Knowledge for Real: On implicit and explicit representations and education

Abstract

Explicit knowledge is highly valued in the traditional educational system at the expense of implicit equivalents. Why is this? Are we right to so value it? To provide an answer I attempt to characterise the relation between representations and referents of implicit and explicit knowledge. Whereas explicit representations are detached from referents and so “inauthentic”, implicit representations are analogous to referents and more “authentic”. The notion of authenticity frames to what extent critical properties such as transferability to different contexts and conveyance between agents, which seem vital to class teaching, are met by implicit and explicit knowledge.

Keywords:

• Implicit knowledge
• Explicit knowledge
• Evolution
• Authenticity

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by grant number 04‐0073/20 from the Carlsberg Foundation.

Notes

1. Though learning, memory, and knowledge are qualitatively different phenomena, the difference has no significant bearing on the issues raised in this article. In the text my emphasis will be on implicit aspects in general and I will use the terms interchangeably unless otherwise stated.

2. As this article proceeds towards demarcation issues, I refrain here from definite introductory definitions. However, since “tacit knowledge” seems to be a generic term for basically differing phenomena, it seems relevant to emphasise that my understanding of implicitness leans towards neuropsychological interpretations in particular and is less concerned with the extent to which it aligns with other understandings.

3. To some extent, an appreciation of how implicit learning contributes to the acquisition of unique knowledge can be found. For instance, acknowledgment of implicit processes as sources of importance to learning is occasionally canonised at the level of educational training programmes directed at pilots (with extensive use of flight simulators), nurses (apprenticeship learning), and surgeons (skill learning). In fact, apprenticeship learning is still influential in most practice‐oriented disciplines.

4. A word on terminology is necessary. In this article “knowledge” will be used to refer to the general retention of information, either behaviourally or neurologically. “Representation” refers to the more specific expression of knowledge, whether as a matter of exact anatomical components and processes or interpretations.

5. What is meant by “reality” will, I hope, be revealed as I proceed.

6. In a sense any representation is abstract. To take this claim to an extreme, even a copy, A*, of some entity A is abstract to some degree, because A* and A are not numerically identical. Thus, I do not mean to assert that implicit representations are concrete and not abstract, whereas explicit representations are abstract. I merely want to emphasise the qualitative differences in the mode of abstraction in implicit versus explicit representations.

7. Though the issues I here raise are peripherally connected to the philosophical problem of how names “pick out” references, my aim is quite different, and I will have nothing explicit to say on the matter.

8. In this article, claims about evolution and evolutionary products might seem crude and supportive of genetic determinism, as opposed to, for instance, the developmental system approach (Oyama, Griffiths & Gray, 2001). This is not my intention, but further elaboration here would take us too far.

9. However, implicit knowledge which cannot be reasonably described in terms of such simple stimulus/response analogies no doubt exists. I admit that this is a challenge to be met.

10. In light of inherent visual properties, some might dispute this and pose that colour perception is primary to the alternative perspectives. In fact further subdivision seems highly appropriate but unfortunately is beyond the scope of this article.

11. Apparently, instantiations differ qualitatively, and further division might prove productive but is in need of deeper analysis. Here I settle for preliminary remarks to maintain the focus of the article.

12. The characterisation of knowledge types as presented in figure 2 is preliminary. Therefore, pointing exclusively to explicit intention/ethereal extension and implicit intention/sensible extension is not meant as an exhaustive treatment of what could be known about democracy.

13. How the invoked freedom comes about, though crucial to understanding the nature of explicit knowledge, is beyond the scope of this article. Here I deal exclusively with qualitative differences between implicit and explicit representations, as it seems to me to embody essential qualities of implicit and explicit knowledge.

14. Lack of real‐life experiences would probably lead to defective understanding and misuse of language, but that is another story.

15. Of course there is a lot more to implicit learning than this, since implicit knowledge comes in many intricate forms.