng, “Zaitan renyin xuezhi zhi feichu: yi gongneng lilun wei shijiao [Re-exploring the Abolition of Renyin Decrees: From the Perspective of Functionalism],” Minnan shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Minnan Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)] 31, no. 4 (2017): 91.

⁴ See e.g. Guan Xiaohong, Wan Qing xuebu yanjiu [A Study on the Ministry of Education in the Late Qing] (Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 55; Wang Jiarong, Minzu hun: jiaokeshu bianqian [The Soul of the Nation: The Transformation of Textbooks] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2008), 20; and Mi and Li, “Qingmo ‘guimao xuezhi’ tidai ‘renyin xuezhi’ de yuanyin tanxi,” 91.

⁵ See e.g. Sally Borthwick, Education and Social Change in China: The Beginnings of the Modern Era (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 70–1; Marianne Bastid, Educational Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Centre for Chinese Studies, 1988), 36; Zheng Yuan, “The Status of Confucianism in Modern Chinese Education, 1901–49: A Curricular Study,” in Education, Culture, and Identity in Twentieth-Century China, ed. Glen Peterson, Ruth Hayhoe, and Yonglin Yu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), 193–216.

⁶ The phrase “decree cohort” as it is used in this article refers to a group of officials and literati who contributed to the writing of the 1902 and 1904 decree documents.

⁷ This article is based on a section of the first chapter of my PhD thesis, which focuses on the history of democratic education in China (1901–1937).

⁸ Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1993), 14.

⁹ Peter Zarrow, After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885–1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 72.

¹⁰ Borthwick, Education and Social Change, 4.

¹¹ Ibid., 10; Sun Huimin, “‘Xinshi xuexiao’ guannian de xingcheng ji yingxiang [The Formation of the Concept of ‘New-style School’ and Its Influence],” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang zhong de zhuanxing shidai: Zhang Hao yuanshi qizhi zhushou lunwenji [The Transitional Period of the Intellectual History of Modern China: A Collection of Essays in Celebration of Chang Hao’s Seventieth Birthday], ed. Wang Fansen (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2007), 82.

¹² Sun, “‘Xinshi xuexiao’ guannian de xingcheng ji yingxiang,” 82.

¹³ School is used here as a general translation for places for teaching and learning activities in China before the fundamental reform of the traditional educational system in the 1900s. The adoption of a general translation is intended to avoid confusions, rather than implying any equivalency between the traditional Chinese concept of “school” and that in modern Western culture.

¹⁴ Benjamin A. Elman, “Changes in Confucian Civil Service Examinations from the Ming to the Ch’ing Dynasty,” in Education and Society in Late Imperial China, 1600–1900, ed. Benjamin A. Elman, Alexander Woodside, and Joint Committee on Chinese Studies (US) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 131.

¹⁵ Ibid., 144.

¹⁶ For decades, the military and industrial advancements of the Western powers had been seen as the linchpin of their victories over China.

¹⁷ For discourse on education during the 1860s–1890s, see Zhu Youhuan, comp., Zhongguo jindai xuezhi shiliao er shang [Historical Sources on Educational System in Modern China vol.2a] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1987), 1–13; Zhongguo jindai xuezhi shiliao yi xia (1986), vol. 1b, 476–83.

¹⁸ While the Eight-legged Essay aimed at testing the candidates’ understandings of the Neo-Confucian classics, Policy and Discourse required critical reflections on politics and current affairs.

¹⁹ The conservatives in this article are those who were opposed to radical political reform and preferred to maintain the existing socio-political order. In the late Qing era, there was no categorical line between the reformed-minded and the conservative, and most reform-minded and conservative officials and literati had been involved and participated in reforms to varying degrees. See Luo Zhitian, “Xin de chongbai: xichao chongji xia jindai Zhongguo sixiang quanshi de zhuanyi [Worshipping Newness: Shifts of Intellectual Power in Modern China under the Impact of Western Tide],” in Quanshi zhuanyi: jindai Zhongguo de sixiang, shehui yu xueshu [Shifts of Power: Modern Chinese Thought and Society] (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1999), 18–81. In other words, the conservatives were not against moderate reforms that were limited to the sphere of technology and infrastructure. See Zarrow, After Empire, 132.

²⁰ There were many Confucian strands in Chinese history. A detailed introduction to these strands exceeds the scope of this article. New Text Confucianism in this article refers to Kang’s re-interpretation of Confucian classics for his reforming propositions.

²¹ Zarrow, After Empire, 26, 54.

²² Peter Zarrow, “The Reform Movement, the Monarchy, and Political Modernity,” in Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China, ed. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2002), 19, 25.

²³ The causes and developments of the Boxer Rebellion were very complex, a detailed recounting of which also exceeds the scope of the article. Briefly speaking, the Boxer Rebellion, resulting from the conflicts of interest between common Chinese and the Western powers, was the expression of various kinds of problems in China. The anti-imperialist, anti-foreign, and anti-Christian Rebellion intensified the conflict between the Western powers and China.

²⁴ Qu Xingui and Tang Yanliang, comps., Zhongguo jindai jiaoyshi ziliao huibian: xuezhi yanbian [Collected Corpus of Documents in the History of Modern Education in China: Evolution of the Educational System] (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), 2–3. All citations from primary sources are my own translations unless otherwise stated.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Zhu, Zhongguo jindai xuezhi shiliao, vol. 1b, 776.

²⁷ Cited from Tang Zhijun, Wuxu bianfa shi [The History of the Reform Movement of 1898] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2003), 477–9.

²⁸ Timothy B. Weston, The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898–1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 44–5.

²⁹ Qu and Tang, Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibian, 265.

³⁰ See ibid., 263–4, 270–1.

³¹ As a direct product of the military defeats in the two Opium Wars, the movement was promoted by the Qing government and was headed by reform-minded officials. It aimed at strengthening and enriching the empire by promoting military, industrial, and educational developments. The military defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 brought an end to the movement.

³² Su Yunfeng, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei jiaoyu gaige [Zhang Zhidong and Educational Reforms in Hubei] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1983), 6–8.

³³ It is well accepted that the motivations in learning from Japan were threefold: (1) Japan is close to China so it would be more expedient for Chinese to study Japan rather than Western countries; (2) Japanese is more similar to Chinese so that it would be more cost-effective for Chinese to use Japanese-translated books; (3) Japan’s existing polity, the constitutional monarchy, was more attractive to the ruling circle.

³⁴ Pre-university education.

³⁵ See Qu and Tang, Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibian, 292, 307, 317–18.

³⁶ See e.g. Guan, Wan Qing xuebu yanjiu, 55; and Zheng, “The Status of Confucianism,” 193–216.

³⁷ Weston, The Power of Position, 44–5.

³⁸ Pi Xirui (1850–1908) was a New-Text Confucian scholar; when he was the head of Jingxun Academy, he reformed the traditional content of learning and lectured on “practical knowledge”.

³⁹ Wang Caiyou, “Jinwen jingxue, shuyuan shiren qunti yu difang zhengzhi: yi Jiangxi jingxun shuyuan (1892–1898) wei zhongxin [New Text Confucianism, Academy Gentry Group and Local Politics: Taking Confucian Classics Training Academy in Jiangxi for Example, 1892–1898],” Difang wenhua yanjiu [Local Culture Studies], no. 2 (2014): 63–9.

⁴⁰ Munakata Kotarou (1864–1923) was a Japanese activist. He was closely related to the Reformers around 1898 and was in favour of Kang Youwei’s reform movement.

⁴¹ Zongfang Xiaotailang [Munakata Kotarou], Zongfang Xiaotailang riji weikangao zhong juan [Munakata Kotarou’s Unpublished Diary Vol. 2], trans. Gan Huijie (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2016), 448–50.

⁴² Shanghai tushuguan [Shanghai Library], comp., Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha [Correspondences between Wang Kangnian and His Friends Vol. 3] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1986), 3111.

⁴³ Having been cracked down on by Cixi in 1898, the Reformers, headed by Kang Youwei, fled into exile and established the Society of Protecting the Emperor.

⁴⁴ Fang Zhiqin, Kang Liang yu baohuanghui [Kang, Liang, and the Society of Protecting the Emperor] (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1997), 104–7.

⁴⁵ Guan, Wan Qing xuebu yanjiu, 46–50.

⁴⁶ Weston, The Power of Position, 62–3; and Guan, Wan Qing xuebu yanjiu, 55.

⁴⁷ Weston, The Power of Position, 62–3.

⁴⁸ The other two people are Liang Qichao (1873–1929), who was the most famous disciple of Kang, and Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who was a leading revolutionary.

⁴⁹ Su, Zhang Zhidong yu Hubei jiaoyu gaige.

⁵⁰ Luo Zhitian, “Dushu yu chuantong: Qingji minchu shiren yixiang chixu guanhuai de yanbian [Learning and Tradition: The Evolution of A Lasting Concern of Literati in the Late Qing and the Early Republic],” in Liebian zhong de chuancheng: 20 shiji qianqi de Zhongguo wenhua yu xueshu [Inheritance with Rupture: Culture and Scholarship in the Early Twentieth-Century China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), 131–7.

⁵¹ Tze-ki Hon, “Zhang Zhidong’s Proposal for Reform: A New Reading of the Quanxue pian,” in Karl and Zarrow, Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period, 116.

⁵² Guan, Wan Qing xuebu yanjiu, 52.

⁵³ Lin Zhihong, “Fulu: Qingyimin jiben ziliao biao [Appendix: A Table on Basic Profiles of the Qing Loyalists],” in Minguo nai diguo ye: zhengzhi wenhua zhuanxing xia de Qingyimin [The Republic is the Enemy State: The Qing Loyalists in the Political and Cultural Transformation] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2013), 423.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 399.

⁵⁵ Sun, “‘Xinshi xuexiao’ guannian de xingcheng ji yingxiang,” 82.

⁵⁶ The general primary and secondary education in the school system envisaged by the 1902 Decrees subsumed gradations of kindergarten (grades 1–4), common primary school (grades 5–7), higher primary school (grades 8–10), and middle school (grades 11–14). The general primary and secondary education of the school system established by the 1904 Decrees included lower primary school (grades 1–5), higher primary school (grades 6–9), and middle school (grades 9–14) and excluded the gradation of kindergarten which was taken as nursery/pre-school education in 1904.

⁵⁷ In the 1904 curriculum, the subject dealing with Confucian classics was renamed as Reading and Lecturing Classics (dujing jiangjing). To avoid confusion, this article uses Reading Classics for both the 1902 and 1904 curricula. In addition, there was another subject, namely Self-cultivation (xiushen) utilising some classics as textbooks in the 1902 and 1904 Decrees. But this article only analyses the curricular arrangements regarding Reading Classics because the separate subject of Self-cultivation was not essentially a component of the Chinese traditional curriculum.

⁵⁸ All the time proportion are based on my own calculation of the allocated hours out of the total lecturing hours. For the original statistics, see Qu and Tang, Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibian, 265, 272–5, 297–9, 311–13, 323–5.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 271.

⁶⁰ Timothy B. Weston, “The Founding of the Imperial University and the Emergence of Chinese Modernity,” in Karl and Zarrow, Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period, 116.

⁶¹ Qu and Tang, Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibian, 294–5, 309.

⁶² See ibid., 237–8.

⁶³ Ibid., 343.

⁶⁴ See ibid., 329, 340.

⁶⁵ Wang Guowei had been in favour of the Reform Movement of 1898 and was an influential intellectual in modern China.

⁶⁶ Wang Guowei, Wang Guowei xueshu wenhua suibi [Wang Guowei’s Academic and Cultural Essays] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1996), 26.

⁶⁷ Li Guilin, Qi Mingxiu, and Qian Manqian, comps., Zhongguo jindai jiaoyushi ziliao huibian: putong jiaoyu [Collected Corpus of Documents in the History of Modern Education in China: General Education] (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007), 237–9.

⁶⁸ The institute was abolished in 1904.

⁶⁹ Wu Hongcheng, Zhongguo jiaoyushi yanjiu: Zhongguo xuexiao jiaocaishi zhong [A Study on the History of Education in China: The History of Textbooks Vol. 2] (Chongqing: Xinan shifan daxue chubanshe, 1998), 238.

⁷⁰ Wang Jianjun, Zhongguo jindai jiaokeshu fazhan yanjiu [A Study on the Development of Textbooks in Modern China] (Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 148.

⁷¹ Wu Yannan, Feng Zuyi, and Su Zhongli, Qingmo shehui sichao [Social Thoughts in the Late Qing] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1990), 249–59.

⁷² See ibid., 263–79; Sha Peide [Peter Zarrow], “‘Li yu jun, li yu min’: wan Qing guanyuan dui lixian zhi yilun [‘Of Benefit to the Ruler, of Benefit to the People’: Official Discussions of Constitutionalism in the Late Qing],” Jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica] 42, no. 4 (2003): 49–51.

⁷³ Chen Yunxiu, Qingmo de Jiangsu jiaoyu zonghui [The General Educational Association of Jiangsu in the Late Qing] (Xinbei: Huamulan wenhua chubanshe, 2011), 4.

⁷⁴ Bastid, Educational Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China, 59.

⁷⁵ Weston, “The Founding of the Imperial University” 121.