Balancing Rigidity and Flexibility: Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems

Abstract

Federal systems need stable constitutions protecting the division of power, but they also need constitutional flexibility to adjust to changing social and political conditions. This article explains how this dilemma is dealt with in different federations. Whereas the number of veto players is often assumed to cause the mentioned dilemma, this study shows that complex structures and processes of constitutional policy are conducive to balancing continuity and change in federal constitutions. Successful amendments can be expected if constitutional policy is dissociated from normal policy-making, if amendment proposals are negotiated in various connected arenas and in sequences, and if negotiations and ratification are loosely coupled. In contrast, a concentration of powers in intergovernmental bargaining or negotiations of party elites followed by parliamentary ratification is conducive to incremental change and can cause destabilising dynamics. Focused case studies illustrate the variety of patterns of constitutional change and their different consequences.

Acknowledgements

This article builds on a comparative research project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG 1667/9-1). I owe gratitude to Nathalie Behnke, Andrea Fischer-Hotzel, Dominic Heinz, Eike-Christian Hornig, Jörg Kemmerzell and Bettina Petersohn who contributed to the research project. I also thank Jörg Broschek for inspiring discussion on theories of federalism and federal dynamics.