Democratic Stress and Political Institutions: Drives of Reforms of Bicameralism in Times of Crisis

ABSTRACT

Traditional patterns of political participation and party representation in Europe have been put to the test by the so-called crisis of representative democracy: mainstream parties have been perceived as more unfit to govern; the level of electoral participation has decreased; and voters have shown increasing dissatisfaction with representative institutions. In several cases, these changes have pushed governing elites to (seek to) redefine the ‘rules’ of the political process, in response to the challenges posed by new party contesters. In particular, in different European countries political actors have stressed the need to undermine the role of second chambers as veto players. This article focuses on both successful and failed attempts of reforms of bicameralism between 2006 and 2016 in seven EU countries (Belgium; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Romania; Spain; UK). It tries (1) to understand if political elites in Europe have pursued parliamentary reforms as a reaction to ‘democratic stress’ and (2) to single out the circumstances of success and failures. A discussion of the detectable trends of institutional reforms during democratic crises and some tentative explanations are finally provided.

KEYWORDS:

• Second parliamentary chambers
• party democracy
• constitutional reform

Acknowledgments

A preliminary version of this article was presented at the 31st Annual National Conference of the Italian Political Science Association, held at the University of Urbino, 14–16 September 2017. I thank the participants for their comments. Moreover, I am grateful to the Editors of the special issue and the anonymous reviewers of Representation for their valuable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 See data in IDEA’s Voter Turnout Database (www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout).

2 Following comparative literature, henceforth upper chamber is used as synonym of both second chamber and upper house.

3 Bedock (2017, p. 112) highlights the reinforcing effect that the 2008 economic crisis could have had on the impact of the more general ‘crisis of representative democracy’. In other words, reforms’ political determinants could be shaped by economic crises. This article posits economic conditions as fixed environmental background, which is not a direct determinant of reforms.

4 The nature of the institution to reform may count too (Bedock, 2017, p. 47). In our case, however, we can assume this aspect as given (or at least to vary only a little), since we focus on reforms of the same institution across systems.

5 As Bedock (2017, p. 257) points out, ‘low political support triggers democratic reforms, in a context where [… discontented voters] flourish’. The empirical evidence gathered in her book shows that the causal link between these factors is indeed ‘strong, statistically significant [… , and] negative’.

6 The analysis of the Irish case is based on MacCarthaigh and Martin (2013).

7 The Spanish Council of State is a consultative body of the Spanish government.

8 Given the narrow focus of this article, I have not stressed the institutional mechanisms that in each country allow altering institutional powers. But future investigations could add this. With regard to our cases, there is however little variation. Only the UK allowed changes with the approval of an ordinary parliamentary majority, while the other systems are characterised by constitutional rigidity. Ireland and Italy ask for a binding popular referendum, if the modification is voted by an ordinary majority. Belgium and Spain required a 2/3 (or equivalent) majority, while Germany and Romania reach the highest level of rigidity, requiring a qualified majority of more than 2/3 (Lijphart, 2012, p. 208; Roberts, 2006).

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Notes on contributors

Michelangelo Vercesi

Michelangelo Vercesi is Research Associate in Comparative Politics at Leuphana University in Lüneburg and holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Pavia. He worked and spent visiting periods in Italy, Germany, Austria, and the UK. He is elected member of the executive board of the international Research Committee on Political Sociology (CPS). His research focuses on political elites and leadership, political institutions, political parties. On these topics, he has published several chapters and articles in peer-reviewed journals, such as Parliamentary Affairs, Government and Opposition, Regional & Federal Studies, European Politics and Society. E-mail: [email protected]