“Discovering” normative power as a state strategy in the framework of security, foreign, and defense policy: the case of Japan

Abstract

Various factors influence the (trans)formation of security, foreign, and defense policies of countries. One of them is normative power, a concept that has gained significance in academic debates in the last decade. However, normative power as an emerging though theoretically disputed concept remains a relatively under-researched area in academia. With the exception of research by mostly European scholars, this particularly holds true for case studies of Asian countries. This article contributes to the body of knowledge on normative power by analyzing the case study of Japan, from the standpoint of a country that has increased and then applied its normative power as an important means through which traditional (interest-based) foreign, security and defense goals can be pursued. In the analysis of Japan's aspirations to become recognized as a global normative power advocate, we analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War on the country's perception of its strategic environment, and subsequent efforts to redefine its role in promoting a new norms-based framework. We also identify three areas in which Japan has been able to strengthen its hard security while simultaneously reinforcing its normative power: its security alliance with the United States, its multi- and bilateral (military) cooperation with other states, and its ability to bolster both its hard and its normative power in an emerging multipolar international system.

Keywords::

• Japan
• Asia
• normative power
• state strategy
• security policy
• foreign policy

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, which proved invaluable in preparing the article for publication. The authors take full responsibility for any errors in the manuscript.

Notes

^1. In September/November 2010 and April 2012, about 2400 hits obtained with the search of key words “security policy” and “defense policy” (as one part of security policy) were skim-read. The articles dated from 2000 to 2012. Afterwards, only the relevant articles were analyzed, providing five plus one groups of factors as listed above. A small pilot study was also carried out; first, the time range was increased from 1991 to 2012; and second, a specific database (EBSCO Military & Government Collection), which provides full texts for nearly 300 journals and periodicals, was searched using the same criteria. No additional content that has not already been obtained previously through the main method was found.

^2. Capabilities needed by the country for projecting and making use of its normative power are further explored in Zupančič and Hribernik (2013).

^3. Although it continues to be disputed by some experts, such as Oros (2008), Katzenstein (2008), and Hagström (2009).

^4. This view is espoused by authors such as Samuels (2007) and Hughes (2009).

^5. For an in-depth analysis of the sources of Japan's normative power in the post-Cold War era, please refer to Zupančič and Hribernik (2013).

^6. In the broadest sense, advocates of human security believe that the field of security no longer encompasses only inter-state conflict, but includes any threat to an individual's economic security, personal safety, and health, to name just a few characteristics. There is no single accepted definition of the concept. Human security was first outlined by the UN Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP 1994).

^7. After renewed tensions over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute with China in 2012, and the return of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to power in December 2012, Japan began to adopt a more robust defensive posture. This includes the December 2013 adoption of a new 10-year security strategy, which will bolster defense spending on assets that could be employed in the event of a potential conflict with China. Contrary to much of the post-Cold War era, the Japanese government made no attempt to justify this increase in spending through the prism of norms. While the authors are aware of this, they believe such changes are too few in number and too recent to present anything but an aberration at the time of writing.

^8. This listing follows the studies of many scholars, namely Ito (1991), Catalinac (2007), Green (1995, 2001), Drifte (1996), and Iokibe (2011).

^9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Bluebook of 2011 clearly identified “the development of proactive diplomacy” (our emphasis) as one of its key objectives. It added the following observation of utmost relevance: “Diplomacy must play a great role in further securing and advancing the national interests through international cooperation precisely because this is a period of a great change. As the world is in a period of transition, it is needed for Japan to set clear goals, stand at the forefront of international society, conduct an active diplomacy, and pursue its own national interests” (MOFA 2011).

^10. The term “partnership of equals” has been used frequently to refer to Japan's aspirations for a more equitable role in determining the future of the Japan–US alliance. It rarely applies to US demands for Japan to boost its burden-sharing in security and defense responsibilities to match that status (Smith 2011).

^11. According to Green (2001, 202–205), this claim was frequently used in Japan's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

^12. Katzenstein (1996a, 1996b), Berger (1998), and Pyle (2007), for instance, focused on the impact of identity and norms in Japan's foreign and security policy. For more, see also Oros (2008).

^13. Drifte (1996, 49–72) also identifies these changes in the strategic environment.

^14. For a study of Japanese soft power, see Vyas (2011).

^15. Officially designated as the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, Act. 79 of 19 June 1992.

^16. To see how human security was introduced to Japanese international public policy, see Edström (2008).

^17. The 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines identify these two elements as the foundation of Japan's defense policy.

^18. Now Ministry of Defense.

^19. One example of such a destabilizing issue would be the ongoing island dispute(s) in the South China Sea, an area that is vitally important for the unhindered transportation of resources into Japan. The 200 small rocks, islands, and reefs that form the disputed Paracel and Spratly Island chains in the South China Sea are in total or part claimed by six states (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei). For more, see Lam (1996) and Rowan (2005).

^20. For some examples on how China and North Korea factor into the US–Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era, see Kliman (2006); Green (2001); Christensen (1999); Rozman (2007); and Kokubun (2006).

^21. Significant limitations on the SDF's ability to use force persist, as does the Japanese government's insistence that Japan lacks the right to collective self-defense. Even so, Article 9's interpretation is far less strict than its content – which essentially limits Japan's ability to use force only for self-defense in the strict sense of the word – would imply.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rok Zupančič

Rok Zupančič, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.

Miha Hribernik

Miha Hribernik, MSc, is an Associate of the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels.