The Media Freedom Movement in Malaysia and the Electoral Authoritarian Regime

Abstract

This article will provide an outline of the Malaysian media freedom movement from reformasi in 1998 until today. Research for this article includes testimony from those journalists and activists who attempted to implement reform in the media industry, including detailing reported instances of direct editorial intervention. This article explains that the advent of new media technologies has pushed journalism in new directions in Malaysia, but rather than accept these changes as part of a media liberalisation process, the government has retaliated through constraints and controls over the media and its practitioners. Seen through the prism of media liberalisation, this article adds to the body of scholarly work which examines Malaysia’s electoral authoritarian regime.

Key Words:

• Malaysia
• media
• journalism
• press freedom
• reformasi
• politics

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank all those who were interviewed for this research, Dr John Funston, and the three anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. Interviews in Malaysia were conducted in November and December 2011. The interviews were semi-structured, in which interviewees were asked to recall their time as journalists or in pursuing greater press freedom through their organisation. The “snowballing” technique followed. At the conclusion of the interview, interviewees were asked to recommend others who were involved in attempting to liberalise the media from within, and many interviewees were identified and found upon the recommendation of other interviewees. Interviewees were selected if they were considered to be involved in pursuing greater press freedom in Malaysia. Some interviewees were selected largely through their publications on the topic. Some potential interviewees discussed in this article, such as Premesh Chandran, Tan Hoon Chen and Hata Wahari, were approached but were unable to be interviewed. Other interviewees were unable to be personally interviewed but responded to questions via other means. This included Wong Chin Huat (email), Jason Tan (email) and Jacqueline Surin (telephone).

2. The ISA allows for detention without trial at the Home Affairs Minister’s discretion. According to CIJ (2011) this law “still looms large in the Malaysian psyche” as calls for arrest under ISA are still commonly employed. The Sedition Act states that offenders can be charged for seditious “tendencies” or “affecting disaffection” or raising “discontent” and ill-will amongst Malaysians of different races. The Official Secrets Act allows the government to classify documents as “secret” thereby making it a crime to communicate any information contained in them. It is particularly effective in negating the courage of potential whistle blowers.

3. Mahathir wanted to give Malaysia an advantage over its neighbour, Singapore, which had strict controls over Internet Service Providers, and to encourage foreign investment in Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor Project.

4. For example, the deregulation of the media industry by the Mahathir administration in the 1980s had some activists hoping it would foster a growth of independent media. But publishing licences found their way into the hands of the ruling elite and their economic allies (Ng and Lim 2008, 85). Furthermore, the internal struggles within the BN have also meant certain newspapers at certain times would write more critically of the government, depending on whether the Chief Editor was aligned to the Deputy Prime Minister. For example, see Rehman Rashid (1993).

5. A cursory examination of Men’s Review editions in 1996–97 showed it included stories about Megawati Sukarnoputri and George Soros, amongst others, but other stories included “Brigitte Bardot, threesomes, playboys & lyle;” “hipster slang decoded;” “50 years of Vespa fashion” and “Simply Red: soul survivor.”

6. For example, see November 1996 edition with the cover story and photo of Megawati: “Megawati: Indonesia on the cusp of change” with Kuttan’s report from Jakarta.

7. Many ended up in Chinese broadcast media (TV2, NTV7, 8TV, Astro, the now-defunct online ETV), which have been more vibrant and vocal than their counterparts in other languages.

8. SUQUI is the Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee established in 1999. It was essentially a lobby group advocating for national unity, advance democracy and to defend Chinese education and places of worship. In 1999 the government accepted in principle their push for reforms, including demand number 13: “Develop a fair media,” but after the 1999 election tended to dismiss SUQUI as “troublemakers.”

9. By 2005 Aliran was selling only “a few thousand copies per month” of Aliran Monthly (Brown 2005, 42). In March 2011 Aliran stopped producing the magazine for news-stands. It now produces only subscription-based copies.

10. The two-thirds majority is “crucial” in a practical sense because to change the constitution in parliament, a two-thirds majority is required, but also psychologically the ability to gain the two-thirds majority has always been a key factor in how many Malaysians view the success or failure of BN in the election.

11. Statistics from politweet.org showed that between June 9 and August 14, the #bersih hashtag was used by 33,940 users in 263,228 “tweets.”

12. Malaysia’s internet penetration was almost 63% in 2011, and growing (see Weiss 2013).

13. See also http://www.facebook.com/pages/UMNO-cybertroopers-club/197067584569

14. The ABC’s figures for the full year 30 June 2010–30 June 2011 showed drops in circulation for Utusan Melayu (–5.9%), The Star (–3.1%), The New Straits Times (–9.5%) and Berita Harian (–12.3%). Harian Metro’s circulation figures in West Malaysia were 386,742 from July-December 2011, up from 249,575 in July-December 2005. See http://www.abcm.org.my (accessed July 12, 2012).